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Chapter 1
Introduction
Fiscal federalism. Among public economists there is virtual unanimity that fiscal fed-
eralism is the “optimal form of government” (Oates 1972, page 15). According to the
theory of fiscal federalism a federal government structure tackles the trade-offs between
the two poles of extreme centralized and decentralized government. It assigns the three
central economic functions of the public sector – resolving the distribution, stabilization
and allocation problem – to the level of government which performs best: The higher levels
of government are responsible for maintaining economic stabilization and attaining equi-
table distribution. The lower levels of government are responsible for establishing efficient
allocation by the decentralized provision of public goods, among others (“decentralization
theorem”) (Oates 1968, 1972; Musgrave 1959). However, employing a federal system of
government does not only demand the divisions of functions to the appropriate level of
government, but also the fiscal instruments to fulfill them. The most important revenue
instruments being taxes, debt and – what is unique to a federal system – intergovernmen-
tal transfers. It lies at the core of the theory of fiscal federalism to provide a normative
framework to evaluate the appropriate division of functions and fiscal instruments between
the different levels (e.g., McLure 1983). In practice, employing a federal government struc-
ture triggers an ongoing assignment problem. Nevertheless, this finds its justification in
its claim for superiority. All these issues render research on fiscal federalism vital.
It does not come as a surprise that the German system of federalism is far from being
optimal from a theoretical point of view. A good example for this is that the local level
has the autonomy over the volatile and mobile business tax. The mature German system
of federalism is not designed from scratch on the drawing board by economists. It is the
1
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reflection of ongoing social, political and economic change with the European integration
towards a supranational level of government merely representing the tip of the iceberg.
The actual division of functions and fiscal instruments between the different levels of gov-
ernment and the layers of government itself are subject to an ongoing political debate and
reformation. But this is inherent to a system of fiscal federalism. For empirical economists
this inherence is attractive: With its 16 federal states and more than 10,000 municipalities
the German fiscal federalism is an ongoing laboratory with great institutional variety and
frequent reforms.
The aim of this dissertation is not to employ the theory of fiscal federalism on general
grounds to the German system of federalism and to provide a comprehensive review on
potential ideas of improvements in the form of policy recommendations. This dissertation
acknowledges that a radical reform is rather unlikely. This is why it employs established
economic principles and tools to the lowest federal level of government in Germany – the
municipalities – to pointedly answer economic questions and – if possible – to derive and
provide adequate policy implications and recommendations. It draws on the full spectrum
of economic theory and does not concentrate on the theory of fiscal federalism. The
major keywords being: Race to the bottom (Chapter 2), inverse-elasticity rule (Chapter
3), common pool problem (Chapter 4) and tax smoothing (Chapter 5). In short, the main
objective of this dissertation is to put conventional economic concepts into the context of
a federal environment.
Data. After having established the main motivation to focus this dissertation on the
German federal landscape, let me address another reason: data. Germany has a detailed
statistical reporting system on all levels of government. Comprehensive reporting rules
lie the basis for a common statistical framework in all German federal states. There is a
broad spectrum of demographic, social and economic indicators which is gathered annually
for all German municipalities and counties. This enables empirical research on the lower
federal levels. The data is accessible for the public. However, it is not provided ready for
use in a single dataset. It has to be collected from a variety of sources. In particular, if
one wants to use time series data with a long panel dimension. This leads over to the next
reason: existing body of applied literature.
Applied literature. When we started this research, the existing body of applied
academic literature employing research in this arena, i.e., analyzing data of German munic-
ipalities empirically, was rather scarce. Major exemptions were, e.g., Becker et al. (2012),
Büttner (2003, 2005, 2006) and Egger et al. (2010). Potential explanations for this are
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twofold: The practical challenges on data availability might pose one. On the other hand,
the number of academic researchers having a solid background on the complex German
institutional system and its ongoing reforms is rather limited. In the course of writing this
dissertation a rising academic interest in this topic has evolved. More and more litera-
ture is emerging (e.g., Baskaran 2013, 2014, 2015; Blesse and Baskaran 2014; Borck et al.
2015; Fuest et al. 2016). Against this backdrop, this dissertation provides four further
contributions belonging to the field of applied literature on German municipalities.
1.1 Key issues
This section comments on key issues: It shortly introduces the research questions, remarks
on the common empirical background of the following four chapters and discusses the
related literature. Last, the policy implications are summarized.
1.1.1 Research questions
The common background of the four main chapters of this dissertation is that they put
established economic principles and tools in the federal environment. All of them study
research questions of practical economic and political relevance at the local level empiri-
cally using German administrative data. All chapters have their starting point in economic
theory. Chapter 2 studies the incentive effects of municipal fiscal equalization systems.
The hypothesis of standard tax multipliers as a driver of local tax policy has long been
discussed in the applied literature on the evaluation of and reform options for fiscal equal-
ization systems. However, an explicit test of this hypothesis was missing from the academic
literature. We close this gap by approaching the following research questions:
• Do standard business tax multipliers have an effect on actual business tax multipli-
ers?
• Have practitioners at the state level devised a clever mechanism to circumvent com-
mon pitfalls of local tax policy?
Chapter 3 studies the real-world tax policy at the local level. From a theoretical per-
spective the seminal contribution of Ramsey (1927) shows that optimal tax rates on goods
depend inversely on their elasticity of demand. However, it is an open question whether
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real-world policy makers apply optimal taxation rules. This paper employs the German
case – municipalities have the autonomy on the business and the property tax – as empir-
ical testbed. This leads to the following research questions:
• Do real-world policy makers apply the rules of Ramsey by imposing different tax
rates on goods with different tax elasticities?
• In other words: does tax policy set higher tax rates on goods that are less responsive
to taxation relative to more responsive goods?
Chapter 4 applies the common pool problem to the political environment. It studies
whether municipalities affected by a municipal territorial reform exploit their common
pool and behave opportunistically by strategically taking on debt to finance (inefficient)
public projects. Empirical research on the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968) is, in
particular, compelling since the veracity of this claim is successfully challenged by recent
developments in the literature of the “commons.” My research questions are:
• Do municipalities free-ride and exploit their common pool in the event of a territorial
reform?
• Is the size of the effect greater the smaller the municipality’s own size relative to its
common pool?
• Are there factors mitigating or preventing opportunistic behavior?
Chapter 5 puts Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing in the federal context. It studies whether
ruling out debt finance could prevent subnational governments that enjoy tax autonomy
over certain taxes from engaging in welfare-enhancing tax smoothing. This paper chal-
lenges credit rationing at the local level on these grounds. It analyzes the empirical
relationship between credit access and tax smoothing using the case of municipalities in
Germany with the focus on the following question:
• Are local tax rates less volatile in federal states where municipalities have easy access
to credits?
1.1.2 Empirical background
All research questions are answered empirically. All chapters have in common that they
employ administrative data on German municipalities. Meaning, in all chapters, the unit of
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observation is the municipality. Chapter 3 and 5 use data on municipalities of all German
federal states. Chapter 2 focuses on an institutional reform in North Rhine-Westphalia
and Chapter 4 on a municipal territorial reform in Saxony-Anhalt.
Data sources and structure. We draw on a variety of official statistical sources.
Data is provided by the statistical offices of the individual federal states, the Regional
Database Germany (Regionaldatenbank Deutschland), the Statistical Local (Statistik
Lokal) publications, the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit), the
Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) and the Research Data Centres of the
Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder (Forschungsdatenzentren
der Statistischen Ämter des Bundes und der Länder).
Chapter 2 to 4 employ annual panel data with a long time dimension (in Chapter 5
we employ a simple aggregated cross section). Panel datasets contain a time series for
each cross-sectional unit, i.e., the municipality. Having repeated observations on the same
municipality comes along with various benefits (see, e.g., Wooldridge 2006). Most im-
portantly, it allows to control for unobserved but time-invariant omitted municipal-level
characteristics by employing fixed effects estimation techniques. The datasets provide in-
formation on a broad spectrum of demographic, social and economic indicators for the
individual municipalities and counties over time. The panel datasets are of a multi-level
nature in so far that we combine municipal-level and county-level information (in Chap-
ter 5 we even add state-level information in the form of the credit access index). There
is a base set of data which is drawn on in all chapters. Depending on the research fo-
cus of the individual chapters we acquire further information. This is in particular true
for the two chapters which concentrate on individual federal states (Chapter 2 on North
Rhine-Westphalia and Chapter 4 on Saxony-Anhalt). For Chapter 5 we even conduct an
institutional analysis with respect to local credit access which flows into the credit access
index.
Identification strategy. For the identification of the causal relationship we draw on
difference-in-differences designs by exploiting policy reforms in all but the last chapter. We
employ them in a panel data environment by using fixed effects. In particular, in Chapter 2
we make use of a very convincing quasi-experiment being the result of a ruling of North
Rhine-Westphalia’s state constitutional court on the municipal fiscal equalization scheme.
Quasi-experiments are well-liked in applied economics to analyze non-experimental data
in an experimental spirit (see Angrist and Pischke 2009, page 15 ff. and 227 ff.). If
all identifying assumptions are met (key assumption is the common trend assumption),
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employing a difference-in-differences design solves the common endogeneity concerns and
allows to credibly identify the causal effect of interest. As opposed to the other chapters,
in Chapter 5 we mainly work with descriptive statistics. The econometric approach is
based on ordinary least squares. The reason for this is that our research interest demands
aggregation.
1.1.3 Related literature
What comes along with the various dimensions of the research questions is that this
dissertation does not belong to a closed body of research: First and foremost, this
literature pushes the body of applied research working with German administrative data.
As already stated above there is a rising academic interest on this regard. Examples
include Baskaran (2013, 2014, 2015), Becker et al. (2012), Blesse and Baskaran (2014),
Borck et al. (2015), Büttner (2003, 2005, 2006), Egger et al. (2010), Foremny and Riedel
(2014) and Fuest et al. (2016). Besides that, this dissertation adds to the significant body
of fiscal federalism on general grounds (see, e.g., Oates [1972] for an introduction in the
traditional theory and Oates [2005] for a review on its second generation).
Chapter 2. The findings of Chapter 2 contribute to the strand of research studying
fiscal equalization systems and tax competition. See, e.g., Becker et al. (2012), Bucovetsky
and Smart (2006), Köthenbürger (2002) and Smart (2007). We add to the literature
by empirically analyzing the impact of standard business tax multipliers on municipal
business tax policy. We furthermore adapt an established theoretical model used in Smart
(2007) and Egger et al. (2010) to illustrate the interaction of local taxation and fiscal
equalization. Closest to our work are Büttner (2006) and Egger et al. (2010). They also
employ German data. They investigate the incentive effects of equalization systems on
tax policy and demonstrate the positive impact of capacity equalization on local tax rates.
Baskaran (2014) is closely related to our work in so far that he takes the hypothesis of
standard tax multipliers as a driver of local tax policy as a given in his analysis of local
tax mimicking by municipalities in Germany.
Chapter 3. The work of this chapter speaks about and contributes to three lines
of literature. It studies if implemented tax policy at the local level is consistent with the
seminal inverse-elasticity rule. First, we relate to a small literature that studies whether
actual tax policy follows the requirements of optimal-taxation theory. See, for instance,
Saez (2001) and Mankiw et al. (2009). As opposed to our paper, the few studies on the
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optimality of actually implemented taxes are mostly on the personal income tax. We
provide some first evidence in this regard for other taxes. Second, we contribute to the
literature on the elasticity of the corporate tax base and the elasticity of tax revenues.
While the literature acknowledges that firms respond to tax incentives and adjust to taxes
along various different dimensions, the literature studying the tax-sensitivity of the overall
tax bases and tax revenues empirically is scarce (e.g., Devereux et al. 2014 and Dwenger
and Steiner 2012). A few papers study the sensitivity of the business-tax base in the same
institutional setting that we use. Most importantly, Baskaran (2015), Büttner (2003)
and Fossen and Steiner (2014). Our analysis intends to complement the few empirical
papers, and adds to the important understanding of behavioral responses of firms to profit
taxation. Third, our research adds to a very small literature on the sensitivity of property
to taxes. One recent study is by Baskaran (2015), older research is by Stine (1988).
Chapter 4. The research of Chapter 4 contributes to the significant body of litera-
ture on the “commons” on a general level (see, e.g., Ostrom et al. [2002] for a review). In
this context, particular mention should be made on this chapter’s relation to the sizable
empirical literature focusing on the validity of the “law 1/n” with regard to the impact
of legislature size on spending (Chapter 4 employs this formalization of the common pool
theory derived by Weingast et al. [1981] as a theoretical starting point). Examples in-
clude Bradbury and Crain (2001), Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001) and Pettersson-Lidbom
(2012). Studying free-riding on public debt for the case of a municipal territorial reform
in the German federal state of Saxony-Anhalt this work is directly related to the just
emerging empirical literature on opportunistic behavior in municipal territorial reforms.
Notable other studies with a focus on free-riding on public debt with evidence from Scan-
dinavian countries are by Hinnerich (2009), Jordahl and Liang (2010) and Saarimaa and
Tukiainen (2015). Contributions with a somewhat different angle are by Blom-Hansen
(2010), Hansen (2014) and Nakazawa (2013). As opposed to the other papers, this re-
search does not only focus on capturing the implications of the “law 1/n,” but broadens
the horizon on the underlying incentive effects.
Chapter 5. This chapter advances the research on tax smoothing and the literature
on budget constraints (see, e.g., Barro 1979 and Oates 2005). It is motivated by the
sizable empirical and theoretical literature on tax smoothing following the pioneering work
of Barro (1979) and Bohn (1990). This chapter investigates the empirical relationship
between credit access and tax smoothing using the case of municipalities in Germany.
Our approach allows us to use tax rate data and investigate tax rate volatility directly.
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This is in contrast to the indirect tax smoothing tests prevalent in existing literature.
See, for example, Adler (2006), Barro (1979, 1995), Bohn (1990), Olekalns (1997) and
Strazicich (1997). We establish a link between tax smoothing and actual credit access that
is to the best of our knowledge almost entirely missing from the literature to date. Most
existing studies focus on tax smoothing at the national level, where free credit access can
be assumed. Notable exceptions are Strazicich (1997) and Reitschuler (2010). This work
also contributes to the branch of the fiscal federalism literature that objects to granting
credit access to lower federal levels by supporting the notion that strict credit rationing
of the local level may be the best institutional choice for higher-level governments even if
there is substantial tax autonomy at the local level (e.g., Oates 2005).
1.1.4 Policy implications at a glance
To answer the research questions outlined above empirically lies at the heart of this dis-
sertation. The empirical results also have valuable policy implications. To do them justice
I provide the key policy implications at a glance:
• Implications for the practical design of fiscal equalization schemes. Our results high-
light the importance of the parameters of equalization systems for shaping local tax
policy. Through its choice of the standard tax multiplier, German federal states can
influence the level of municipal tax rates and the weight of competitive downward
forces. Standard tax multipliers should be regarded as a tool for governments to
shape lower-level tax policy, with important consequences for their own competi-
tiveness.
• Implications for tax policy at the local level. Our results suggest that efficiency gains
could be realized through reducing (or even reversing) the difference in levels between
business and property taxation at the German municipal level.
• Implications for municipal territorial reforms. The findings imply that governments
should consider that municipal territorial reforms trigger opportunistic behavior in
the form of free-riding on public debt for investment purposes. They should take into
account that the incentives structure differs depending on relative common pool size
and further characteristics (voluntary vs. mandatory mergers and accountability).
Governments should take precautions to prevent or at least mitigate opportunistic
behavior such as, e.g., employing spending restrictions, giving municipalities more
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leeway to merge or incorporate according to their preference or reducing the number
of free-riding municipalities by fostering incorporations and mergers where one mu-
nicipality keeps its name. If liquidity credit rationing is enforced strictly, it, per se,
rules out free-riding on debt for consumption purposes and limits it to investment
purposes.
• Implications for local-level public debt for current expenditure. Our results make a
case for more credit rationing, at least at the local level. Otherwise calls for bail-
outs become more and more likely. In Germany, federal states with loose attitudes
towards local debt should then follow the example of states that never expanded
local credit access in the first place. Making such a change would necessarily require
revisiting local spending responsibilities and the adequacy of state transfers to the
local level. Beyond Germany, our findings suggest that higher-level governments
should think twice before allowing subnational governments, and local governments
in particular, access to credit to fund current expenditures. Chances are local debt
will not be used in a welfare enhancing way.
1.2 Chapters and main findings
This section provides an overview of the proceeding chapters. All summaries follow the
same structure: After providing information on co-authorship and prior publication, all
of them begin with the motivation and explain how the research adds to the existing
literature. Next, the empirical approach is outlined and the findings are presented. The
summaries close with policy implications.
1.2.1 Chapter 2: How to stop the race to the bottom?
Chapter 2 examines whether municipal fiscal equalization systems prevent a race to the
bottom of business tax multiplier. It is a joint work with Caroline-Antonia Hummel and
is published as “How to stop the race to the bottom. Empirical evidence from North
Rhine-Westphalia” in International Tax and Public Finance (Rauch and Hummel 2015).
Motivation. Conventional economic wisdom suggests that decentralized business
taxation and a common pool of equalization transfers among local jurisdictions should lead
to a race to the bottom in local business tax rates. In this paper, we argue that the so-called
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“standard tax multipliers” (fiktive Hebesätze or Nivellierungshebesätze) help to prevent
both the race to the bottom and the raiding of the commons. Standard tax multipliers
are employed in municipal fiscal equalization schemes in all German territorial states
to calculate the fiscal capacity from taxes for which subnational governments enjoy tax
autonomy such as the business tax. Their use has the following effect: If the municipality’s
actual business tax multiplier is smaller than the standard tax multiplier, the accounted
standardized business tax revenue is greater than actual business tax revenue (and vice
versa). While the effects of most mechanisms within the equalization system are unknown
to the municipalities, they are well aware of the impact of the standard tax multiplier (i.e.,
the “overestimation” of tax revenue if the standard tax multiplier exceeds their business
tax multiplier). Standard tax multipliers prevent municipalities from neglecting their own
tax sources. They provide a signal for an “appropriate” tax rate level, which municipalities
are incentivized to follow in order to maximize their revenue. Thus, practitioners at the
state level have devised a clever mechanism to circumvent common pitfalls of local tax
policy. Consistent with this argument, local business tax rates in Germany hardly appear
to have been driven by a race to the bottom. Instead, they have exhibited a steady upward
trend over the past three decades. This paper presents further evidence of the upward
pressure that fiscal equalization exerts on local tax rates.
Contribution to the literature. We add to the literature by focusing the analysis
on standard tax multipliers and using an innovative identification strategy with a new
dataset. Standard tax multipliers are an institutional feature of any equalization scheme
that relies on so-called “representative tax systems,” as well as being present in municipal
fiscal equalization in all thirteen German territorial states. The hypothesis of standard tax
multipliers as a driver of local tax policy has long been discussed in the applied literature
on the evaluation of and reform options for fiscal equalization systems. To the best of our
knowledge, an explicit test of this hypothesis is absent from the academic literature to date.
We adapt an established theoretical model to illustrate the interaction of local taxation
and fiscal equalization. This allows us to derive the optimal business tax multiplier as well
as the incentive effect of a change in the standard business tax multiplier. Beyond the
mechanics exposed in the model, we believe that standard tax multipliers provide an easy-
to-read signal to local policymakers. They view standard tax multipliers as a reference
for an appropriate and politically feasible tax multiplier. Thus, we argue that changes in
standard tax multipliers are more obvious and potentially a more powerful trigger of local
tax responses than previously analyzed fiscal equalization parameters.
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Empirical approach. Standard tax multipliers are often equal, or at least related,
to the average of actual tax multipliers, creating an endogeneity problem in empirical
analysis. A quasi-experiment in North Rhine-Westphalia allows us to solve this problem.
Until 1995, North Rhine-Westphalia’s equalization scheme featured standard tax multi-
pliers that were differentiated according to municipal population size. In 1993, the state
constitutional court ruled that this arbitrary differentiation was not permissible. As a
result, North Rhine-Westphalia’s state legislature had to adjust its municipal fiscal equal-
ization scheme. The court ruling thus led to exogenous variation in the standard tax
multiplier for small municipalities. The strict exogeneity of this reform is in contrast to
other reforms where standard tax multipliers are adjusted to better reflect actual average
tax multipliers. Our empirical analysis is based on a balanced panel dataset of annual
administrative data for all 396 municipalities of North Rhine-Westphalia. The dataset
covers the time period from 1987 to 2002, thereby containing information on the pre-
reform, reform and post-reform periods. It draws on a variety of official statistics data
sources. The rich and unique dataset includes a number of municipal- and county-level
control variables. Our research design combines a municipal-level fixed effects model with
a difference-in-differences approach, where local business tax multipliers are regressed on
interaction terms between treatment groups and treatment points. Our identification
strategy exploits the exogenous (quasi-experimental) variation of the standard tax mul-
tiplier for “small” municipalities induced by the reform of the North Rhine-Westphalian
municipal fiscal equalization system in the mid-1990s.
Findings. The results show that upward shifts in standard business tax multipliers
lead to immediate upward adjustments in actual business tax multipliers. This is true
for all affected municipalities. The reaction is more pronounced for municipalities whose
business tax multipliers are below post-reform standard tax multipliers. The findings are
robust to a number of alternative specifications. They also reflect the positive incentive
effect derived from theoretical considerations.
Policy implications. Our results have important implications for the practical
design of fiscal equalization schemes. They highlight the importance of the parameters
of equalization systems for shaping local tax policy. Through its choice of the standard
tax multiplier, a state can influence the level of municipal tax rates and the weight of
competitive downward forces. Standard tax multipliers should be regarded as a tool for
governments to shape lower-level tax policy, with important consequences for their own
competitiveness.
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1.2.2 Chapter 3: Does tax policy follow the inverse-elasticity
rule?
Chapter 3 studies whether implemented tax policy is consistent with the seminal inverse-
elasticity rule. This chapter is written in collaboration with Philipp Dörrenberg.
Motivation. The seminal contribution of Ramsey (1927) shows that optimal tax
rates on goods depend inversely on their elasticity of demand. While the optimal-tax
literature has made progress since Ramsey’s initial contribution, the general idea of his
framework has not lost ground: the excess burden of taxation is positively related to the
sensitivity of the tax base, and the tax rate should be inversely related to a tax base’s tax
sensitivity. In the case of two tax bases, for example, Ramsey taxation suggests to impose
a higher tax rate on the tax base that is relatively less responsive to tax-rate changes.
Empirical evidence on this question is scarce.
Contribution to the literature. Our paper speaks about and contributes to three
strands of literature. First, we relate to a small literature that studies whether actual tax
policy follows the requirements of optimal-taxation theory. The few studies on the opti-
mality of actually implemented taxes are mostly on the personal income tax. We provide
some first evidence in this regard for other taxes. Second, we contribute to the literature
on the elasticity of the corporate tax base and the elasticity of tax revenues. While the
literature acknowledges that firms respond to tax incentives and adjust to taxes along
various different dimensions, only a few papers explicitly study the tax-sensitivity of the
overall tax bases and tax revenues. One reason for scarce evidence presumably is that in
most countries, corporate taxes are levied on the national or state level, which hinders
the causal identification of credible estimates. Comparisons of countries, and even federal
states within a country, are critical and common trend assumptions in country-level anal-
yses over time are often hard to establish. We aim to overcome these shortcomings by re-
lying on the case of German local business and property taxes in a difference-in-differences
research design with many independent tax-setting municipalities which operate in a ho-
mogeneous economic environment. Third, our work adds to a very small literature on the
sensitivity of property to taxes.
Empirical approach. We explore the unique case of local taxation on the municipal
level in Germany, where more than 11,000 municipalities have autonomy to set taxes on
business profits and property values. This empirical playground allows us to identify how
changes in business and property taxes affect the respective tax revenues, and hence makes
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it possible to evaluate local taxation in Germany with respect to Ramsey taxation. Our
dataset covers the full universe of municipalities in a very long panel of 16 years, 1995-
2010. We employ a difference-in-differences research design and for identifying variation
we rely on many (business and property) tax-rate reforms that were implemented by the
municipalities. The long panel dimension, along with the fact that the municipalities
operate in a very homogeneous economic environment, allows us to control for many
confounding factors that present potential threats to common trend assumptions. As
opposed to many other empirical tax studies, we do not have to deal with changes in the
tax base definitions that often come along with tax reforms, because the tax base, as well
as a basic tax rate, is defined on the federal level and municipalities only set a multiplier
on the exogenous basic rate and base.
Findings. We find that business-tax revenue does not significantly increase in re-
sponse to tax hikes. Property-tax revenue, on the other hand, increases by almost 1% in
response to a 1% increase in the tax rate. These results imply that the business-tax base
responds strongly to tax-rate changes whereas the property-tax base is not tax sensitive. If
tax policy was consistent with the inverse-elasticity rule, our estimates would suggest that
tax rates are significantly higher on immobile property than on mobile business profits.
However, this is not what we observe. In almost all years of our sample period, the share
of municipalities with a higher business tax than property tax is considerably greater than
50%. In addition, the average business-tax rate is greater than the average property-tax
rate in all years of our sample period.
The inverse-elasticity rule depicts that goods should be taxed in inverse proportion
to their price elasticities. We can combine this rule with our elasticity estimates and
conduct back-of-the-envelope calculations to determine the optimal relation between the
business and property tax rates. Given our elasticity estimates of 0.129 for business-tax
revenues and 0.886 for property-tax revenues, such calculations yield that the property
tax rate should, from an optimal-tax perspective, approximately be seven-times higher on
average than the business tax rate. This is in contrast to actual rates; we observe that
throughout our sample period the business-tax multiplier is on average 1.08 times higher
than the property-tax multiplier.
Policy implications. This suggests that German municipalities are not compliant
with the inverse-elasticity rule and presumably leave efficiency gains on the table. Our
results suggest that efficiency gains could be realized through reducing (or even reversing)
the difference in levels between business and property taxation.
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1.2.3 Chapter 4: Common pool problems and territorial reforms
Chapter 4 studies the common pool problem in the context of a municipal territorial
reform. It is the only single-author paper.
Motivation. The common pool problem is a well-known and widely studied phe-
nomenon among public economists. This paper applies the notion of the common pool
problem to the event of a municipal territorial reform: Municipalities being designated for
the same merger or incorporation form a temporary common pool with respect to debt
during the time window between the announcement and actual execution of a reform,
because they generally still have the autonomy to take on debt individually. Responsible
for repayment, however, are not the individual municipalities themselves, but the newly
founded municipality they become part of. According to the “tragedy of the commons”
(Hardin 1968) this situation results in exploitation and overuse of the resource. This im-
plies that the municipalities affected by the reform strategically take on debt to finance
(inefficient) public projects.
The previous applied literature on common pool problems in territorial reforms gen-
erally employs a formalization of the common pool theory derived by Weingast et al. (1981)
as a theoretical starting point for the analysis. Broadly interpreted, the so-called “law 1/n”
proposes that the size of the incentive effect is greater the smaller the municipality’s own
size relative to the size of its common pool. However, in the aftermath of Hardin (1968) a
growing body of interdisciplinary research on the “commons” has successfully challenged
the general validity of Hardin’s pessimistic view. In this spirit one can propose that there
might be other (implicit) mechanisms, mitigating or even preventing free-riding, which
are not covered by the “law 1/n.” Against this backdrop, there is demand for empirical
clarification.
Contribution to the literature. Econometric research on free-riding in municipal
territorial reforms has evolved only recently. This paper is among the first to study
empirically free-riding on public debt before the execution of a territorial reform. The
existing small strand of literature focuses on capturing the implications of the “law 1/n”
and reports mixed results. The contribution to the literature of this paper is threefold:
First, since the existing empirical evidence is inconclusive, future research is required.
Second, exploring the free-riding incentives for the case of a municipal territorial reform in
Germany, this is the first notable study for a non-Scandinavian country. This paper, hence,
contributes to the generalization of results. Third, in the light of the recent developments
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in the literature on the “commons” this paper goes one step further and takes a broader
perspective on the underlying incentive mechanisms. It emphasizes that there may as well
be factors which reduce or prevent free-riding.
Empirical approach. A promising case for a strong difference-in-differences design
is the recent municipal territorial reform in Saxony-Anhalt. It reduced the number of
municipalities from 1,039 to 219 between 2007 and 2011. This reform has an array of
interesting facets that allow me to study all hypotheses in a coherent environment. This
study exploits data that has not been used by academic research so far. Apart from
the vast number of observations, it is the long panel dimension that makes this dataset
particularly interesting from an econometric point of view. Therefore, I am able to closely
investigate the validity of the main identifying assumption (common trend assumption).
Furthermore, due to the specific settings of the reform I can perform an array of robustness
checks (e.g., alternative control group), strengthening the econometric design.
Findings. My empirical results, indeed, confirm that being in a common pool,
indeed, triggers an incentive to free-ride (Hypothesis 1a). However, the size of the incentive
is linked to the theoretical predictions based on the “law 1/n.” I find a statistically and
economically significant free-riding effect with the incentive to free-ride being greater, the
smaller the municipality’s own size is relative to its common pool (Hypothesis 1b). What
distinguishes my paper is that I carefully consider differences in incentive structures by
approaching three further hypotheses: I can report a statistically insignificant free-riding
effect for the group of surviving municipalities. This confirms the accountability prediction
(Hypothesis 2a). Furthermore, municipalities which merge or incorporate in the non-
mandatory phase behave less opportunistically than municipalities being forced to merge
or incorporate in the mandatory phase (Hypothesis 2b). Last, I cannot provide evidence
in favor of timing (Hypothesis 3). The sizes of the effects are of economic relevance.
Policy implications. My results support the notion that governments should con-
sider the opportunistic behavior when announcing a municipal territorial reform. They
should take into account that the incentives structure differs depending on relative com-
mon pool size and further characteristics (voluntary vs. mandatory mergers and account-
ability). The results have important policy implications: First, to prevent (or at least
mitigate) opportunistic behavior, governments could constrain municipal autonomy after
a municipal territorial reform is made public. However, at least in Germany the implemen-
tation of spending restrictions might prove to be difficult due to the guarantee of municipal
autonomy granted by the Basic Law. Second, governments should be aware of the fact
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that free-riding also occurs in the case of voluntary mergers, but to a lesser extent. This
is a particularly important point for Germany. Aside from extensive state-wide municipal
territorial reforms, there are constantly voluntary mergers or incorporations of individ-
ual municipalities. Governments could encourage self-binding inter-municipal contracts
to reduce free-riding. Third, they could mitigate the incentives to free-ride by giving the
municipalities more leeway to merge or incorporate according to their preference. Last,
they could reduce the number of free-riding municipalities by fostering incorporations and
mergers where one municipality keeps its name. If liquidity credit rationing is enforced
strictly, it, per se, rules out free-riding on debt for consumption purposes and limits it to
investment purposes.
1.2.4 Chapter 5: Tax smoothing and credit access
Chapter 5 studies if credit access has an impact on tax smoothing at the local level. It is
co-authored with Caroline-Antonia Hummel and Eva Gerhards.
Motivation. In the context of recent debt crises, political practitioners emphasize
risks associated with high public debt levels, and try to design effective measures for lim-
iting debt build-up. Public debate often portrays debt as something that is best avoided
or at least strictly limited. Otherwise, countries might one day have to suffer the conse-
quences in the form of debt crises, recessions, fiscal austerity and painful reforms to clean
up the mess. The theory of tax smoothing suggests that giving governments access to
debt financing could be welfare enhancing as allowing governments to smooth their taxes
over time can reduce distortionary costs from taxation. While it is clear from a theoret-
ical viewpoint that tax smoothing is beneficial, it is unknown whether governments with
credit access do in fact engage in tax smoothing. Political decision-makers might not real-
ize the potential benefits from tax smoothing and instead take advantage of debt to finance
unsustainable levels of current expenditures. The possible relationship between credit ac-
cess and tax smoothing is particularly important where lower level governments enjoy tax
autonomy. The standard fiscal federalism literature objects to granting credit access to
lower federal levels. However, ruling out debt finance could prevent subnational govern-
ments that enjoy tax autonomy over certain taxes from engaging in welfare-enhancing tax
smoothing. This paper investigates the empirical relationship between credit access and
tax smoothing using the case of municipalities in Germany.
Contribution to the literature. We contribute to the literature, first, by devel-
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oping and using an innovative and intuitive approach to investigating the strength of tax
smoothing behavior. In contrast to existing studies, we do not ask whether governments
do or do not engage in tax smoothing. Instead, we analyze whether tax rates become
smoother and thus closer to Barro’s ideal if the institutional setting becomes more ac-
commodating. We define “smoother tax rates” as tax rates that are subject to a smaller
number of changes within a given time period. This measure constitutes an intuitive and
straightforward translation of theoretical tax smoothing definitions found in the literature
into the context of local tax policy. Our approach also allows us to use tax rate data and
investigate tax rate volatility directly. This is in contrast to the indirect tax smoothing
tests prevalent in existing literature, which rely on the behavior of the budget balance or
government expenditure over time. Second, we establish a link between tax smoothing
and actual credit access that is to the best of our knowledge almost entirely missing from
the literature to date. While credit access is typically not an issue at the national level, it
becomes crucial once we move to subnational levels of government. Third, we contribute
to the literature that objects to granting credit access to lower federal levels by supporting
the notion that strict credit rationing of the local level may be the best institutional choice
for higher-level governments even if there is substantial tax autonomy at the local level.
Empirical approach. This paper uses the unique institutional setting of German
fiscal federalism to study the behavior of municipalities in Germany and to test whether
credit access is associated with lower tax rate volatility. Germany is a promising case
to study given that municipalities enjoy autonomy over property and business tax rates
and differ in the degree of credit access allowed by the respective federal state. To op-
erationalize local credit access, the institutional environment and empirical level of local
indebtedness in each of the 13 territorial states were examined in detail to derive an index
of local credit access. We propose the number of tax rate changes within a 16 year-time
frame as a measure of tax rate volatility. The descriptive and econometric modeling is
based on a sample of more than 10,000 municipalities in all German territorial states. We
employ a line of argument based on four steps of data analysis using descriptive statistics
(Step 1 to 3) and econometric analysis (Step 4).
Findings. We start by showing that the development of liquidity credit stocks has
not been cyclical (Step 1). In fact, easier credit access coincides with dramatic increases in
local per capita short-term liquidity credits in some federal states. In Step 2 we pinpoint
that tax rate changes are rather rare in all federal states regardless of credit access. We
find no cyclical behavior involving tax reductions and jumps. Instead, we find a rise in tax
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rate volatility towards the end of our time horizon, despite easing credit access. Next, we
show graphically that there is a possible positive relationship between tax rate volatility
and credit access, contradicting the notion that credit access might induce less volatile tax
rates (Step 3). We suggest spending pressure as a potential explanation. Last, we employ
an econometric approach in which we account for spending pressure (Step 4). However, the
econometric results also suggest a positive link, which would point to an improper use of
local debt. Hence, we cannot reject the positive relationship between credit access and tax
rate volatility. It therefore appears that whether federal states allow their municipalities
access to debt or not has no impact on the stability of their tax rate choices. Local tax
rates are not less volatile in federal states which grant their municipalities ample access
to debt. While local tax rates in Germany are generally rather stable over time, this still
gives cause for concern. Further research will be required to validate this conclusion. If it
is confirmed, important implications follow.
Policy implications. If the major theoretical justification for public debt for con-
sumption expenditures crumbles in practice, there is a case for more credit rationing, at
least at the local level. Otherwise calls for bail-outs become more and more likely. In Ger-
many, federal states with loose attitudes towards local debt should then follow the example
of states that never expanded local credit access in the first place. Making such a change
would necessarily require revisiting local spending responsibilities and the adequacy of
state transfers to the local level. Beyond Germany, the findings of this paper suggest that
higher-level governments should think twice before allowing subnational governments, and
local governments in particular, access to credit to fund current expenditures. Chances
are local debt will not be used in a welfare enhancing way.
Chapter 2
How to stop the race to the bottom?
2.1 Introduction
It is a well-known normative principle among public economists that business taxation
should not be decentralized to subnational levels of government. Otherwise, so the ar-
gument goes, local governments would engage in a harmful “race to the bottom” where
they constantly try to undercut their neighbors’ business tax rates. Resulting tax rates
would be inefficiently low (Oates 1972). A similarly widespread insight is that problems of
overspending and reduced tax effort arise whenever budgeting involves a common pool of
resources (see Raudla [2010] for a review on the use of the “budgetary commons” metaphor
in existing literature).
Germany’s institutional setting involves business tax autonomy for local governments
and a common pool of fiscal equalization transfers from the state to the local level. As a
result, conventional wisdom points to overly low business tax rates as a likely outcome:
Competition for mobile capital presumably pushes tax rates downwards. At the same
time, one might suspect that the common pool of equalization transfers further reduces tax
effort. Indeed, Köthenbürger (2002) shows that equalization schemes that rely on revenue
equalization tend to reinforce tax competition. In contrast, fiscal equalization in the form
of tax base or capacity equalization increases subnational tax rates and thus attenuates
competitive forces, which may be efficiency-enhancing when competition effects are strong
enough (Köthenbürger 2002; Bucovetsky and Smart 2006; Smart 2007). Municipal fiscal
equalization in Germany adheres to the capacity equalization principle, which is also
employed in the transfer systems of countries such as Canada and Australia. In such
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systems, jurisdictions’ tax bases are evaluated at a standard tax rate and compared to a
benchmark level of spending or revenue to determine the size of the transfer.1 The transfer
to each jurisdiction decreases in its “fiscal capacity.”
In this paper, we argue that the so-called “standard tax multipliers” (fiktive Hebesätze
or Nivellierungshebesätze) help to prevent both the race to the bottom and the raiding
of the commons. Standard tax multipliers are employed in fiscal equalization schemes
to calculate the fiscal capacity from taxes for which subnational governments enjoy tax
autonomy. In the case of German municipalities, business tax is one of the most impor-
tant components of fiscal capacity. The use of standard tax multipliers has the following
effect: If the municipality’s actual business tax multiplier is smaller than the standard
tax multiplier, the accounted standardized business tax revenue is greater than actual
business tax revenue (and vice versa). While the effects of most mechanisms within the
equalization system are unknown to the municipalities, the municipalities are well aware
of the impact of the standard tax multiplier (i.e., the “overestimation” of tax revenue if the
standard tax multiplier exceeds their business tax multiplier). Standard tax multipliers
prevent municipalities from neglecting their own tax sources. They provide a signal for
an “appropriate” tax rate level, which municipalities are incentivized to follow in order to
maximize their revenue. Thus, practitioners at the state level have devised a clever mech-
anism to circumvent common pitfalls of local tax policy. Consistent with this argument,
local business tax rates in Germany hardly appear to have been driven by a race to the
bottom. Instead, they exhibited a steady upward trend over the past three decades.2
A growing body of empirical literature investigates the incentive effects of equaliza-
tion systems on tax policy and demonstrates the positive impact of capacity equalization
on local tax rates. Egger et al. (2010) exploit a change of the equalization formula in the
state of Lower Saxony and show that this reform had a significant impact on municipali-
ties’ business tax rates for four consecutive years. Büttner (2006) provides evidence that
there is a positive relationship between the marginal contribution rate, defined as the rate
at which an increase in the tax base reduces equalization transfers, and local business tax
rates in the state of Baden-Württemberg. Smart (2007) investigates the effect of equal-
1In contrast to most such systems, German municipal fiscal equalization schemes rely on a comparison
between “fiscal need” and “fiscal capacity.” Moreover, the sum of all equalization transfers is typically
fixed by the state level and not endogenous.
2Weighted average business tax multipliers in Germany increased from 330 in 1980 and 364 in 1990 to
390 in 2010 (Federal Statistical Office 2014c).
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ization among Canadian provinces, showing that an expansion of transfers leads to higher
provincial tax rates.
This paper presents further evidence of the upward pressure that fiscal equalization
exerts on local tax rates. We add to the literature by focusing the analysis on standard tax
multipliers and using an innovative identification strategy with a new dataset. Standard
tax multipliers are an institutional feature of any equalization scheme that relies on so-
called “representative tax systems,” as well as being present in municipal fiscal equalization
in all thirteen German territorial states.3 The hypothesis of standard tax multipliers as a
driver of local tax policy has long been discussed in the applied literature on the evaluation
of and reform options for fiscal equalization systems (e.g., Büttner et al. 2008; Parsche and
Steinherr 1995; Goerl et al. 2013). Baskaran (2014) even takes this hypothesis as a given
in his analysis of local tax mimicking by municipalities in Germany. He views a reform of
standard tax multipliers in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia in 2003 as the cause of
observable adjustments in actual tax multipliers. This is despite the fact that, to the best
of our knowledge, an explicit test of this hypothesis is absent from the academic literature
to date. We adapt the theoretical models used in Smart (2007) and Egger et al. (2010)
to illustrate the interaction of local taxation and fiscal equalization. This allows us to
derive the optimal business tax multiplier as well as the incentive effect of a change in the
standard business tax multiplier. Beyond the mechanics exposed in the model, we believe
that standard tax multipliers provide an easy-to-read signal to local policymakers. They
view standard tax multipliers as a reference for an appropriate and politically feasible
tax multiplier. In contrast to changes in eligibility criteria, adjustment levels, or marginal
contributions rates, which may also influence local tax multipliers as shown in the previous
literature, standard tax multipliers have the same magnitude as actual multipliers. As a
result, changes in standard tax multipliers are easily translated into perceived necessary
adjustments of local multipliers. As stated by Baskaran (2015), hikes in standard tax
multipliers also provide a window of opportunity for local officials to raise tax multipliers
while deflecting the blame to the state level. Thus, we argue that changes in standard tax
multipliers are more obvious and potentially more powerful trigger of local tax responses
than previously analyzed fiscal equalization parameters.
Standard tax multipliers are often equal, or at least related, to the average of actual
3Moreover, fiscal equalization between federal states in Germany also employs standard tax rates to
standardize property transfer tax revenue since the introduction of state tax rate autonomy for this tax
in 2006.
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tax multipliers, creating an endogeneity problem in empirical analysis. A quasi-experiment
in North Rhine-Westphalia allows us to solve this problem. Until 1995, North Rhine-
Westphalia’s equalization scheme featured standard tax multipliers that were differentiated
according to municipal population size. In 1993, the state constitutional court ruled that
this arbitrary differentiation was not permissible. As a result, North Rhine-Westphalia’s
state legislature had to adjust its municipal fiscal equalization scheme. The court ruling
thus led to exogenous variation in the standard tax multiplier for small municipalities.
The strict exogeneity of this reform is in contrast to other reforms where standard tax
multipliers are adjusted to better reflect actual average tax multipliers.
Our empirical analysis is based on a balanced panel dataset of annual administrative
data for all 396 municipalities of North Rhine-Westphalia. The dataset covers the time
period from 1987 to 2002, thereby containing information on the pre-reform, reform and
post-reform periods. It draws on a variety of official statistics data sources. The rich and
unique dataset includes a number of municipal- and county-level control variables.
Our research design combines a municipal-level fixed effects model with a difference-
in-differences approach, where local business tax multipliers are regressed on interaction
terms between treatment groups and treatment points. Our identification strategy exploits
the exogenous (quasi-experimental) variation of the standard tax multiplier for “small”
municipalities induced by the reform of the North Rhine-Westphalian municipal fiscal
equalization system in the mid-1990s. We find a positive effect of the standard business
tax multiplier on local business tax multipliers, as predicted by theoretical considerations.
The findings are robust to a number of alternative specifications.
Section 2.2 clarifies the institutional features of the German business tax and munic-
ipal fiscal equalization. Section 2.3 introduces the theoretical model. Section 2.4 explains
our empirical approach and data. Section 2.5 presents the results of the empirical analysis.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional background
Germany’s federal structure is a key determining factor of the country’s fiscal landscape.
The federal level, the three city-states and 13 territorial states, and the more than 11,000
municipalities each have differing degrees of tax autonomy over different taxes. For
German municipalities, the business tax (Gewerbesteuer) and the equalization transfers
Chapter 2 Empirical Essays on Fiscal Federalism 23
(Schlüsselzuweisungen) provided to them by their federal state are two of the most im-
portant income sources.4 In 2013, municipal net revenue from the business tax and fiscal
equalization transfers accounted for 15.8 and 14.3% of aggregate municipal income, re-
spectively (Federal Statistical Office 2014b).
2.2.1 Business taxation
It is a particularity of the German tax system that municipalities enjoy business tax auton-
omy. Each municipality sets its own local business tax multiplier (Gewerbesteuerhebesatz).
In contrast, the business tax base and the basic tax rate (Steuermesszahl)5 are defined at
the federal level. The resulting tax rate is determined by multiplying the local business tax
multiplier with the basic federal tax rate. The business tax is charged on operating profits
of corporate and non-corporate firms. In 2013, gross business tax revenue amounted to
43 billion (bn) euros, making it Germany’s third most revenue-generating tax (Federal
Statistical Office 2014a).
2.2.2 Municipal fiscal equalization
In 2013, municipal fiscal equalization transfers in Germany totaled 29.4 bn euros (Federal
Statistical Office 2014b). These transfers serve a double purpose. First, most German
municipalities lack sufficient own revenue sources to fund their tasks. The transfers they
receive from their respective federal state via its municipal fiscal equalization system thus
serve a fundamental financing function. Second, the transfers are designed to reduce
differences in municipalities’ capacities to provide public goods.
Municipal fiscal equalization systems function similarly in all German states. All of
them employ the same basic mechanism of comparing a fictitious measure of “fiscal need”




(Schlüsselmasse, i.e., the sum of all equalization transfers paid out in one year in the state
in question) are predetermined. The fiscal equalization transfer Ti of municipality i equals
Ti = α(βNi − Ci) ∀ i with βNi > Ci. (2.1)
4Other relevant sources are the local property tax, the municipal shares of value-added tax (VAT) and
income tax, as well as duties and charges.
5The basic federal tax rate was set at 5% (with lower rates for operating profits below 48.000 euros)
during our sample period. It was reduced to a uniform rate of 3.5% in 2007.
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Ti depends on the combined effect of the following factors: adjustment level α, i.e., the
degree to which the difference between fiscal need and fiscal capacity is equalized; fictitious
measure of fiscal need, which is calculated by multiplying a fiscal need number Ni by the
basic amount β; standardized measure of fiscal capacity Ci.6
Municipalities whose fiscal capacity exceeds their fiscal need are called “abundant”
and do not benefit from fiscal equalization transfers. The basic amount is determined via












∀ i with βNi > Ci. (2.2)
While the derivation of the fictitious measure of fiscal need is negligible with respect
to the focus of this paper, the derivation of the standardized measure of fiscal capacity
is not. Fiscal capacity is the sum of standardized business and property tax revenue and
the (unstandardized) municipal share of VAT and income tax revenue. To assure local
tax multiplier autonomy, municipal fiscal equalization systems employ so-called standard
tax multipliers to evaluate tax revenue from taxes for which the municipalities set tax
multipliers (business and property tax). Standard tax multipliers are set by the respective





with Ri :=business tax revenue, mi :=business tax multiplier and s :=standard tax mul-
tiplier.8
If the actual business tax multiplier is smaller than the standard tax multiplier,
the accounted standardized tax revenue is greater than the actual business tax revenue
(and vice versa). While the effects of most mechanisms within the equalization system
are unknown to the municipalities, they are well aware of the impact of the standard tax
6In addition to such “common” fiscal equalization transfers, some states employ special transfers to
municipalities suffering from a very low standardized tax revenue to ensure that they achieve a pre-defined
level of fiscal resources. However, this is not the case in North Rhine-Westphalia.
7Due to the endogeneity of the basic amount, the comparative statics of municipal fiscal equalization
are not straightforward and unknown to municipalities.
8Standardized property tax revenue is determined equivalently.
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multiplier (i.e., the “overestimation” of tax revenue if the standard tax multiplier exceeds
their business tax multiplier).
2.3 A simple theoretical model
To understand the incentive effect of standard tax multipliers, we develop a simple theoret-
ical model of local taxation and fiscal equalization with two revenue-maximizing local ju-
risdictions. It is a version of the models employed by Egger et al. (2010) and Smart (2007),
which we extend to include the standard tax multiplier as well as the basic amount. It al-
lows us to derive the optimal business tax multiplier and the incentive effect of a change in
the standard business tax multiplier. Suppose there are two municipalities i and j whose
sole income sources are business taxation and fiscal equalization transfers. The business
tax base Bi of municipality i does depend not only on its own business tax rate mi, but
also on the one of municipality j, mj:
Bi = B0i + γmj − δmi (2.4)
where B0i ≥ 0 and δ > γ ≥ 0. Tax revenue Ri thus becomes
Ri = mi(B0i + γmj − δmi). (2.5)




= s(B0i + γmj − δmi) (2.6)
where s again denotes the standard tax multiplier.
Assuming that both municipalities are non-abundant, the respective fiscal equaliza-
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B0i + γmj − δmi
)
(2.7)
As an auxiliary assumption, suppose that both municipalities seek to maximize their
revenue from taxes and transfers:
max
mi
Ri + Ti (2.8)
The reduced-form equation for the optimal tax rate of municipality i then becomes:
mi∗ = 14δ2 − γ2
[
2δB0i + γB0j + αs
{
γδ + 2δ2 + 1
Ni +Nj
(γNj(γ − δ) + 2δNi(γ − δ))
}]
(2.9)




= 14δ2 − γ2
[
3δγNi +Nj(2δ2 + γ2)
]
> 0 (2.10)
Proposition: An increase in the standard tax multiplier increases the optimal tax
multiplier chosen by the municipalities.
Given this relationship, the use of standard tax multipliers prevents municipalities
from neglecting their own revenue sources and provides a clever way to circumvent the
common pool problem. What is more, many municipalities consider the standard tax
multiplier as a signal for their own tax policy. Even if – as is likely the case – local
policymakers do not fully understand the intricacies of fiscal equalization and the effect of
the basic amount, they recognize intuitively that they should respond to changes in the
standard tax multiplier to avoid transfer losses. In contrast to changes in the adjustment
level α, which also induces tax multiplier reactions, changes in s are easily translated into
appropriate adjustments of the local tax multiplier, as both have the same magnitude.




Ti + αs(B0i + γmj − δmi +B0j + γmi − δmj)
α(Ni +Nj)
.
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Therefore, a race to the bottom in local business tax rates does not occur when standard
tax multipliers are used in equalization.
2.4 Empirical approach
In this section we first provide background information on the quasi-experiment exploited
in the empirical analysis, before we present our data sources and outline our empirical
model. Last, we discuss our identification strategy.
2.4.1 Quasi-experiment
We exploit a quasi-experiment in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia for an empirical
test of our proposition. North Rhine-Westphalia offers a promising case to study given
that it is the most populous German state with over 17 million inhabitants. Moreover,
it stands out as a state where municipalities’ business tax multipliers are high relative to
those found elsewhere in Germany. The same applies to its standard tax multipliers.
Like those in the other 12 territorial states, the 396 North Rhine-Westphalian munic-
ipalities receive state transfers through a municipal fiscal equalization system. Each year,
several billion euros (8 bn in 2014) are paid out as equalization transfers. North Rhine-
Westphalia currently sets a single standard tax multiplier with respect to the business tax.
Until 1995, the equalization scheme featured standard tax multipliers that were differenti-
ated according to population size. The fiscal capacity of municipalities with up to 150,000
inhabitants (“small” municipalities) was calculated using a standard tax multiplier of 350.
The fiscal capacity of municipalities whose population size exceeded this threshold (“big”
municipalities) was evaluated with a standard tax multiplier of 380. In 1993, the state
constitutional court ruled that this arbitrary differentiation was not permissible (VerfGH
9/92, 22/92).10 As a result, North Rhine-Westphalia’s state legislature was required to
adjust its municipal fiscal equalization scheme. Standard tax multipliers for municipalities
with less than 150,000 inhabitants were increased in three equal steps between 1996 and
1998 to reach the larger cities’ multiplier. This 30-points change amounted to an increase
of 8.5% in the standardized tax multiplier. The court ruling thus led to sizable exoge-
nous variation in the standard tax multiplier for small municipalities. To the best of our
10The differentiation was found to be arbitrary as long as the legislator had not established why it was
warranted for objective reasons.
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knowledge, this quasi-experiment has not been used in the literature to date.
2.4.2 Data sources
Our empirical analysis is based on a balanced panel dataset of annual administrative data
for all 396 municipalities of North Rhine-Westphalia. The dataset covers the time pe-
riod from 1987 to 2002, thereby containing information on the pre-reform, reform, and
post-reform periods. It draws on a variety of official statistics data sources, namely North
Rhine-Westphalia’s statistical office (IT.NRW ), the Regional Database Germany (Re-
gionaldatenbank Deutschland) and the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur f ür
Arbeit). The rich and unique dataset includes municipal business tax multipliers, inhab-
itants, income tax and VAT shares, employees at place of employment, gross domestic
product (GDP) (at county level), disposable income of private households (at county
level), municipal debt, tax bases and revenues from property and business tax, commuters
and municipal surface area. There are 375 “small” and 21 “big” municipalities up until
1999. From 2000 onwards, one additional city has more than 150,000 inhabitants.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics, 1987-2002
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Business tax multiplier 373.284 35.652 250 490 6336
Income tax share 0.286 0.05 0.17 0.484 4356
GDP 20.732 4.013 13.066 62.922 3960
Inc. of priv. households 16.645 1.642 13.136 21.456 3168
Employees 0.259 0.093 0.048 0.625 3960
Surface area 0.429 0.345 0.028 2.36 4356
Notes: Business tax multiplier (in %), surface area (in hectare (ha) p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000
euro p.c.), employees (p.c.) (municipal level) and income of private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.),
GDP (in 1,000 euro p.c.) (county level); number of observations: 396 municipalities per year.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the most important variables, which are
reported in per capita (p.c.) terms with the exception of business tax multipliers. Between
1987 and 2002, business tax multipliers in North Rhine-Westphalia varied between 250 and
490, with an unweighted average of 373.28. Table 2.1 also illustrates some data availability
issues. None of the tabulated control variables are available for all years. Municipal income
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tax shares, GDP and surface area have only been reported since 1992.11 There are no data
on the disposable income of private households before 1995 or on the number of employees
before 1993. More detailed summary statistics are provided in Tables 2.6, 2.8 and 2.7 in
Appendix 2.7.
Figure 2.1 depicts the difference between average business tax multipliers of “big” and
“small” municipalities between 1992 and 2002.12 The three dashed vertical lines mark the
three reform years where standard business tax multipliers for small municipalities were
raised. As shown, the average business tax multiplier of big municipalities was more than
70 percentage points higher than that of small municipalities at the outset. During the
three reform years, the difference in averages dropped sharply, to a level of 60 percentage
points and below.
Figure 2.1: Difference in average business tax multipliers between “big“ and
“small“ municipalities, 1992-2002
Source: IT.NRW, own calculations.
11GDP is also missing in 1993.
12In 2003, the standard tax multiplier was increased to 403 for all North Rhine-Westphalian communi-
ties.
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2.4.3 Empirical model
Our research design combines a municipal-level fixed effects model with a difference-in-
differences approach. The dependent variable is the business tax multiplier mi,t of mu-
nicipality i in year t. Our independent variables of interest are the interaction terms
TGi×TPt, t = 1996, ..., 1998 between treatment groups (TGi = 1 if population ≤ 150, 000
and 0 otherwise)13 and treatment points (TP1996 = 1 if t = 1996, TP1997 = 1 if t = 1997,
TP1998 = 1 if t = 1998 and 0 otherwise).
We include two types of control variables to adjust for observable time-variant dif-
ferences between municipalities: Xi,t and Zc,t represent column vectors of municipal-
level variables (debt p.c., share of income tax etc.) and county-level variables (GDP p.c.
etc.), respectively. Furthermore, we control for municipal and year fixed effects (λi,Φt).
The municipal fixed effects account for unobserved but time-invariant omitted municipal-
level factors that may influence business tax multipliers. By adding year fixed effects
to the regression equation we are able to control for common shocks affecting tax rates
across all municipalities in a given year. We use the following regression model with
t = 1995, ..., 1998:
mi,t = αTGi + δ1996TGi × TP1996 + δ1997TGi × TP1997 + δ1998TGi × TP1998
+ βXi,t + θZc,t + λi + Φt + εi,t
(2.11)
where the error term εi,t is clustered on the county level.
Our coefficients of interest δ1996, δ1997 and δ1998 measure how the business tax multi-
plier differential between “small” municipalities (treatment group) and “big” municipalities
(control group) changed ceteris paribus (c.p.) between the reference year 1995 and 1996,
and 1997 and 1998, respectively.
2.4.4 Discussion of identification
Our identification strategy exploits the exogenous (quasi-experimental) variation of the
standard tax multiplier for “small” municipalities induced by the reform of the North
Rhine-Westphalian municipal fiscal equalization system in the mid-1990s. In contrast
13Population size in 1995 determines assignment to treatment groups for the one municipality that
grows beyond 150,000 inhabitants in 2000.
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to later changes to standard business tax multipliers, this reform was prompted by a
court ruling and is therefore truly exogenous. The chosen identification strategy thus
circumvents typical endogeneity concerns.14 The validity of identification hinges on the
assumption of a common trend between treatment and control groups.15 We assume
that business tax multipliers would have evolved in parallel in the absence of treatment
(conditional on other included independent variables). Without treatment, δ1996, δ1997 and
δ1998 would have to be zero.
Differences in administrative status between the treatment and the control groups
might pose a potential concern regarding this identifying assumption. All 21 cities in the
control groups are cities with county status. Of the 375 municipalities in the treatment
group, only two have county status, while the remaining 373 belong to a county. If there
had been systematic differences in or changes to the financing structure or spending re-
sponsibilities of municipalities with as opposed to without county status during our sample
period, this might constitute a violation of the common trend assumption. We know of
no such major shifts during the period of interest. Moreover, the revenue sources of cities
with county status are equivalent to those of municipalities belonging to a county: Both
rely on the same types of taxes, fees and charges, transfers, etc. In contrast, counties are
financed solely through state transfers and the Kreisumlage, a financial contribution levied
from municipalities within the county. Through this levy, municipalities belonging to a
county share the responsibility for financing county-level spending. Given this adminis-
trative and fiscal setup, we believe that our treatment and control groups are sufficiently
comparable.
Systematic differences in the degree to which both groups suffer from fiscal distress
and find themselves under the supervision of regulatory authorities might also bias our es-
timation results. In recent years, regulatory authorities have been bound by official decrees
to ensure that local tax multipliers of municipalities operating under budget consolidation
plans are higher or at least equal to average state-wide tax multipliers of municipalities in
their population size range. This might induce upward movements in tax multipliers which
are unrelated to standard tax multipliers. There are unfortunately no official records on
municipalities with budget consolidation plans in the mid-1990s. However, according to
14Standard tax multipliers were not set exogenously in later reforms (2003, 2011).
15Although we distinguish “treated” and “untreated” municipalities, it is important to note that transfer
payments to all municipalities were affected by the reform: The sum of all transfers is fixed and the change
in the standard tax multiplier affects how this sum is distributed among all municipalities.
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the Ministry of the Interior, the practice of actively influencing tax multipliers is a rela-
tively new phenomenon. To the best of their knowledge, no official decrees existed during
our sample period that would have mandated regulatory authorities to make higher tax
rates a precondition for the approval of budget consolidation plans. What is more, budget
consolidation plans were much less widespread during our sample period than they are
today. Thus, we are confident in the validity of the common trend assumption.
We investigate the common trend by plotting the development of the average busi-
ness tax multipliers of “small” municipalities (treatment group) and “big” municipalities
(control group) between 1987 and 2010 (Figure 2.2). The former is represented by the
gray dashed and the latter by the black dotted line. The corresponding standard tax
multipliers are shown in gray (“small” municipalities) and black (“big” municipalities/
all municipalities). Figure 2.2 supports the common trend assumption. Both groups have
seen a gradual upward trend since 1987. The development of their business tax multipliers
has been similar for most of the time period. Visible exceptions with some convergence of
averages occurred during the reform years 1996-1998 and 2003 (see also Figure 2.1).16
Figure 2.2: Development of average business tax multipliers and standard
business tax multipliers, 1987-2010
Source: IT.NRW, own calculations.
16As mentioned above, there was another reform in 2003. The incentive effect was stronger for the
group of “small” municipalities due to their lower business tax multipliers.
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2.5 Results
In this section we first present our main results. Next, we perform a number of robustness
checks to validate our results. Last, we provide an extension to test if “small” municipali-
ties’ reactions to the reform differed systematically depending on their pre-reform business
tax multipliers.
2.5.1 Main results
Table 2.2 shows results for two regressions where t = 1995, ..., 1998. We restrict our
main analysis to the reform period as we expect municipalities to react instantaneously to
changes in applicable standard tax multipliers. Specification I contains baseline results for
a regression without any control variables apart from the usual municipal and year fixed
effects. The regression displayed in Specification II includes income tax shares, GDP and
disposable income of private households, surface area and the number of employees at
place of work (each per capita) as additional controls.
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Table 2.2: Regression results
I II
Baseline With controls
Treatment group × 1996 3.694∗∗∗ 3.527∗∗∗
(0.755) (1.077)
Treatment group × 1997 9.406∗∗∗ 6.772∗∗∗
(1.974) (2.296)
Treatment group × 1998 12.047∗∗∗ 8.471∗∗∗
(2.321) (2.883)












Notes: Fixed effects estimates based on Equation (2.11). Balanced panel of all 396 municipalities
for the period 1995 to 1998. Dependent variable: business tax multiplier (in %) (municipal level).
Independent variables of interest: interaction terms between treatment group and treatment points.
Treatment group: "small" municipalities, whose standard tax multiplier was increased in three equal
steps between 1996 and 1998. Control group: "big" municipalities, whose standard tax multiplier
was not affected by the reform. Treatment points: 1996, 1997 and 1998. Base year: 1995. Base
group: control group. Both specifications control for municipal and year fixed effects. Specification
II additionally controls for income of private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.), GDP (in 1,000 euro
p.c.) (county level) and surface area (in ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000 euro p.c.), employees
(p.c.) (municipal level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels:
∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
In line with our expectations, the interaction terms TGi × TPt, t = 1996, ..., 1998,
between treatment group and treatment point dummies are highly significant with positive
estimated coefficients in both regression specifications. According to the baseline specifi-
cation, business tax multipliers of small municipalities were about 3.7 percentage points
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higher in 1996 than in 1995 (δ1996 = 3.694), c.p. They rose by another 5.7 percentage
points in the following year (δ1997− δ1996 = 5.712). A smaller adjustment of about 2.6 per-
centage points took place in 1998, the final year of the reform (δ1998−δ1997 = 2.641). Given
the annual increase of the standard tax multiplier of 10 percentage points, the degree of
adjustment of small municipalities’ tax multipliers is remarkable.
Adding time-variant controls slightly affects the coefficients of interest
(Specification II). Per capita income tax shares and GDP each turn out to be in-
dividually significant covariates. Per capita disposable income of private households,
surface area and employees at place of employment are jointly significant with the
remaining controls and further improve the goodness of fit as measured by the R2. The
results of Specification II support the general magnitude and the direction of the reform
effect. However, they also suggest that the development of business tax multipliers is
affected by time-variant factors aside from the reform. We expect the common trend
between treatment and control groups to hold conditional on these time-varying factors.
Our results are stable across all tested model specifications.17
2.5.2 Robustness checks
To validate our results, we perform equivalent regressions using the full dataset where t
runs from 1987 to 2002 and corresponding interactions terms TGi×TPt, t = 1987, ..., 1994,
1996, ..., 2002 and year fixed effects are added. Specification III of Table 2.3 shows the
results of such a regression without any further control variables.
17Further potential controls were tested (e.g., debt p.c. and employees p.c.), but were not significant
and did not improve goodness of fit.
Chapter 2 Empirical Essays on Fiscal Federalism 36
Figure 2.3: Coefficients on interaction terms
Notes: Dotted lines mark 95% confidence intervals around point estimates.
Source: IT.NRW, own calculations.
The coefficients of interest, δt, belonging to this regression are also illustrated in
Figure 2.3. Importantly, the interaction terms TGi × TPt, t = 1987, ..., 1994 belonging to
the pre-reform period are all individually and jointly statistically insignificant. In contrast,
the interaction terms TGi × TPt, t = 1996, ..., 2002 of the reform and post-reform period
are all highly significant with positive coefficients, indicating an upward shift of business
tax multipliers triggered by the reform. The estimated adjustment during the reform
years 1996 to 1998 is exactly the same as in Specification I of Table 2.2. In the years
following the reform, estimated coefficients δ1999 to δ2002 remain fairly stable. This lends
support to the notion of an immediate response to each annual change of the standard tax
multiplier.18 Due to limitations in data availability (see Section 2.4.2), a regression using
pre-reform data and a set of control variables is not possible. However, the analysis can be
extended to post-reform years. This is done in Specification IV of Table 2.3 where t runs
from 1995 to 2002 and per capita income tax shares, GDP, disposable income, surface area
and employees again have been included as control variables. Again, the reform effects are
significant and their magnitude and direction are in line with our expectations.
18The slightly higher coefficients in 2001 and in 2002 might be due to anticipating reactions to the 2003
reform.
Chapter 2 Empirical Essays on Fiscal Federalism 37
Table 2.3: Regression results (extended time period)
III IV
Pre- and post-reform Post-reform
Treatment group × 1987 -1.927
(5.167)
Treatment group × 1988 -3.782
(3.762)
Treatment group × 1989 -4.001
(3.457)
Treatment group × 1990 -3.808
(3.081)
Treatment group × 1991 -0.347
(2.955)
Treatment group × 1992 0.089
(2.343)
Treatment group × 1993 -0.402
(2.138)
Treatment group × 1994 0.888
(1.715)
Treatment group × 1996 3.694∗∗∗ 3.533∗∗∗
(0.755) (0.879)
Treatment group × 1997 9.406∗∗∗ 7.578∗∗∗
(1.975) (1.940)
Treatment group × 1998 12.047∗∗∗ 10.291∗∗∗
(2.323) (2.298)
Treatment group × 1999 12.387∗∗∗ 11.092∗∗∗
(2.383) (2.457)
Treatment group × 2000 12.035∗∗∗ 9.824∗∗∗
(2.398) (2.611)
Treatment group × 2001 14.203∗∗∗ 11.754∗∗∗
(2.416) (2.777)
Treatment group × 2002 14.916∗∗∗ 12.554∗∗∗
(2.562) (2.927)
Income tax share 100.505∗∗∗
(31.279)
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III IV
Pre- and post-reform Post-reform
GDP -0.418
(0.409)








Notes: Specification III and IV are based on a balanced panel of all 396 municipalities for the
period 1987 to 2002 and 1995 to 2002, respectively. Dependent variable: business tax multiplier (in
%) (municipal level). Independent variables of interest: interaction terms between treatment group
and treatment points. Treatment group: "small" municipalities, whose standard tax multiplier was
increased in three equal steps between 1996 and 1998. Control group: "big" municipalities, whose
standard tax multiplier was not affected by the reform. Treatment points: 1987 to 1994 (only
Specification III ), 1996 to 2002. Base year: 1995. Base group: control group. Both specifications
control for municipal and year fixed effects. Specification IV additionally controls for income of
private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.), GDP (in 1,000 euro p.c.) (county level) and surface area (in
ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000 euro p.c.), employees (p.c.) (municipal level). Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
As an additional robustness check, we rerun Specifications I and II of Table 2.2, this
time excluding municipalities that were abundant, i.e., did not receive any equalization
transfers, at any point between 1995 and 1998. This reduces the number of munici-
palities in the treatment group to 316. There are 19 municipalities left in the control
group. Municipalities that did not benefit from equalization transfers presumably faced
weaker incentives to raise their tax multipliers following the increase in their standard tax
multiplier. Some incentive effect remains as it is very hard, if not impossible, for most
municipalities to predict whether their fiscal capacity might exceed their fiscal need in a
given year. Nonetheless, we expect the estimated treatment effect to be stronger than in
our baseline specification.
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Table 2.4 shows the corresponding regression results. The estimated treatment effect
is very similar and slightly more pronounced than in our baseline specifications, confirming
our expectations.
Table 2.4: Regression results (excluding abundant municipalities)
V VI
Baseline With controls
Treatment group × 1996 3.695∗∗∗ 3.386∗∗∗
(0.847) (1.179)
Treatment group × 1997 10.227∗∗∗ 7.325∗∗∗
(2.151) (2.361)
Treatment group × 1998 12.921∗∗∗ 9.024∗∗∗
(2.526) (2.872)












Notes: Fixed effects estimates based on Equation (2.11). Balanced panel of 335 municipalities, which
received transfers in all years from 1995 to 1998, for the period 1995 to 1998. Dependent variable:
business tax multiplier (in %) (municipal level). Independent variables of interest: interaction terms
between treatment group and treatment points. Treatment group: "small" municipalities, whose
standard tax multiplier was increased in three equal steps between 1996 and 1998. Control group:
"big" municipalities, whose standard tax multiplier was not affected by the reform. Treatment
points: 1996, 1997 and 1998. Base year: 1995. Base group: control group. Both specifications
control for municipal and year fixed effects. Specification VI additionally controls for income of
private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.), GDP (in 1,000 euro p.c.) (county level) and surface area (in
ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000 euro p.c.), employees (p.c.) (municipal level). Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
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2.5.3 Extension
Lastly, we adapt our model to test if “small” municipalities’ reactions to the reform differed
systematically depending on their pre-reform business tax multipliers. We expect to find
a more pronounced effect for “small” municipalities with a “low” pre-reform business tax
multiplier. We operationalize these considerations by distinguishing two groups within our
original treatment group: Treatment group 1 consists of the 217 “small” municipalities
whose business tax multiplier was smaller than 380 in 1995 (TG1i = 1 if population
≤ 150, 000 and mi,1995 < 380 and 0 otherwise). Treatment group 2 refers to the 158
“small” municipalities with business tax multipliers greater than or equal to 380 in 1995
(TG2i = 1 if population ≤ 150, 000 and m1995 ≥ 380 and 0 otherwise). The corresponding
interaction terms are defined as TG1i × TPt and TG2i × TPt, t = 1996, ..., 1998. We
estimate the following regression equation with t = 1995, ..., 1998:
mi,t = α1TG1i + α2TG2i +
∑1998
t=1996 δ1,t TG1i × TPt +
∑1998
t=1996 δ2,t TG2i × TPt
+βXi,t + θZc,t + λi + Φt + εi,t
(2.12)
Table 2.5 shows the results for differentiated treatment groups, with Specification V
displaying the regression without controls (except for the usual municipal and year fixed
effects) and Specification VI including the same time-variant controls as Specifications II
and IV.
In line with our expectations, we find a much stronger reform effect on the business
tax multipliers of treatment group 1 than on those of treatment group 2. All interaction
terms between treatment group 1 and treatment point dummies are highly statistically
significant with positive estimated coefficients δ1,t. The size of the estimated coefficient
on the interaction term between treatment group 1 and treatment point 1996 is rather
low and close to the one of treatment group 2 (Specification V : δ1,1996 − δ2,1996 = 0.951).
This is not the case in 1997 and 1998: According to Specification V, the business tax
multipliers of treatment group 1 were about 13.4 percentage points higher in 1997 than in
1995 (δ1,1997 = 13.375) and continued rising in 1998 (δ1,1998 = 17.284).
In contrast, the estimated effects of the interaction terms between treatment group
2 and the treatment point dummies are rather stable (δ2,1996 = 3.144, δ2,1997 = 3.956 and
δ2,1998 = 4.855). Moreover, statistical significance of treatment group 2’s interaction terms
is low compared with those of treatment group 1 and in case of δ2,1998 depends on the
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specification used.
Table 2.5: Regression results (two treatment groups)
V VI
Two treatment groups With controls
Treatment group (1) × 1996 4.095∗∗∗ 4.782∗∗∗
(1.046) (1.339)
Treatment group (2) × 1996 3.144∗∗∗ 3.360∗∗∗
(0.897) (0.961)
Treatment group (1) × 1997 13.375∗∗∗ 14.279∗∗∗
(2.113) (2.588)
Treatment group (2) × 1997 3.956∗ 3.945∗
(2.080) (2.282)
Treatment group (1) × 1998 17.284∗∗∗ 16.836∗∗∗
(2.209) (2.815)














Notes: Fixed effects estimates based on Equation (2.12). Balanced panel of all 396 municipalities
for the period 1995 to 1998. Dependent variable: business tax multiplier (in %) (municipal level).
Independent variables of interest: interaction terms between treatment groups and treatment points.
Treatment group 1: "small" municipalities whose business tax multiplier was smaller than 380 in
1995, and whose standard tax multiplier was increased in three equal steps between 1996 and 1998.
Treatment group 2: "small" municipalities whose business tax multiplier was greater than or equal
to 380 in 1995, and whose standard tax multiplier was increased in three equal steps between 1996
and 1998. Control group: "big" municipalities, whose standard tax multiplier was not affected by the
reform. Treatment points: 1996, 1997 and 1998. Base year: 1995. Base group: control group. Both
specifications control for municipal and year fixed effects. Specification VI additionally controls for
income of private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.), GDP (in 1,000 euro p.c.) (county level) and surface
area (in ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000 euro p.c.), employees (p.c.) (municipal level). Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
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In summary, we find that the rise of the standard business tax multiplier had an
effect on the business tax multipliers of all “small” municipalities, but this effect was
particularly strong for municipalities with a “low” pre-reform business tax multiplier (i.e,
pre-reform business tax multiplier below post-reform standard tax multiplier).
2.6 Conclusion
Conventional economic wisdom suggests that decentralized business taxation and a com-
mon pool of equalization transfers among local jurisdictions should lead to a race to the
bottom in local business tax rates. In practice, however, a simple institutional device,
standard tax multipliers, is used to counteract downward pressure on municipal tax rates
and tax effort. Standard tax multipliers are employed in fiscal equalization schemes in
all German territorial states to assess a municipality’s fiscal capacity independently of its
actual tax multiplier.
Using the case of North Rhine-Westphalia in the mid-1990s, this paper empirically
analyzes the impact of standard business tax multipliers on municipal business tax policy.
The results show that upward shifts in standard business tax multipliers lead to imme-
diate upward adjustments in actual business tax multipliers. This is true for all affected
municipalities. The reaction is more pronounced for municipalities whose business tax
multipliers are below post-reform standard tax multipliers. The findings are robust to a
number of alternative specifications. They also reflect the positive incentive effect derived
from theoretical considerations.
Our results have important implications for the practical design of fiscal equaliza-
tion schemes. They highlight the importance of the parameters of equalization systems
for shaping local tax policy. Through its choice of the standard tax multiplier, a state can
influence the level of municipal tax rates and the weight of competitive downward forces.
Some states choose to set standard tax multipliers that are so low that they have virtually
no signaling effect while others induce a race to the top in local taxation through regular
adjustments of standard multipliers. This partially explains why there is far greater het-
erogeneity in business tax multipliers across federal states than within states in Germany.
By consequence, standard tax multipliers should be regarded as a tool for govern-
ments to shape lower-level tax policy, with important consequences for their own compet-
itiveness.
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2.7 Appendix










1987 342.737 . . . . .
1988 348.838 . . . . .
1989 349.583 . . . . .
1990 352.146 . . . . .
1991 356.376 . . . . .
1992 364.646 0.294 18.849 . . 0.450
1993 369.182 0.294 . . 0.266 0.445
1994 371.593 0.296 19.471 . 0.261 0.440
1995 374.801 0.294 20.066 15.480 0.261 0.434
1996 378.775 0.268 20.288 15.686 0.257 0.430
1997 387.518 0.270 20.603 16.018 0.253 0.426
1998 393.114 0.282 20.992 16.339 0.254 0.423
1999 393.912 0.294 21.287 16.647 0.257 0.420
2000 394.530 0.296 21.699 17.204 0.260 0.418
2001 396.346 0.281 21.884 17.923 0.261 0.416
2002 398.449 0.278 22.181 17.866 0.259 0.414
Total 373.284 0.286 20.732 16.645 0.259 0.429
Notes: Business tax multiplier (in %), surface area (in ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000 euro p.c.),
employees (p.c.) (municipal level) and income of private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.), GDP (in
1,000 euro p.c.); number of observations: 396 municipalities p.a.
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1987 338.811 . . . . .
1988 344.813 . . . . .
1989 345.547 . . . . .
1990 348.120 . . . . .
1991 352.533 . . . . .
1992 360.827 0.291 18.505 . . 0.472
1993 365.336 0.291 . . 0.259 0.466
1994 367.816 0.294 19.124 . 0.255 0.461
1995 370.976 0.292 19.690 15.482 0.255 0.455
1996 375.147 0.266 19.935 15.693 0.251 0.451
1997 384.192 0.269 20.239 16.036 0.247 0.447
1998 389.928 0.281 20.604 16.363 0.248 0.444
1999 390.744 0.292 20.899 16.673 0.250 0.440
2000 391.344 0.294 21.289 17.233 0.254 0.438
2001 393.275 0.279 21.471 17.960 0.254 0.436
2002 395.416 0.276 21.755 17.895 0.253 0.435
Total 369.676 0.284 20.351 16.667 0.253 0.450
Notes: Business tax multiplier (in %), surface area (in ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000 euro p.c.),
employees (p.c.) (municipal level) and income of private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.), GDP (in
1,000 euro p.c.); number of observations: 375 "small" municipalities p.a.
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1987 412.857 . . . . .
1988 420.714 . . . . .
1989 421.667 . . . . .
1990 424.048 . . . . .
1991 425.000 . . . . .
1992 432.857 0.338 24.986 . . 0.055
1993 437.857 0.342 . . 0.382 0.055
1994 439.048 0.334 25.658 . 0.373 0.055
1995 443.095 0.335 26.778 15.444 0.368 0.055
1996 443.571 0.308 26.597 15.554 0.363 0.055
1997 446.905 0.298 27.105 15.704 0.360 0.056
1998 450.000 0.315 27.930 15.915 0.360 0.056
1999 450.476 0.331 28.205 16.189 0.366 0.056
2000 451.429 0.326 29.037 16.692 0.372 0.056
2001 451.190 0.311 29.245 17.260 0.373 0.056
2002 452.619 0.308 29.786 17.344 0.370 0.056
Total 437.708 0.323 27.533 16.263 0.369 0.056
Notes: Business tax multiplier (in %), surface area (in ha p.c.), income tax share (in 1,000 euro p.c.),
employees (p.c.) (municipal level) and income of private households (in 1,000 euro p.c.), GDP (in
1,000 euro p.c.); number of observations: 21 "big" municipalities p.a.
Chapter 3
Does tax policy follow the
inverse-elasticity rule?
3.1 Introduction
Motivation and research question. The seminal contribution of Ramsey (1927) shows
that optimal tax rates on goods depend inversely on their elasticity of demand. While the
optimal-tax literature has made progress since Ramsey’s initial contribution, the general
idea of his framework has not lost ground: the excess burden of taxation is positively
related to the sensitivity of the tax base, and the tax rate should be inversely related to
a tax base’s tax sensitivity. In the case of two tax bases, for example, Ramsey taxation
suggests to impose a higher tax rate on the tax base that is relatively less responsive to
tax-rate changes.1 One important question that arises in this context is: do real-world
policy makers apply the rules of Ramsey by imposing different tax rates on goods with
different tax elasticities? In other words: does tax policy set higher tax rates on goods
that are less responsive to taxation relative to more responsive goods?
Our approach. Evidence on this question is scarce, and the reasons for this scarcity
are twofold. First, in order to ensure comparability between the tax rates on different
1Ramsey’s original framework is about minimizing the deadweight loss of indirect taxes. However, the
general rationale also applies to other type of taxes. For example, the recent literature on the elasticity
of taxable income (surveyed by Saez et al. 2012) concludes that optimal labor income taxes decrease with
the mobility of the income-tax base. In a similar vein, optimal corporate taxes depend on the mobility of
the firm tax base (Devereux et al. 2014; Kawano and Slemrod 2015). Mankiw et al. (2009) and Piketty
and Saez (2013) survey the current status of the optimal-tax literature.
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goods, one requires an institutional setting where tax rates on distinct taxable goods
are set by the same institutional players and the taxed goods are subject to similar eco-
nomic conditions. Second, since tax elasticities are to be estimated empirically, a set-up
is required that allows credible empirical identification of the tax sensitivity of the taxed
goods of interest. In this paper, we address the research question in an empirical set-up
that meets both requirements. We explore the unique case of local taxation on the mu-
nicipal level in Germany, where more than 11,000 municipalities have autonomy to set
taxes on business profits and property values. This empirical playground allows us to
identify how changes in business and property taxes affect the respective tax revenues,2
and hence makes it possible to evaluate local taxation in Germany with respect to Ram-
sey taxation. We particularly study whether different elasticities of the business-tax and
property-tax revenue, which we estimate empirically, translate into actual tax-policy fol-
lowing the inverse-elasticity rule (which is an advancement of the standard Ramsey result;
see Baumol and Bradford [1970]).
Our dataset covers the full universe of municipalities in a very long panel of 16 years,
1995-2010. We employ a difference-in-differences research design and for identifying varia-
tion we rely on many (business and property) tax-rate reforms that were implemented by
the municipalities. The long panel dimension, along with the fact that the municipalities
operate in a very homogeneous economic environment, allows us to control for many con-
founding factors that present potential threats to common trend assumptions. As opposed
to many other empirical tax studies, we do not have to deal with changes in the tax base
definitions that often come along with tax reforms, because the tax base, as well as a
basic tax rate, is defined on the federal level and municipalities only set a multiplier on
the exogenous basic rate and base.3
2Note that there is a direct link between tax-revenue elasticities and tax-base elasticities: a high tax-
revenue elasticity with respect to (w.r.t.) tax rates implies a low (in absolute terms) elasticity of the tax
base w.r.t. taxes, and vice versa (see Section 3.4 for a detailed exposition of this rationale). We estimate
the effect on tax revenues, rather than tax bases, because of data restrictions; the statistical offices do not
provide long panel data on tax bases. Calculating the base as tax revenue divided by tax rate is not an
option because of unobserved deductions and credits (Fossen and Steiner 2014) and because we do not
have information on the distribution of property types in the municipalities (see Section 3.2.2).
3Due to data-access limitations and the non-existence of the long panel dimension out of a single data
source, these data have not been used extensively by researchers. Notable exceptions include Büttner
(2003) on the sensitivity of the business tax base, Becker et al. (2012) on the effect of the local tax on
the activity of multinational enterprises, Baskaran (2014) for tax-mimicking effects, Foremny and Riedel
(2014) for the effect of elections on tax-rate changes, and Fuest et al. (2016) on the incidence of the tax
on wages.
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Findings. In our empirical analysis we relate business-tax revenue and property-
tax revenue in a municipality to the business-tax rate and property-tax rate, respectively,
in this municipality, and exploit within-municipality variation over time to study how
elastically business-tax and property-tax revenues respond to tax changes. We find that
business-tax revenue does not significantly increase in response to tax hikes. Property-tax
revenue, on the other hand, increases by almost 1% in response to a 1% increase in the tax
rate. These results imply that the business-tax base responds strongly to tax-rate changes
whereas the property-tax base is not tax sensitive (see Section 3.4 on the relationship
between the tax-base elasticity and the tax-revenue elasticity). If tax policy was consistent
with the inverse-elasticity rule, our estimates would suggest that tax rates are significantly
higher on immobile property than on mobile business profits. However, this is not what we
observe. In almost all years of our sample period, the share of municipalities with a higher
business tax than property tax is considerably greater than 50%. In addition, the average
business-tax rate is greater than the average property-tax rate in all years of our sample
period. Our elasticity estimates are not driven by municipalities with higher property-tax
rates than business-tax rates: municipalities which impose higher rates on business profits
than on property also face much more tax responsive business profits than property.
The inverse-elasticity rule depicts that goods should be taxed in inverse proportion
to their price elasticities.4 We can combine this rule with our elasticity estimates and
conduct back-of-the-envelope calculations to determine the optimal relation between the
business and property tax rates. Given our elasticity estimates of 0.129 for business-tax
revenues and 0.886 for property-tax revenues, such calculations yield that the property
tax rate should, from an optimal-tax perspective, approximately be seven-times higher
on average than the business tax rate. This is in contrast to actual rates; we observe
that throughout our sample period the business-tax multiplier is on average 1.08 times
higher than the property-tax multiplier. This suggests that German municipalities are
not compliant with the inverse-elasticity rule and presumably leave efficiency gains on the
table.
Rationalizing the results. We propose three reasons for this result. The deviation
4The inverse-elasticity rule is about minimizing deadweight loss in the presence of an exogenous revenue
requirement. Note that municipalities arguably do face such a revenue requirement. For example, they
are obligated by the federal level to finance large parts of child care and social assistance to unemployed
individuals. The inverse-elasticity rule is given by τ1η1 = τ2η2, where τ and η are the tax rates and
base elasticities of the two goods. See Section 3.4 for a formal argument on the relationship between the
tax-base and tax-revenue elasticity.
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between actual and optimal rates are either rooted in (i) a lack of knowledge of optimal-
tax rules among local policy-makers, (ii) distributional (equity) concerns where property is
taxed low for social-policy reasons, (iii) political-economy arguments in which politicians
seek to maintain office, or a combination of these three points. The first possible reason
may be prevalent because the optimal-tax literature is highly theoretical and there is a
disconnect to applied public finance (see also Footnote 5). The second point may play a
role because it is often a declared goal of social-policy to incentivize people to buy and
own property in order to build up wealth and be able to absorb economic shocks such
as job losses. The rationale for the third reason is that, in contrast to property owners,
firm-owners and workers of local firms are more likely to live in other municipalities and
therefore do not vote in the municipality where their work place is located. It is therefore
more attractive for office-seeking politicians to tax non-residents through business taxes
rather than residents through the property tax.
Contribution to the literature. Our paper speaks about and contributes to
three strands of literature. First, we relate to a small literature that studies whether
actual tax policy follows the requirements of optimal-taxation theory.5 For example, Saez
(2001) develops an optimal income tax model that can be applied based on empirically
estimated earnings elasticities. Numerical simulations show that the pattern of actual
tax schedules is close to the U-shaped pattern of optimal tax rates that he derives based
on his model. The optimal top marginal tax rate, however, is higher than the actual
top rate in the United States (U.S.) (Diamond and Saez 2011). Mankiw et al. (2009)
discuss the extent to which the most important lessons from the optimal-tax literature
are consistent with actual policies. They conclude that “tax policy has moved in the
directions suggested by theory along a few dimensions, even though the recommendations
of theory along these dimensions are not always definitive.” (Mankiw et al. 2009, pages
147/148). For example, they argue that the observed trend towards flatter income-tax
rates in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries
may suggest that tax-policy is affected by optimal-tax theory. The paper mostly reports
cross-country trends in taxation and does not provide a test of optimal-tax rules based on
empirically estimated elasticities. Creedy and Gemmell (2015) build on empirical estimates
5According to Saez (2001), the optimal-tax literature mostly interests theorists and does not make an
impact on applications. This disconnect between the theoretic optimal-tax literature and the applied-
empirical literature may be among the reasons why actual tax policies are rarely evaluated in the light of
optimal-tax laws. Sørensen (2007) discusses the political relevance of the theory of optimal taxation.
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of the elasticity of taxable income to show that, for many individuals actual income-tax
rates in the U.S. are well in line with optimal revenue-maximizing tax rates. As opposed
to our paper, these few studies on the optimality of actually implemented taxes are mostly
on the personal income tax. We provide some first evidence in this regard for other taxes.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the elasticity of the corporate tax base
and the elasticity of tax revenues. While the literature acknowledges that firms respond to
tax incentives and adjust to taxes along various different dimensions,6 only a few papers
explicitly study the tax-sensitivity of the overall tax bases and tax revenues. One reason
for scarce evidence presumably is that in most countries, corporate taxes are levied on
the national or state level, which hinders the causal identification of credible estimates.
Comparisons of countries, and even federal states within a country, are critical and common
trend assumptions in country-level analyses over time are often hard to establish. We aim
to overcome these shortcomings by relying on the case of German local business and
property taxes in a difference-in-differences research design with many independent tax-
setting municipalities which operate in a homogeneous economic environment.
There are a few papers that identify the effect of business/corporate taxes on tax
revenues or tax bases. Devereux et al. (2014) examine the elasticity of corporate taxable
income in the United Kingdom. Using kinks in the corporate tax schedule, the paper
finds moderate elasticities that differ depending on which kink is examined. Dwenger and
Steiner (2012) study a reform of the federal German corporate tax to estimate an elasticity
that is slightly larger than the ones in Devereux et al. (2014). In contrast to these papers,
our estimations are not based on a short time period or a single tax reform but exploit
various tax rate changes in a panel over many years.7
A few papers study the sensitivity of the business-tax base in the same institutional
setting that we use. Büttner (2003) finds a very large effect on the tax base, suggesting
that the municipalities are on the downward-sloping part of the business-tax Laffer curve.
6For example, it has been shown that corporate tax policies affect location decisions (e.g., Devereux and
Griffith 1998), investment behavior (e.g., Feld and Heckemeyer 2011), financing decisions (e.g., Graham
2003) or choice of organizational form (e.g., de Mooij and Nicodème 2008). Devereux et al. (2014) present
a more detailed overview of this literature.
7Additional papers on the effect of corporate taxation on the tax base and revenues in non-German
countries include Gruber and Rauh (2007) who use accounting data that are subject to the usual concerns
with these type of data. Clausing (2007), Devereux (2007) and Brill and Hassett (2007) employ country-
level regressions but do not include country fixed effects, which makes the results questionable. Mintz
and Smart (2004) and Dahlby and Ferede (2012) use within-country variation in Canada. Kawano and
Slemrod (2015) study corporate-tax-base responses in a panel of OECD countries.
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Baskaran (2015)8 does not find any significant effects of the business tax on tax revenues;
this is in line with our findings. These studies of Büttner (2003) and Baskaran (2015)
are based on data from only one (out of 16) federal states while we use country-wide
data. Fossen and Steiner (2014) use firm-level data to study how firms respond to changes
in municipality-level tax rates. Their findings suggest that firms reduce their taxable
income by about 0.5% in response to a 1% increase in the tax rate, suggesting that
municipalities can raise extra tax revenues through higher tax rates despite a significant
tax-base response. In contrast to the long panel we are able to rely on, Fossen and
Steiner (2014) only use data from two years which complicates standard common trend
assumptions. In general, our analysis intends to complement the few empirical papers, and
adds to the important understanding of behavioral responses of firms to profit taxation.
Third, our work adds to a very small literature on the sensitivity of property to taxes.
One recent study is Baskaran (2015) (see Footnote 8), which uses the same institutional
set-up as we do, though only for one federal state, and finds that the tax-revenue elasticity
of property taxes is close to unity. Stine (1988) uses local-level panel data from New York
State and finds that the property tax base does not respond strongly to tax-rate changes.
The findings in both these studies are consistent with our findings.
Structure of the paper. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 illustrates the
institutional background. Section 3.3 describes the data sources and provides summary
statistics. Section 3.4 lays out our empirical model and identification strategy. Section 3.5
presents and discusses the results. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Institutional background
While most taxes are set at the federal level in Germany, German municipalities are
granted the right to set a business tax (Gewerbesteuer, short: BT) and a property tax
(Grundsteuer, short: PT) autonomously. This implies that the business and property tax
are set locally by each of more than 11,000 municipalities (Gemeinden) that are spread
around the entire country. Business and property tax revenue are two of the most relevant
sources of income of German municipalities.9 The business tax is the most abundant tax
8This paper, developed independently of this work, focuses solely on the revenue elasticities of the local
taxes, while we focus on the implications of our revenue-elasticity estimates for the inverse-elasticity rule.
9Other major municipal income sources are: municipal share of value-added tax and income tax, duties
and charges, municipal fiscal equalization transfers.
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on profits in Germany. Total (gross) business tax revenue amounted to 43 billion (bn)
euros in 2013, this corresponds to about 7% of total national tax revenues. Property tax
income summed up to 12.4 bn euros in 2013.
3.2.1 Business taxation
The business tax is levied on operating profits and applies to both corporate and non-
corporate firms.10 The tax base for the local business tax is legally defined by the federal
government and cannot be affected by the municipalities. The federal government also
sets a basic federal tax rate (Steuermesszahl, τBTfed ), but the local municipalities choose the
multiplier (Hebesatz, mBTi ). The actual business tax rate is derived by multiplying the
local tax multiplier with the basic federal tax rate.11 The local tax rate τBTi on business
profits in a municipality i equals: τBTi = τBTfed ×mBTi . The basic federal tax rate, τBTfed , was
set at 5% until 2007 and was decreased to 3.5% since 2008. That is, a multiplier mBTi of
300% implied a local business-tax rate of 15% before 2008 and 10.5% since 2008.12 There
are no kinks in the tax schedule and the tax rate is not graduated so that marginal tax
rates equal average tax rates. With regard to the period of interest, two relevant reforms
took place in Germany on the federal level: First, the tax on business capital was abolished
in 1998, reducing the tax base of the business tax. Second, since 2008 the business tax is no
longer deductible as a business expense widening the tax base. These two reforms affected
all municipalities and firms in the country equally, and therefore should not confound our
results. Business tax multipliers varied between 30 and 600 during the time period 1995
to 2010 and averaged about 325 (Figure 3.1 in Section 3.5.3 provides an overview of the
development of average multipliers over time, more summary statistics can be found in
Section 3.3.2).
10In addition to the local business tax, corporate firms and non-corporate firms are also subject to
federal corporate and income taxes, respectively. Subject to certain restrictions, non-corporate firms may
deduct the local business tax from the federal income tax. Most companies in the agricultural and public
sector as well as self-employed and freelancers are exempted from the local business tax.
11Strategic profit shifting of corporations with multiple establishments to exploit differences in local
business tax multipliers are illegal and very difficult.
12A minimum multiplier (floor) of 200% was implemented in 2004 to avoid detrimental tax competition.
However, only about 18 out of more than 11,000 municipalities had set a multiplier below 200% before
this reform.
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3.2.2 Property taxation
The property tax works much in the same way as the business tax; the tax base and the
basic federal rate are defined at the federal level, and the municipalities only decide upon
the property-tax multiplier. The German property tax system distinguishes two categories
of property: property used for agricultural and forestry (property tax A) and constructable
property or property with buildings (property tax B). In this paper, we focus on the latter
(property tax on buildings and constructable property) because the tax on agricultural
and forestry property is of minor importance for a municipality’s tax revenue. The tax
base is a standardized value (Einheitswert) of the property (and not the market value).13
As with the business tax, the property tax in a municipality i depends on the federal
rate and the multiplier, i.e., τPTi = τPTfed × mPTi . The basic federal tax rate depends on
the type of building and also varies between West and East Germany. Depending on the
type of property, the rates vary between 0.26 and 0.35% in West Germany and between
0.5 and 1% in East Germany. The differences between East and West Germany account
for the different definitions of the standardized value (which is the tax base) in the two
parts of the country and are intended to make the multiplier rates comparable between
East and West Germany.14 Property tax multipliers varied between 50 and 810 during the
time period 1995 to 2010 and averaged about 313 (Figure 3.1 in Section 3.5.3 provides an
overview of the development of the average multipliers over time, more summary statistics
can be found in Section 3.3.2).
3.2.3 Comparability of business and property tax rates
In evaluating whether German municipalities apply the inverse-elasticity-rule when setting
the multiplier tax rates for the property and business tax, we imply that the multipliers
are comparable between these two types of taxes. At first glance, this seems to be a strong
assumption because the tax bases appear to be very different: operating profits of firms
are the tax base in case of the business tax, and standardized property values are the base
for the property tax. However, in this paper we do not compare the effective tax rates
13The standardized values do not fairly reflect today’s real property value (although they are supposed
to according to the legal basis). This is only one of the reasons why the reform of the property tax is
subject to frequent debate.
14Since our data is on the municipality level, we do not have information on the distribution of property
types, hence do not know the respective federal tax rates. This is one reason why we use the multipliers
rather than the effective tax rates in our empirical analyses.
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but rather use the multiplier rates for comparison. These are not directly applied to the
respective tax bases (profits or property). Instead, the base is multiplied with the federal
tax rate (Steuermesszahl) and then the multipliers are applied (recall: τi = τfed×mi). We
argue that the substantially different levels of the federal tax rate (recall: between 3.5 and
5% for the business tax and between 0.26 and 1% for the property tax) account for the
different nature of the tax bases, and make the multiplier rates comparable between the
two types of taxes. This is supported by the levels of multipliers that we observe. Although
the tax bases are so different in nature, the multipliers for both taxes range between very
similar levels. During the time period that we examine, on average multipliers ranged
between 312 and 338 for the business tax and 292 and 329 for the property tax. Hence,
the multipliers appear to be on similar and comparable levels.15
3.3 Data
In this section we provide an overview of our data, present summary statistics and sum-
marize the identifying variation in tax rates that we use in our empirical analyses.
3.3.1 Data sources
We construct a unique dataset on German municipalities using and combining different
sources of administrative data. Our municipality-level data on tax rates, tax revenues
and population come from the statistical offices of the federal states.16 Municipality-level
employment statistics are provided by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur
für Arbeit). We further add variables on the county-level (gross domestic product (GDP),
level of debt, disposable income of private households) for the years 1995-2010, which
come from a different data source at the statistical offices of the federal states (note that
each of about 400 counties either comprises several municipalities or constitutes a single
15The view that the federal rates are adjusted to make the tax multipliers comparable is supported
by the fact that the federal rates for the property tax are different for East and West Germany due to
different definitions of the standardized property values.
16The most recent data, since 2009, are available online at the so-called Regional Database Germany
(Regionaldatenbank Deutschland). Data for the years between 2001 and 2008 are made available via the
Statistical Local (Statistik Lokal) publications. Earlier data before 2001 are retrieved on request directly
from the respective statistical offices of the federal states. This is the reason why the time dimension of
our dataset varies by state. For example, while our oldest data on the PT and BT go back to the 1970s
(Bavaria), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern could only provide data since 1998.
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municipality).
While some federal states provide data that range back to the 1970s, the majority of
states make data available since the early 1990s. In addition, the county-level variables are
as well only available since 1995. This is the reason why we base our baseline estimations
on the period 1995-2010. We also run sensitivity checks with a longer time-series but fewer
federal states. To obtain comparable elasticity measures, we restrict our empirical analysis
to those municipalities for which we have complete information on the business-tax and
property-tax rates and revenues. We further exclude municipalities with negative business
or property tax revenue in a certain year from our empirical analysis since actual revenues
cannot be negative but are only reported to be negative due to accounting procedures. In
total, the data in our baseline analyses contain about 170,000 municipality-level observa-
tions in the 16-year panel, 1995-2010 (see Table 3.5 in Appendix 3.7 for more information).
The next section provides summary statistics.
3.3.2 Summary statistics and identifying variation
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for our baseline sample during the period 1995
to 2010. Average tax revenue from the business tax (BT) is much higher than from the
property tax (PT), suggesting that the business tax is more important for the municipali-
ties. The table also shows that there is great heterogeneity across municipalities w.r.t. to
population size (between 10 and 3.4 million inhabitants). The fact that the average BT
multiplier is higher than the average PT multiplier is at the center of this paper, and will
be discussed in more detail below. Tables 3.6 to 3.11 in Appendix 3.7 report summary
statistics (mean, standard deviation, numbers of observation) by year and state.
Our difference-in-differences identification strategy rests on within-municipality vari-
ation in tax rates over time. Table 3.2 provides an overview of variation in the business-tax
and property-tax multipliers. For each year of your baseline sample, it depicts the share
of municipalities which change their BT and PT rates in year t compared to year t − 1.
On average, 8% and 10% of the municipalities change their BT and PT multipliers per
year, respectively. Thereby, the BT tends to be more stable than the PT and the share of
municipalities that changed the PT is higher each year.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics, 1995-2010
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Revenue BT 2651.616 28204.096 0.005 2078955 174670
Revenue BT (log) 4.91 2.501 -5.276 14.547 174670
Multiplier BT 324.885 37.755 30 600 174670
Multiplier BT (log) 5.776 0.121 3.401 6.397 174670
Revenue PT 808.975 8033.088 0.511 747238 174670
Revenue PT (log) 4.799 1.694 -0.671 13.524 174670
Multiplier PT 313.119 45.87 50 810 174670
Multiplier PT (log) 5.736 0.146 3.912 6.697 174670
GDP 3773758.17 3354230.616 671848 98751797 158540
Population 7.183 46.607 0.01 3471.418 174418
Population (sq) 2223.819 117169.293 0 12050743 174418
Debt 157390.836 119370.435 0 3414334 162730
Private income 2845050.66 1934041.044 488465 31811513 150270
Employees 2549.232 18909.947 0 1158925 158700
Notes: Summary statistics. Municipal level variables BT and PT revenue (in 1,000 euro) and
multiplier (in %), population (in 1,000) and number of employees. County level variables: level
of debt (in 1,000 euro), income of private households (in 1,000 euro) and GDP (in 1,000 euro).
Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities collected from the statistical offices
of the German federal states. Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to observations for which information
on BT and PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue is reported negative.
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 in Appendix 3.7 provide further detailed information on the size
and direction of the changes that we exploit for identifying variation. Most of the changes
are multiplier increases in the range between 1 and 50 points. There are more tax increases
than decreases, and only a small share of municipalities implement multiplier changes that
exceed 50 points. The variation over time is visualized in Appendix 3.7 Figures 3.2 and
3.3. The figures depict maps of Germany showing the levels of business taxes and property
taxes in the years 2001 and 2010, respectively. The differences in colors between the years
provide a visualization of the variation over time for both type of taxes.
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Table 3.2: Share of municipalities with changing BT and PT multipliers (in
%), 1995-2010


















Notes: Share of municipalities which change their BT and PT multipliers between years.
3.4 Empirical strategy and identification
To estimate the effect of local taxes on tax revenues, we employ the following difference-
in-differences (DiD) panel-regression model:




1Xi,c,s,t + βj2Zc,s,t + λi + φt + φt × ηs + µji,s,c,t, (3.1)
where i stands for a municipality in county c in federal state s in year t, and j
indicates the type of tax; either property tax (PT) or business tax (BT). The dependent
variable, Y ji,c,s,t, is tax revenue generated from the (business or property) tax of type
j (in euro) in municipality i. The explanatory variable of interest is the (business or
property) tax multiplier mji,c,s,t. Xi,c,s,t is a vector containing several control variables on
the municipality-level (population, number of employees), Zc,s,t contains control variables
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on the county-level (GDP, level of debt, disposable income of private households), λi are
municipality fixed effects, φt are year fixed effects, φt × ηs are federal-state specific year
effects, and µi,c,s,t is an error term. Tax revenues and tax rates enter the regression in logs
to derive an elasticity interpretation of the effect of tax rates on revenues. The elasticity of
interest for tax of type j is denoted j. Standard errors are clustered on the municipality
level.
Each of the about 11,000 municipalities annually sets the tax rate multiplier for
year t in the last months of year t−1, and our data cover the universe of all municipalities
and span a long time period (see Section 3.3.2 for details on the variation in tax rates).
This institutional set up generates many differential tax rate changes, motivating the use
of the DiD research design. The identifying assumption behind our DiD design is that
municipalities with tax rate changes would have had the same development of tax revenues
as municipalities without tax rate changes, had they not implemented a tax rate change.
This assumption is violated if, for example, local economic conditions force certain mu-
nicipalities to change rates, whereas other municipalities face other, less pressing local
economic conditions. We take two steps to control for this possible threat to identification
(as in Fuest et al. [2016]; also see Footnote 17): First, we include federal-state (Länder)
specific year effects that control for any economic shocks on the federal-state level. Since
federal states constitute homogeneous economic environments, it is unlikely that a certain
economic shock hits municipalities within a federal state differently. Second, in addition
to wiping out time-invariant municipality effects, we control for time-varying municipality
characteristics such as size as well as economic conditions such as GDP, level of debt or
number of employees. This implies that we only compare municipalities with similar char-
acteristics and economic conditions. In addition, previous evidence shows that tax changes
are usually implemented for political, rather than economic, reasons (such as upcoming
elections), suggesting that local economic conditions play a minor role in explaining tax
changes (see, e.g., Castanheira et al. 2012; Foremny and Riedel 2014; Fuest et al. 2016).17
One other concern with many empirical tax studies is that tax reforms often come
with changes in tax rates and tax base definitions (e.g., tax-rate-cut-cum-base-broadening
type reforms. Kawano and Slemrod [2015] provide empirical evidence that tax changes are
usually accompanied by tax-base changes). This is not a concern in our set-up: any changes
in tax base definitions are legislated on the federal level and are accounted for by the year
17Fuest et al. (2016) use the same variation in business taxes that we use in a similar empirical design.
They provide careful tests showing that local economic conditions do not drive tax changes.
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fixed effects. Reverse causality is not likely to bias our results either. The timing of events
is such that municipalities usually set the multiplier in the last months of year t− 1; that
is, before they are aware of tax revenues in year t. Reverse causality, however, remains
a potential problem if municipalities have precise expectations in t − 1 regarding tax
revenue in year t. We argue that such expectations will usually be based on economic
conditions and hence should be captured by the control variables and state-specific year
effects. A further identification concern relates to tax competition effects and the potential
dependency of tax policies across neighboring municipalities. Recent empirical evidence
using the same institutional set-up as ours by Baskaran (2014), however, does not find
any sort of tax mimicking and therefore neglects this possible source of bias. His paper
shows that following an exogenous tax reform that provided municipalities in one federal
state with an incentive to change rates, neighboring municipalities in other federal states
did not adjust their rates in response. Isen (2014) finds a similar result for local taxation
in the US.
In general, this empirical set-up is very advantageous in light of the purpose of this
paper: we aim to compare tax responses of two different taxable goods. This can be done
cleanly in the described empirical framework since we look at the same municipalities over
the same time period using the exact same identification strategy and data. If any sources
of endogeneity remain despite our carefully chosen research design, the resulting bias will
be similar for the property and business tax elasticities, hence ensuring that the relative
magnitudes of the estimates are comparable.
Tax-base versus tax-revenue elasticities. The inverse-elasticity rule is regarding the
responsiveness of tax bases, rather than the responsiveness of tax revenues. However, data
restrictions do not allow us to study the effect of taxes on tax bases and we instead estimate
the effect on tax revenues (see Footnote 2 and Section 3.2.2). To see the relationship
between the tax-base elasticity and the tax-revenue elasticity, consider the simple inverse-
elasticity rule:
τ1η1 = τ2η2, (3.2)
where τj and ηj (with j ∈ 1, 2) are the tax rate and the tax-base elasticity of goods
1 and 2 (i.e., property and business), respectively. The tax base is denoted Bj and the
term for the tax-base elasticity is: ηj = ∆Bj∆τj
τj
Bj
. Tax revenue TRj is given by TRj = τjBj,
and changes in tax revenue are then:
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∆TRj = ∆τjBj + τj∆Bj = ∆τjBj + ηjBj∆τj = Bj(1 + ηj)∆τj (3.3)






= (1 + ηj) (3.4)
The left-hand-side in this equation is the elasticity of tax revenue w.r.t. the tax rate, which
is the parameter that we identify from our empirical estimates (denoted j in the regression
equation above). The equation shows that our empirical estimate equals (1+ηj), and hence
has a direct relationship with the elasticity of the tax base. In particular, a high elasticity
of tax revenues is associated with a low (in absolute terms)18 elasticity of the tax base, and
vice versa. In the extreme case where our revenue elasticity would be estimated to be 1 (0),
the associated tax-base elasticity is 0 (-1). This exercise of course neglects the existence
of deductions and credits, but illustrates the general relation between the elasticities of
the tax base and tax revenue.
3.5 Results and discussion
In this section we first present our main regression results. Next we provide some additional
results. Last we discuss our findings and provide possible explanations.
3.5.1 Main results
Table 3.3 depicts our main regression results. Columns (I) and (II) show that business
profits are very sensitive to tax-rate changes. The elasticity of tax revenues with respect
to a change in the tax multiplier is about 0.12 and not different from zero in a statistical
sense. That is, municipalities are not able to raise significant amounts of extra tax revenue
by increasing business tax rates. The results are robust to the control variables included
(Columns (I) vs. (II)). Our elasticity estimates suggest that, because firms are tax respon-
sive, tax rates in German municipalities are placed close to the peak of the Laffer curve.
While these elasticities appear to be very low, they are still higher than the results in
18Note that we expect the tax-revenue elasticity to be positive and the tax-base elasticity to be negative.
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Büttner (2003) who finds that municipalities in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg
even loose tax revenue in response to tax-rate hikes.
Columns (III) and (IV) of Table 3.3 present the results for the property-tax elastici-
ties. We find that, in contrast to business income, property is almost not responsive to tax-
rate changes. A 1% increase in the property tax multiplier leads to a tax-revenue increase
of about 0.9%. The results are practically independent of the control variables we include
(Columns (III) vs. (IV)). The property tax elasticities are in line with intuition: physical
property cannot be as mobile as business income and only responds slightly through, for
example, long-term responses (see next subsection) or avoidance/evasion channels. In light
of the fact that we estimate property-tax and business-tax elasticities in the exact same
institutional set-up using an identical research design, the plausibility of the property-tax
estimates also lends credibility to our estimates for the business-tax elasticities.
Table 3.3: Effects of business and property taxes on tax revenues
(I) (II) (III) (IV)





Observations 158,288 136,614 158,288 136,614
R2 0.148 0.136 0.671 0.685
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Municip. FE yes yes yes yes
State × Year FE yes yes yes yes
Add. Controls no yes no yes
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation (3.1) with standard errors in parentheses. Stan-
dard errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities. Years 1995 to 2010. The unit of ob-
servation is a single municipality. Dependent variable in Columns (I) and (II) is municipality-level
tax revenue generated from the local business tax (BT), and municipality-level tax revenue from
the local property tax (PT) in Columns (III) and (IV). The independent variable of interest is the
municipality-level tax multiplier m for the business or property tax. Reported coefficients can be
interpreted as elasticities identified from tax reforms. All specifications include year fixed effects,
municipality fixed effects, and federal-state specific year fixed effects. Columns (I) and (III) include
controls for population and GDP. Columns (II) and (IV) additionally add controls for the level of
debt, number of employees, and disposable income of private households.
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3.5.2 Additional results
Our results are robust to a number of further sensitivity checks presented in Table 3.14
in Appendix 3.7. Panel A of the table depicts the results of regressions estimated on
a balanced panel of municipalities. The results are almost unchanged. In Panel B, we
present regressions estimated on a sample of less federal states for which we have data for
more years. In particular, these regressions include the years 1984 to 2010 for the federal
states of North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, and Lower Saxony. Compared to the baseline
estimates, both elasticities become smaller. However, a negative coefficient for the business
tax multiplier remains insignificant. Panels C and D present long-run estimates where we
lag the independent tax variable one and two years, respectively. Still insignificant, the
property tax coefficient moves even closer to zero. The results for the property tax are
interesting. As one would expect, property is more mobile in the long-run. The coefficient
drops to 0.66 when we lag the tax rate one year, and drops even further, to 0.46, in the
two-year-lag specification. The result that property becomes more mobile in the long-run
is in line with the findings of Stine (1988).
In order to examine if differences in elasticities are associated with different tax
rates, Table 3.4 reports regression results separately for municipalities that have higher
property-tax rates than business-tax rates (Panel A) and municipalities that impose a
higher rate on business profits than on property (Panel B). The coefficients in both panels
reveal the same pattern as before for both types of municipalities. Business profits are very
tax sensitive with imprecisely measured elasticities close to zero, whereas the tax-revenue
elasticity for the property tax is always close to unity. These results show that business-
profits are more responsive to taxes even in those municipalities that impose higher taxes
on business than on property.
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Table 3.4: Tax-revenue elasticities. Heterogeneity w.r.t. tax-rate relation
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Revenue business tax Revenue property tax





Observations 66242 55461 66242 55461
R2 0.167 0.154 0.544 0.491





Observations 92046 81153 92046 81153
R2 0.122 0.115 0.753 0.775
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Municip. FE yes yes yes yes
State × Year FE yes yes yes yes
Add. Controls no yes no yes
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation (3.1) with standard errors in parentheses. Stan-
dard errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities. Years 1995 to 2010. The unit of ob-
servation is a single municipality. Dependent variable in Columns (I) and (II) is municipality-level
tax revenue generated from the local business tax (BT), and municipality-level tax revenue from
the local property tax (PT) in Columns (III) and (IV). The independent variable of interest is the
municipality-level tax multiplier m for the business or property tax. Reported coefficients can be
interpreted as elasticities identified from tax reforms. All specifications include year fixed effects,
municipality fixed effects, and federal-state specific year fixed effects. Columns (I) and (III) include
controls for population and GDP. Columns (II) and (IV) additionally add controls for the level of
debt, number of employees, and disposable income of private households. Panel A (B) is restricted
to municipalities whose business-tax multiplier is smaller or equal (greater) than the property-tax
multiplier.
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3.5.3 Discussion of results
Comparing implemented business-tax and property-tax rates. Our empirical
findings are consistent across all specifications: property-tax revenue responds significantly
to tax-rate changes whereas business-tax revenue does not. These results imply that the
property-tax base is significantly less responsive than the business-tax base. Following the
simple inverse-elasticity rule, this would suggest that average property taxes should be
considerably higher than average business taxes. However, this is not what we observe in
the data. Figure 3.1 depicts the evolution of the (unweighted) average business-tax mul-
tiplier and the (unweighted) average property-tax multiplier over time. The figure clearly
shows that property-tax multipliers are lower than business-tax multipliers throughout
our entire sample period. While the difference becomes slightly smaller over time, it has
been considerably large and stable since the early 2000s. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 in the Ap-
pendix 3.7 provide an overview of business-tax and property-tax multipliers in all German
municipalities in 2001 and 2010, respectively. The maps confirm the previous figure; there
seem to be more darker areas – which indicate high multipliers – in the left maps sketching
business-tax rates compared to the right map where we display the property-tax rates in
both years. Table 3.15 in the Appendix 3.7 presents more evidence in this regard. For each
year between 1995 and 2010, it displays the share of municipalities which have a higher
business-tax multiplier than property-tax multiplier. On average, 54% of all municipal-
ities taxed business profits higher than property, and this share was larger than 50% in
all years except 1999 and 2000. Our results show that our main elasticity estimates are
not driven by those municipalities with higher property-tax rates than business-tax rates:
the business-tax elasticities are not different for municipalities which set higher taxes on
business profits relative to those with higher property-tax rates (see Table 3.4).
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Figure 3.1: Average BT and PT multipliers over time, 1995-2010
Notes: The figure depicts the evolution of business-tax and property-tax multipliers over time.
Unweighted country-wide averages for the years 1995-2010 based on municipality-level data. Own
compilation. Administrative data as described in the text.
Given our empirical elasticity findings, the descriptive observation that business
profits are taxed at higher rates than property stands in contrast with the inverse-elasticity
rule, which depicts that goods should be taxed in inverse proportion to their tax sensitivity.
Considering the simplest version of this theoretical insight,19 our baseline revenue-elasticity
estimates of 0.129 for business-tax revenues and 0.886 for property-tax revenues would
imply that the multiplier on property should be approximately seven times higher than
the multiplier on business profits. This ratio is very high and likely not feasible in practice,
but it reveals that in this set-up, taxing business profits at higher rates than property is
not in line with one of the basic insights of optimal taxation. As opposed to the ”optimal”
ratio, we observe that in reality throughout our sample period the business-tax multiplier
is on average 1.08-times higher than the property tax multiplier. In support of the claim
that municipalities do not set tax rates in line with inverse-elasticity-rule ideas, we find
19Note that the inverse-elasticity rule reads τ1η1 = τ2η2, where our estimated tax-revenue elasticities
equal (1 + ηj), with ηj being the elasticity of the tax base (see Section 3.4).
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that even those municipalities that set higher business-tax rates face highly tax-responsive
business-tax bases and non-responsive property tax-bases.
Possible explanations. Why do we find that policy-makers in German municipalities
do not set tax rates according to the inverse-elasticity-rule? We propose three possible
explanations for the fact that municipalities tax business profits heavier although they are
much more sensitive to tax rate changes than the property-tax base:20 (i) one obvious ex-
planation may be that policy makers in German municipalities lack knowledge of economic
optimal-tax rules. That is, they may simply not know that it may be more efficient to
tax the less mobile tax base higher relative to another more mobile tax base. (ii) Another
explanation is that property is taxed low for social-policy reasons. It may be an explicit
goal of tax policy to encourage individuals to own property and buy real-estate. Low taxes
on property could help to serve this goal. (iii) A third possible explanation is based on
a political-economy argument where politicians seek to stay in office and maximize votes.
Business owners and employees, who would benefit from low business taxes, can live either
in the respective municipality or in neighboring regions. Property owners, on the other
hand, usually live in the municipality where they pay taxes. As a result, an office-seeking
politician may be more encouraged to serve property owners through lower taxes than
business owners and employees who may not have the opportunity to reward low business
taxes through votes in elections.
We acknowledge the possibility that no single argument explains our results, but
that our findings may be driven by a combination of explanations. We also do not claim
that our list of possible explanations is exhaustive. However, these three explanations
seem to be most plausible and we argue that they can help to rationalize our empirical
findings.
3.6 Conclusion
Using rich panel data from German municipalities, this paper estimates how tax revenue
generated from business and property taxes responds to variation in the respective tax
rates. The results indicate that business profits are quite tax sensitive, and property
20These explanations are plausible ad-hoc explanations for which we do not provide empirical evidence.
Testing these explanations is arguably not possible with the available data, and is also beyond the scope
of this paper.
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does not respond significantly in the short-run. A 1% increase in business taxes does not
have a significant effect on business-tax revenue, while a 1% increase in the property tax
increases tax-revenue from the property tax by almost 1%. Applying basic Ramsey-type
rules of optimal taxation, these elasticity estimates would suggest that average tax rates
are significantly higher on property relative to business-tax rates. However, this is not
what we observe in the data: on average, business profits are taxed at lower rates than
property.
Our results suggest that efficiency gains could be realized through reducing (or even
reversing) the difference in levels between business and property taxation. However, we
propose three possible explanations for this deviation between empirical facts and optimal-
taxation theory: (i) a lack of knowledge of optimal-tax rules among local policy-makers,
(ii) distributional (equity) concerns where property is taxed low for social-policy reasons,
(iii) political-economy arguments in which politicians seek to maintain office, or a combi-
nation of these three points. These explanations for lower property taxes could offset the
negative welfare effects that stem from non-compliance with the inverse-elasticity rule.
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3.7 Appendix



















Notes: Number of municipalities in each year for which data are available. Administrative data
on the universe of German municipalities. Baseline sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to
observations for which information on BT and PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue
is reported negative.
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Table 3.6: Summary statistics by year, BT, 1995-2010
Year Statistics Revenue BT Revenue BT (log) Multiplier BT Multiplier BT (log)
1995 Mean 2311.504 4.789 311.508 5.734
Std. Dev. 21598.333 2.574 35.831 0.120
1996 Mean 2517.189 4.840 313.197 5.740
Std. Dev. 23946.445 2.573 35.473 0.117
1997 Mean 2666.805 4.898 314.575 5.745
Std. Dev. 25103.648 2.567 35.663 0.117
1998 Mean 2615.059 4.753 314.179 5.743
Std. Dev. 28113.074 2.564 36.638 0.121
1999 Mean 2473.443 4.467 312.369 5.736
Std. Dev. 27460.430 2.738 37.969 0.129
2000 Mean 2498.550 4.542 312.806 5.737
Std. Dev. 27183.304 2.643 38.460 0.131
2001 Mean 1980.573 4.571 322.796 5.770
Std. Dev. 21136.883 2.463 37.065 0.120
2002 Mean 1973.761 4.653 325.167 5.778
Std. Dev. 20979.255 2.440 36.693 0.120
2003 Mean 2063.060 4.766 327.932 5.786
Std. Dev. 21187.696 2.430 37.039 0.119
2004 Mean 2433.847 4.937 329.102 5.790
Std. Dev. 25367.947 2.402 36.802 0.116
2005 Mean 2725.474 5.015 330.980 5.796
Std. Dev. 29118.591 2.439 36.948 0.114
2006 Mean 3209.349 5.069 332.403 5.800
Std. Dev. 35787.475 2.475 36.694 0.113
2007 Mean 3360.294 5.174 333.072 5.802
Std. Dev. 36408.183 2.484 36.567 0.112
2008 Mean 3460.794 5.270 333.159 5.803
Std. Dev. 35740.545 2.453 36.114 0.110
2009 Mean 2827.814 5.233 334.865 5.808
Std. Dev. 28937.175 2.318 36.271 0.110
2010 Mean 3223.486 5.485 338.181 5.818
Std. Dev. 32704.606 2.266 35.769 0.107
Total Mean 2651.616 4.910 324.885 5.776
Std. Dev. 28204.096 2.501 37.755 0.121
Notes: Summary statistics for the business-tax (BT) multiplier (in %) and revenue (in 1,000 euro)
by year. Municipal level variables. Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities.
Baseline sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to observations for which information on BT and
PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue is reported negative.
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Table 3.7: Summary statistics by year, PT, 1995-2010
Year Statistics Revenue PT Revenue PT (log) Multiplier PT Multiplier PT (log)
1995 Mean 699.414 4.535 291.834 5.665
Std. Dev. 6605.621 1.756 43.523 0.150
1996 Mean 750.503 4.654 294.460 5.674
Std. Dev. 7002.196 1.723 43.632 0.148
1997 Mean 793.135 4.743 297.729 5.685
Std. Dev. 7268.107 1.706 44.344 0.149
1998 Mean 780.040 4.741 300.949 5.697
Std. Dev. 7321.814 1.678 43.122 0.144
1999 Mean 739.522 4.588 302.623 5.703
Std. Dev. 7252.905 1.732 42.203 0.140
2000 Mean 767.201 4.631 303.771 5.707
Std. Dev. 7346.548 1.733 42.409 0.140
2001 Mean 700.672 4.664 308.354 5.722
Std. Dev. 6943.614 1.674 41.820 0.136
2002 Mean 741.952 4.779 310.991 5.731
Std. Dev. 7337.267 1.641 42.527 0.136
2003 Mean 788.204 4.818 314.718 5.742
Std. Dev. 7785.709 1.661 44.213 0.140
2004 Mean 813.757 4.867 317.981 5.752
Std. Dev. 7922.311 1.658 44.740 0.140
2005 Mean 837.927 4.891 321.609 5.764
Std. Dev. 8197.625 1.662 45.198 0.139
2006 Mean 838.376 4.876 323.611 5.770
Std. Dev. 8124.914 1.681 45.443 0.140
2007 Mean 864.923 4.893 324.894 5.774
Std. Dev. 9090.562 1.691 45.945 0.142
2008 Mean 880.519 4.930 324.814 5.774
Std. Dev. 9173.143 1.674 45.347 0.138
2009 Mean 918.787 4.986 326.247 5.778
Std. Dev. 9487.170 1.678 46.421 0.141
2010 Mean 986.964 5.064 329.297 5.787
Std. Dev. 9950.598 1.696 47.874 0.143
Total Mean 808.975 4.799 313.119 5.736
Std. Dev. 8033.088 1.694 45.870 0.146
Notes: Summary statistics for the property-tax (PT) multiplier (in %) and revenue (in 1,000 euro)
by year. Municipal level variables. Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities.
Baseline sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to observations for which information on BT and
PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue is reported negative.
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Table 3.8: Summary statistics by year, control variables, 1995-2010
Year Statistics GDP Population Population (sq) Debt Private income Employees
1995 Mean 3433375.467 8.161 2738.396 154590.008 2559801.562 3392.857
Std. Dev. 2992882.061 51.692 133011.641 134945.719 1708455.063 19784.457
N 7938 8938 8938 8957.000 8008 5971
1996 Mean 3510728.703 8.202 2726.095 158206.215 2640317.645 3364.361
Std. Dev. 3018219.672 51.567 132198.592 135206.793 1738892.703 19582.060
N 7944 8922 8922 8941 7942 5961
1997 Mean 3614216.533 8.222 2690.078 160783.372 2711941.942 2762.070
Std. Dev. 3092953.040 51.213 129854.608 132244.958 1786663.019 20632.247
N 7901 8914 8914 8933 7899 8845
1998 Mean 3552825.841 7.673 2483.495 161337.703 2658979.930 2775.957
Std. Dev. 3148427.497 49.243 124107.002 129722.133 1810624.593 20605.496
N 8492 9465 9465 8774 8490 8634
1999 Mean 3527194.437 7.019 2244.355 156819.311 2659090.049 2508.717
Std. Dev. 3113521.643 46.854 117236.048 116646.174 1803386.496 19448.556
N 9286 10480 10480 10517 9284 9968
2000 Mean 3650911.875 7.130 2292.638 156161.253 2736173.901 2573.133
Std. Dev. 3252803.952 47.350 116967.243 116836.173 1860942.762 19948.901
N 9315 10509 10509 10546 9313 9852
2001 Mean 3488908.559 6.578 1936.406 151317.177 2701554.879 2306.019
Std. Dev. 3139471.379 43.512 108303.265 106505.708 1829176.586 18421.301
N 11257 12363 12363 12358 11255 11758
2002 Mean 3578562.150 6.837 2017.697 153618.009 2755024.182 2348.554
Std. Dev. 3180820.932 44.397 110712.973 108458.270 1864328.874 15771.237
N 10864 11890 11890 11885 10862 11140
2003 Mean 3632078.053 6.929 2064.488 158100.160 2818249.333 2448.032
Std. Dev. 3288927.110 44.907 111824.507 112820.871 1935913.382 18679.377
N 10558 11622 11622 11617 10556 10798
2004 Mean 3716333.846 6.966 2061.225 158834.803 2867310.957 2413.446
Std. Dev. 3312489.813 44.865 111649.361 116399.798 1959544.225 18286.146
N 10591 11654 11654 11649 10589 10839
2005 Mean 3756930.674 6.951 2067.278 158908.250 2918179.425 2329.475
Std. Dev. 3420770.792 44.935 112029.001 117897.918 2008268.102 17851.621
N 10681 11693 11693 11688 10679 11100
2006 Mean 3873972.221 6.848 2053.458 157288.312 2963959.723 2330.555
Std. Dev. 3529823.499 44.797 111904.650 117044.792 2049399.469 17934.164
N 10894 11874 11874 11869 10892 11173
2007 Mean 4059444.476 6.862 2064.035 160899.491 3016112.699 2414.218
Std. Dev. 3595740.818 44.912 112547.357 116166.022 2040731.186 18383.795
N 11433 11935 11935 11930 11431 11063
2008 Mean 4320020.496 6.941 2131.338 160290.078 3179064.384 2403.170
Std. Dev. 3721436.981 45.644 115119.503 114832.111 2100182.080 18719.445
N 10789 11605 11605 11600. 11602 10992
2009 Mean 4190919.295 7.091 2171.336 155181.566 3195175.741 2485.998
Std. Dev. 3580753.216 46.057 116519.711 123711.417 2100534.889 19219.118
N 10688 11470 11470 11466 11468 10866
2010 Mean 4203950.315 7.359 2273.719 . . 2832.661
Std. Dev. 3669922.485 47.114 119863.577 . . 20537.384
N 9909 11084.000 11084 0 0 9740
Total Mean 3773758.170 7.183 2223.819 157390.836 2845050.660 2549.232
Std. Dev. 3354230.616 46.607 117169.293 119370.435 1934041.044 18909.947
N 158540 174418 174418 162730 150270 158700
Notes: Summary statistics for control variables by year. Population (in 1,000) and employees are
municipal-level variables. GDP, debt and private income (in 1,000 euro) are county-level variables.
Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities. Baseline sample: Years 1995 to
2010. Restricted to observations for which information on BT and PT were available. Observation
excluded if revenue is reported negative.
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Table 3.9: Summary statistics by state, BT, 1995-2010
State Statistics Revenue BT Revenue BT (log) Multiplier BT Multiplier BT (log)
Schleswig-Holstein Mean 745.956 3.904 307.727 5.726
Std. Dev. 4780.849 2.132 25.273 0.084
N 16900 16900 16900 16900
Hamburg Mean 1453423.938 14.168 468.750 6.150
Std. Dev. 315091.655 0.212 5.000 0.011
N 16 16 16 16
Lower Saxony Mean 2409.766 5.616 328.742 5.791
Std. Dev. 13799.286 2.073 31.028 0.093
N 16095 16095 16095 16095
Bremen Mean 153736.063 11.391 406.250 6.005
Std. Dev. 132640.105 1.161 24.984 0.062
N 32 32 32 32
North Rhine-Westphalia Mean 18935.870 8.819 402.546 5.995
Std. Dev. 60610.971 1.272 29.995 0.076
N 6326 6326 6326 6326
Hesse Mean 7129.824 7.101 323.426 5.775
Std. Dev. 58395.945 1.534 31.129 0.092
N 6785 6785 6785 6785
Rhineland-Palatinate Mean 799.836 3.780 348.266 5.852
Std. Dev. 7028.456 2.101 16.163 0.045
N 20887 20887 20887 20887
Baden-Württemberg Mean 4000.077 6.737 337.275 5.820
Std. Dev. 19726.553 1.752 15.688 0.046
N 17572 17572 17572 17572
Bavaria Mean 2424.219 5.964 323.094 5.775
Std. Dev. 29041.222 1.630 24.409 0.073
N 32562 32562 32562 32562
Saarland Mean 6513.212 7.737 387.417 5.957
Std. Dev. 14464.098 1.336 28.487 0.074
N 518 518 518 518
Berlin Mean 917270.500 13.711 396.250 5.979
Std. Dev. 187300.175 0.194 31.385 0.088
N 16 16 16 16
Brandenburg Mean 459.642 3.203 298.419 5.688
Std. Dev. 2346.693 2.468 39.828 0.147
N 11357 11357 11357 11357
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Mean 318.373 3.212 286.741 5.649
Std. Dev. 2070.543 2.037 37.871 0.142
N 11060 11060 11060 11060
Saxony Mean 2224.769 5.864 379.783 5.938
Std. Dev. 12614.080 1.671 21.139 0.056
N 4975 4975 4975 4975
Saxony-Anhalt Mean 403.616 3.275 310.850 5.730
Std. Dev. 2621.768 2.117 40.703 0.141
N 15653 15653 15653 15653
Thuringia Mean 382.072 3.496 305.438 5.717
Std. Dev. 2212.053 2.157 28.279 0.098
N 13916 13916 13916 13916
Total Mean 2651.616 4.910 324.885 5.776
Std. Dev. 28204.096 2.501 37.755 0.121
N 174670 174670 174670 174670
Notes: Summary statistics for the business-tax (BT) multiplier (in %) and revenue (in 1,000 euro).
Municipal level variables. Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities. Baseline
sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to observations for which information on BT and PT were
available. Observation excluded if revenue is reported negative.
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Table 3.10: Summary statistics by state, PT, 1995-2010
State Statistics Revenue PT Revenue PT (log) Multiplier PT Multiplier PT (log)
Schleswig-Holstein Mean 261.172 4.027 262.492 5.560
Std. Dev. 1409.915 1.475 35.796 0.146
N 16900 16900 16900 16900
Hamburg Mean 342835.938 12.734 508.125 6.229
Std. Dev. 51732.922 0.153 28.570 0.057
N 16 16 16 16
Lower Saxony Mean 915.927 5.470 323.970 5.771
Std. Dev. 4231.042 1.464 45.563 0.139
N 16095 16095 16095 16095
Bremen Mean 66628.938 10.774 535.625 6.282
Std. Dev. 47974.725 0.873 26.873 0.050
N 32 32 32 32
North Rhine-Westphalia Mean 5651.991 7.788 361.174 5.878
Std. Dev. 14609.484 1.091 54.834 0.154
N 6326 6326 6326 6326
Hesse Mean 1488.887 6.249 253.259 5.520
Std. Dev. 8584.838 1.090 44.141 0.166
N 6785 6785 6785 6785
Rhineland-Palatinate Mean 226.609 3.854 317.264 5.758
Std. Dev. 1295.508 1.430 17.584 0.058
N 20887 20887 20887 20887
Baden-Württemberg Mean 1096.189 5.993 310.575 5.730
Std. Dev. 4431.207 1.279 41.337 0.129
N 17572 17572 17572 17572
Bavaria Mean 616.879 5.323 321.709 5.763
Std. Dev. 5531.124 1.130 49.290 0.144
N 32562 32562 32562 32562
Saarland Mean 1953.108 7.043 296.236 5.686
Std. Dev. 4201.607 0.818 30.477 0.096
N 518 518 518 518
Berlin Mean 561261.625 13.217 671.250 6.502
Std. Dev. 118161.662 0.210 86.862 0.124
N 16 16 16 16
Brandenburg Mean 222.674 3.913 317.220 5.755
Std. Dev. 718.923 1.562 31.716 0.094
N 11357 11357 11357 11357
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Mean 172.862 3.801 310.819 5.737
Std. Dev. 887.033 1.225 23.489 0.072
N 11060 11060 11060 11060
Saxony Mean 989.607 5.691 381.666 5.941
Std. Dev. 5071.448 1.103 34.597 0.086
N 4975 4975 4975 4975
Saxony-Anhalt Mean 181.519 3.776 323.926 5.775
Std. Dev. 1085.329 1.281 33.473 0.100
N 15653 15653 15653 15653
Thuringia Mean 172.063 3.818 307.587 5.727
Std. Dev. 804.378 1.335 20.247 0.064
N 13916 13916 13916 13916
Total Mean 808.975 4.799 313.119 5.736
Std. Dev. 8033.088 1.694 45.870 0.146
N 174670 174670 174670 174670
Notes: Summary statistics for the property-tax (PT) multiplier (in %) and revenue (in 1,000 euro)
by year. Municipal level variables. Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities.
Baseline sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to observations for which information on BT and
PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue is reported negative.
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Table 3.11: Summary statistics by state, control variables, 1995-2010





Schleswig-Holstein Mean 4151959.319 2.629 136.084 141758.697 3233055.944 824.533
Std. Dev. 1411577.813 11.366 2244.043 45722.093 1062259.438 4818.204
N 16900 16900 16900 15844 15844 15503
Hamburg Mean 77652983.813 1735.383 3012321.516 . . 761869.500
Std. Dev. 8631321.696 28.618 99654.676 . . 27185.624
N 16 16 16 0 0 16
Hamburg Mean 4147178.013 7.851 559.628 205605.520 3173531.716 2189.902
Std. Dev. 4778508.583 22.316 8571.394 221902.167 2661481.347 9222.710
N 16095 15971 15971 15083 15083 15795
Bremen Mean 11783102.906 332.674 155980.600 . 6382527.533 140741.125
Std. Dev. 8699017.505 216.264 143875.283 . 4470902.396 97590.495
N 32 32 32 0 30 32
North Rhine-Westphalia Mean 7897634.143 45.466 9674.618 394951.670 6246073.520 14544.072
Std. Dev. 3483560.578 87.228 59297.087 237495.983 2312022.953 36759.705
N 5910 6326 6326 5918 5918 6315
Hesse Mean 5608189.936 14.257 1581.257 297602.351 3963672.880 5034.391
Std. Dev. 3056734.695 37.124 21033.399 170384.191 1549557.950 24805.684
N 6785 6785 6785 6359 6359 6785
Rhineland-Palatinate Mean 2587942.122 2.193 98.422 131467.494 2203686.899 859.843
Std. Dev. 1168709.906 9.676 1366.475 53722.009 849730.922 5368.050
N 20887 20887 20887 18687 18687 16986
Baden-Württemberg Mean 7000051.079 9.658 759.300 164742.411 4909596.943 3454.437
Std. Dev. 3678634.304 25.808 11330.876 80415.282 2493096.545 14132.474
N 17572 17513 17513 16479 16479 17436
Bavaria Mean 3173542.509 6.034 1030.700 114760.582 2245023.083 2131.064
Std. Dev. 2947775.516 31.533 35588.741 73209.247 1116155.683 16828.717
N 32562 32562 32562 30515 30515 32533
Saarland Mean 5031352.753 19.800 937.644 166496.749 3236104.318 6496.625
Std. Dev. 3293402.906 23.381 4180.278 80139.137 1365070.208 14191.731
N 518 518 518 466 466 518
Berlin Mean 82571546.750 3414.457 11659372.688 . . 1091742.923
Std. Dev. 7345400.529 30.175 206653.771 . . 48429.357
N 16 16 16 0 0 13
Brandenburg Mean 2551389.586 2.967 76.613 117349.308 2137335.396 995.508
Std. Dev. 648835.130 8.235 759.802 32190.568 532045.352 3579.122
N 11357 11357 11357 10942 10942 8561
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Mean 1561827.773 2.178 100.252 137164.534 1406583.310 703.014
Std. Dev. 343133.316 9.773 1409.169 23460.862 305885.368 4033.748
N 8690 11024 11024 9495 10277 9429
Saxony Mean 3245178.340 10.577 2041.929 157940.584 2532636.486 3271.035
Std. Dev. 1881977.352 43.937 20273.134 78572.691 1311561.468 16876.904
N 4474 4975 4975 4492 3991 4946
Saxony-Anhalt Mean 3307163.489 2.539 153.559 144848.383 2533005.833 862.667
Std. Dev. 1037183.168 12.129 2665.248 51927.618 675492.733 5287.916
N 2882 15653 15653 15436 2665 12568
Thuringia Mean 1741294.057 2.437 74.130 134660.253 1480964.214 940.747
Std. Dev. 500440.343 8.258 1187.627 33156.792 347946.319 4600.958
N 13844 13883 13883 13014 13014 11264
Total Mean 3773758.170 7.183 2223.819 157390.836 2845050.660 2549.232
Std. Dev. 3354230.616 46.607 117169.293 119370.435 1934041.044 18909.947
N 158540 174418 174418 162730 150270 158700
Notes: Population (in 1,000) and employees are municipal level variables. GDP, debt and private
income (in 1,000 euro) are county level variables. Administrative data on the universe of German mu-
nicipalities. Baseline sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to observations for which information
on BT and PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue is reported negative.
Chapter 3 Empirical Essays on Fiscal Federalism 75
Table 3.12: Size of changes in BT multipliers, 1995-2010
Year I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
1995 0.03 0.09 0.50 0.10 85.60 5.35 7.85 0.46 0.03
1996 0.04 0.14 0.43 0.18 91.55 2.82 4.45 0.38 0.01
1997 0.04 0.15 0.33 0.20 91.17 2.33 5.40 0.32 0.05
1998 0.01 0.13 0.28 0.19 91.04 3.16 4.75 0.39 0.05
1999 0.06 0.14 0.48 0.25 95.37 1.37 2.14 0.18 0.00
2000 0.07 0.16 0.43 0.28 94.98 1.61 2.21 0.24 0.02
2001 0.01 0.10 0.44 0.30 91.99 3.65 3.11 0.34 0.06
2002 0.04 0.11 0.27 0.24 92.04 2.98 4.04 0.28 0.01
2003 0.03 0.04 0.22 0.30 90.31 2.72 6.14 0.22 0.02
2004 0.04 0.07 0.30 0.24 91.19 3.06 4.84 0.22 0.05
2005 0.02 0.07 0.33 0.28 88.88 4.16 5.96 0.29 0.01
2006 0.03 0.04 0.42 0.37 91.80 3.91 3.12 0.25 0.06
2007 0.02 0.04 0.40 0.38 95.50 1.69 1.78 0.15 0.04
2008 0.00 0.09 0.45 0.32 95.71 1.12 1.88 0.40 0.03
2009 0.00 0.05 0.57 0.50 95.16 1.11 2.28 0.30 0.03
2010 0.03 0.04 0.30 0.48 90.21 2.29 5.82 0.80 0.04
Total 0.03 0.09 0.38 0.30 92.18 2.65 4.02 0.32 0.03
Notes: Share of municipalities which change their business-tax multiplier in the range of the following
nine categories, I - IX, by year. I: < −100; II: −100 ≤ change < −50; III: −50 ≤ change < −10;
IV : −10 ≤ change < 0; V: no change; VI: 0 < change ≤ 10; VII: 10 < change ≤ 50; VIII: 50 <
change ≤ 100; IX: change> 100. Municipal level variable. Administrative data on the universe of
German municipalities. Baseline sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to observations for which
information on BT and PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue is reported negative.
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Table 3.13: Size of changes in PT multipliers, 1995-2010
Year I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
1995 0.00 0.10 0.22 0.04 81.03 3.44 13.99 1.07 0.10
1996 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.10 89.40 2.15 7.49 0.56 0.00
1997 0.00 0.04 0.24 0.21 87.06 2.56 9.09 0.80 0.01
1998 0.01 0.05 0.20 0.14 87.60 3.03 8.35 0.56 0.05
1999 0.01 0.04 0.21 0.16 93.75 1.57 4.05 0.18 0.03
2000 0.00 0.07 0.34 0.13 94.05 1.37 3.90 0.14 0.01
2001 0.00 0.26 0.28 0.20 91.70 3.45 3.82 0.25 0.02
2002 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.12 90.03 2.35 6.62 0.66 0.04
2003 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.07 86.65 2.17 8.72 2.15 0.07
2004 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.13 86.74 2.57 9.62 0.79 0.02
2005 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.15 85.02 3.53 10.34 0.77 0.04
2006 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.19 90.02 2.62 6.38 0.50 0.07
2007 0.01 0.03 0.33 0.23 94.30 1.28 3.51 0.28 0.03
2008 0.01 0.08 0.53 0.30 95.00 1.20 2.68 0.18 0.01
2009 0.01 0.11 0.51 0.44 94.93 1.00 2.80 0.19 0.03
2010 0.02 0.05 0.26 0.51 87.12 2.16 8.64 1.11 0.12
Total 0.01 0.06 0.25 0.20 89.86 2.23 6.71 0.64 0.04
Notes: Share of municipalities which change their property-tax multiplier in the range of the following
nine categories, I - IX, by year. I: < −100; II: −100 ≤ change < −50; III: −50 ≤ change < −10;
IV : −10 ≤ change < 0; V: no change; VI: 0 < change ≤ 10; VII: 10 < change ≤ 50; VIII: 50 <
change ≤ 100; IX: change> 100. Municipal level variable. Administrative data on the universe of
German municipalities. Baseline sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to observations for which
information on BT and PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue is reported negative.
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Table 3.14: Robustness checks
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Tax revenue business Tax revenue property





Observations 79,238 73,172 79,238 73,172
R2 0.209 0.178 0.802 0.801





Observations 92,631 / 92,631 /
R2 0.242 / 0.905 /






Observations 138,714 122,370 138,714 122,370
R2 0.150 0.140 0.635 0.637






Observations 124,568 110,743 124,568 110,743
R2 0.146 0.139 0.584 0.574
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation (3.1) with standard errors in parentheses. Stan-
dard errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on the universe of German municipalities. Years in baseline: 1995 to 2010. The
dependent variable in Columns (I) and (II) is municipality-level tax revenue generated from the local
business tax (BT), and municipality-level tax revenue from the local property tax (PT) in Columns
(III) and (IV). The independent variable of interest is the municipality-level tax multiplier. Reported
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities identified from tax reforms. All specifications include
year fixed effects, municipality fixed effects, and federal-state specific fixed effects. Columns (I) and
(III) include controls for population and GDP. Columns (II) and (IV) additionally add controls for
the level of debt, number of employees, and private income. Panel A is identical to the baseline re-
sults in Table 3.3 but estimated on a balanced sample of municipalities. Panel B is for three federal
states for which data are available between 1983 and 2010, and uses this long time span. Panel C
(Panel D) is on the same unbalanced panel of municipalities as the baseline but uses the tax rate
lagged one (two) year(s).
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Table 3.15: Share of municipalities with higher rates on business profits than



















Notes: The table depicts for each year the share of municipalities that have a higher multiplier on
business-profits than on propety. Municipal level variables. Administrative data on the universe of
German municipalities. Baseline sample: Years 1995 to 2010. Restricted to observations for which
information on BT and PT were available. Observation excluded if revenue is reported negative.
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Figure 3.2: BT (left) and PT (right) multipliers in 2001
Notes: The figure depicts the spatial distribution and levels of business-tax (left) and property-tax
(right) multipliers in 2001. Own compilation with geoinformation provided by the GeoDataCenter
(Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy).
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Figure 3.3: BT (left) and PT (right) multipliers in 2010
Notes: The figure depicts the spatial distribution and levels of business-tax (left) and property-tax
(right) multipliers in 2010. Own compilation with geoinformation provided by the GeoDataCenter
(Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy).
Chapter 4
Common pool problems and
territorial reforms
4.1 Introduction
The common pool problem is a well-known and widely studied phenomenon among public
economists. A common pool occurs if an individual (or a smaller group) is the beneficiary
of a common resource, while the costs involved are paid collectively. According to the
“tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968), this situation results in exploitation and overuse
of the resource. A common pool may arise in many contexts and forms – the most
prominent case certainly is the example of fishery (e.g., Gordon 1954; Scott 1955). It also
manifests itself in the political environment (see Tullock 1959; Buchanan et al. 1967).
This paper applies the notion of the common pool problem to the event of a municipal
territorial reform: Municipalities being designated for the same merger or incorporation
form a temporary common pool with respect to debt during the time window between
the announcement and actual execution of a reform. The reason for the formation of a
common pool is that the municipalities generally still have the autonomy to take on debt
individually. Responsible for repayment, however, are not the individual municipalities
themselves, but the newly founded municipality they become part of. Conventional eco-
nomic theory suggests that members of a common pool behave opportunistically. This
implies that the municipalities affected by the reform strategically take on debt to finance
(inefficient) public projects.1 The motives explaining the political decision-making process
1There is anecdotal evidence implying that in view of a municipal territorial reform (some) municipal-
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driving the opportunistic behavior are complex: foreseeable loss of political power, munic-
ipal independence and future accountability. Politicians might act in their private interest,
e.g., pursue flagship projects associated with the politician’s name or in the interest of the
municipality.2
The previous applied literature on common pool problems in territorial reforms gen-
erally employs a formalization of the common pool theory derived by Weingast et al.
(1981) as a theoretical starting point for the analysis (most importantly for this research
Hinnerich [2009], Jordahl and Liang [2010] and Saarimaa and Tukiainen [2015]).3 Broadly
interpreted, the so-called “law 1/n” proposes that the size of the incentive effect is greater,
the smaller the municipality’s own size relative to the size of its common pool. However,
in the aftermath of Hardin (1968) a growing body of interdisciplinary research on the
“commons” has successfully challenged the general validity of Hardin’s pessimistic view
(see, e.g., Ostrom et al. [2002] for a survey). In this spirit one can propose that there
might be other (implicit) mechanisms, mitigating or even preventing free-riding,4 which
are not covered by the “law 1/n.” This is why this paper does not only examine if be-
ing in a common pool triggers an incentive to free-ride (Hypothesis 1a) and if the size
of the effect is greater, the smaller the municipality’s own size relative to its common
pool (Hypothesis 1b). It rather broadens the horizon and explicitly addresses three fur-
ities affected engage in public projects, for instance, building a public swimming pool or playground, they
would not have engaged in otherwise. As my concluding remarks point out, whether or not these projects
are efficient or inefficient from a welfare perspective can only be determined by deeper analysis.
2Analyzing and modeling the political decision making process would go beyond the scope of this paper.
It must remain open for further research (note that Bruns et al. [2015] provide an interesting study on
the determinants of merging decisions for the German federal state of Brandenburg). See Section 4.2.2
for more information on the impact of the reform on the politicians at the local level.
3In a model of distributive policy Weingast et al. (1981) derive, among others, that the inefficiency of
public projects rises with the number of decision makers n (districts). The related literature commonly
refers to this as “law 1/n.” Applied to the case of a municipal territorial reform, this would suggest that
the incentive to free-ride is increasing in the number of municipalities being part of the common pool.
However, for the event of a territorial reform it seems to be more adequate to interpret the “law 1/n” more
broadly by referring to the size of a municipality relative to the size of its common pool (note that this
line of argument was also put forward by Hinnerich [2009] and Jordahl and Liang [2010], among others).
Note that Hansen (2014) advocates the original formulation of the “law 1/n.” I take this into account
by testing some specifications which make direct use of the original formulation (see coalition size Ci in
Section 4.3).
Note that there is a sizable related empirical literature focusing on the validity of the “law 1/n” with
regard to the impact of legislature size on spending. The results are inconclusive (e.g., Bradbury and
Crain 2001; Gilligan and Matsusaka 2001; Pettersson-Lidbom 2012).
4This strand of literature understands “free-riding” as a synonym for “behaving opportunistically by
exploiting (the other members of) the common pool.”
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ther questions: Do municipalities which remain accountable after the execution of the
reform engage in free-riding at all? Do municipalities which identify more with a munic-
ipal territorial reform free-ride less? Does timing affect the free-riding behavior?5 First,
I suggest that municipalities (and their politicians) considered accountable (for handling
public debt and infrastructure) after the reform in public perception will not engage in
free-riding (Hypothesis 2a). This applies to municipalities which are only absorbing or
keep their name when merging.6 Second, the more the members of the common pool
identify with the amalgamation, the lower, presumably, the incentive to behave oppor-
tunistically is. Consequently, voluntary mergers or incorporations might be less affected
by opportunistic behavior (Hypothesis 2b). Third, it seems reasonable to assume that the
timing of the merger or incorporation has an effect on free-riding: The bigger the time
window between announcement and execution, the more time the municipalities have to
coordinate opportunistic behavior and exploit the common pool (see Hypothesis 3).
Against this backdrop there is demand for empirical clarification. Econometric re-
search on this topic has evolved only recently.7 I am among the first to empirically study
free-riding on public debt before the execution of a territorial reform. Closest to my paper
are the two papers on boundary reforms in Sweden (Hinnerich 2009; Jordahl and Liang
2010) and a recent Finnish paper (Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2015). Besides that, there are
the papers by Blom-Hansen (2010), Hansen (2014) and Nakazawa (2013) with a some-
what different angle.8 Common to all previous papers is that they rely on a difference-in-
5One further aspect is also of importance: To behave opportunistically is not sustainable in the long
run. Thus, municipalities forming a common pool might not engage in free-riding if all members (or
rather the respective politicians) convincingly commit themselves to not engaging in it. Unfortunately,
this effect is not measurable in my empirical design.
6Note that when a municipality stays in existence by keeping its name, this does not per se guarantee
that its politicians remain in power after the reform (see Section 4.2.2). However, it outlasts the reform
and its politicians continue to be associated with its performance.
7There is another branch of empirical research on municipal territorial reforms. This branch examines
if they bring economic benefits after amalgamation through taking advantages of economies of scale by
creating larger municipalities. This is of importance, because many countries around the world (Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, New Zealand and Norway to name but a few)
initiated large scale territorial reforms in the last decades to increase municipality size with the objective
of saving costs and increasing efficiency. Empirical evidence on their success is inconclusive with most
studies lacking a convincing empirical strategy (noteworthy exceptions are, e.g., Reingewertz [2012] and
Hansen et al. [2014]).
8Blom-Hansen (2010) studies the common pool problem with a focus on (capital) budget overruns
for the case of the Danish local government reform in 2007. What makes his research interesting is
that a number of spending restrictions were applied prior to the reform. His estimates are derived in
a cross-section environment. He reports overspending due to free-riding for capital budgets as well as
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differences design (in a broader sense) to identify the causal effect of interest. Besides, all
of them also employ a continuous free-ride measure along the lines of the “law 1/n.” The
concrete operationalization differs.9 Hinnerich (2009) explores an extensive mandatory
boundary reform taking place in the early 1970s in Sweden. His dependent variable is the
difference between pre-reform and post-reform debt. His independent variable of interest
is the continuous free-ride measure itself (and not an interaction term). He finds statisti-
cally and economically significant results in favor of opportunistic behavior. Jordahl and
Liang (2010) study a previous municipal amalgamation reform in Sweden (1948 to 1952).
They exploit the time dimension of their dataset and use a conventional difference-in-
differences design. They are the first distinguishing a discrete effect from the continuous
effect (both are applied in form of an interaction term with the treatment period). They
find a discrete free-riding effect, which – contrary to the implications of the “law 1/n” –
does not depend positively on relative common pool size. Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015)
focus exclusively on voluntary mergers fostered by the Finnish government (in particular
through subsidization) between 2007 and 2009. This raises selection issues. Furthermore,
their research suffers from a low number of treated municipalities. However, their research
is particularly interesting, since it approaches the aforementioned questions. Saarimaa
and Tukiainen (2015) also employ a discrete beside a continuous effect and make use of
the panel structure in their research design. They find a strong free-riding effect consistent
with the “law 1/n” for debt and the spending of cash reserves. Furthermore, they report
that the additional revenue was mainly spent on investment and current expenditures.
certain areas of current budgets in the year before the reform with the effect not depending on common
pool size (despite the restrictions). Hansen (2014) explores the same reform as Blom-Hansen (2010).
Her study is the only one that focuses directly on the impact of the number of decision makers in a
common pool (operationalized as number of municipalities) on expenditures. She reports a statistically
significant positive effect of the availability of a common pool as well as its size in the last year of the
treatment period. Nakazawa (2013) studies a large wave of amalgamations after 1999 in Japan with the
focus on the relationship between free-riding behavior and regulation on municipal-level debt. Unlike the
other countries, in Japan, municipal borrowing is strictly monitored (and restricted) by the government.
Nakazawa (2013) finds that regulation, indeed, controls opportunistic behavior.
9The prevailing literature generally distinguishes between a discrete and a continuous free-riding effect.
The aim is to, on the one hand, tackle whether the availability of a common pool alone incentivizes
free-riding and, on the other hand, whether this effect adheres to the suggestions of the “law 1/n.” The
“discrete effect” refers to a standard dummy variable specification that takes the value 1 if the municipality
is affected by the reform and hence part of a common pool and 0 if not. The “continuous effect” refers to
specifications with a continuous variable capturing the free-riding effect along the lines of the “law 1/n”
(municipality’s size relative to the size of its common pool). For the exact specification of the continuous
free-ride measure in this paper, see Fi in Section 4.3.
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Since prior evidence is mixed and focuses on capturing the implications of the “law
1/n,” future research is required. A promising case for a strong difference-in-differences
design is the recent municipal territorial reform in Saxony-Anhalt, which between 2007
and 2011 reduced the number of municipalities from 1,039 to 219. This reform has an
array of interesting facets: First, German municipalities have a large degree of autonomy.
This makes a territorial reform vulnerable to free-riding. Second, the reform was split in
a non-mandatory and a mandatory phase. In the former the municipalities had a certain
degree of leeway with regard to their merging or incorporation decision. In the latter the
state government forced the municipalities to merge or incorporate. This makes it possible
to test in a coherent environment if municipalities which identify more with their partners
behave less opportunistically. Third, not all municipalities amalgamated at the same time.
This allows me to study if the timing of the merger or incorporation affected the size of
the effect. Fourth, I am able to capture the accountability mechanism. Besides mergers
leading to the foundation of a municipality with a new name (as is commonly the case),
there were incorporations as well as mergers where one municipality stayed in existence
and kept its name. Last, unlike in other studies the pre-reform and the post-reform period
can be clearly separated. This makes the identification of the causal effect reliable.
This study exploits data that has not been used by academic research so far. Re-
trieving the data was complicated. The statistical office of Saxony-Anhalt in Germany
could only provide data (ready for use) on past municipal debt reflecting the latest post-
reform territorial status. This makes it unsuitable for my research question. I managed
to retrieve the data by digitizing old paper reports. Apart from the vast number of ob-
servations, it is the long panel dimension that makes this dataset particularly interesting
from an econometric point of view. Thus, I am able to closely investigate the validity of
the main identifying assumption (common trend assumption). Furthermore, due to the
specific settings of the reform I can perform an array of robustness checks (e.g., alternative
control group). This strengthens the econometric design.
This is the first notable study for a non-Scandinavian country exploring the free-
riding incentives for the case of a municipal territorial reform. One motivation for this
paper is the aim to contribute to the generalization of results. However, of more impor-
tance is its aim to broaden the perspective on the underlying incentive structure. My
empirical results confirm that being in a common pool, indeed, triggers an incentive to
free-ride (Hypothesis 1a). However, the incentive effect is linked to the theoretical predic-
tions based on the “law 1/n.” I find a statistically and economically significant free-riding
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effect with the incentive to free-ride being greater, the smaller the municipality’s own
size relative to its common pool (Hypothesis 1b). What distinguishes my paper is that
I carefully consider differences in incentive structures by approaching the three questions
stated above (Hypotheses 2a and b, 3). I can report a statistically insignificant free-riding
effect for the group of surviving municipalities. This confirms the accountability predic-
tion. Furthermore, municipalities which merge or incorporate in the non-mandatory phase
behave less opportunistically than municipalities being forced to merge or incorporate in
the mandatory phase. Last, I cannot provide evidence in favor of timing (Hypothesis 3).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 gives background
information on the institutional framework of German municipalities and describes the
municipal territorial reform in the German federal state of Saxony-Anhalt. Section 4.3
presents the hypotheses. Section 4.4 explains the data sources, reports descriptive statis-
tics, outlines the research strategy and provides a discussion on identification and robust-
ness checks. Section 4.5 first explores the relevant graphical evidence and then presents
results. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Institutional background
In this section I first introduce the German institutional landscape with a focus on mu-
nicipalities. Then I present background information on the municipal territorial reform in
the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt.
4.2.1 Municipalities in Germany
After the federal government and the states, municipalities are the lowest level of admin-
istrative government in Germany. The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany
(Grundgesetz) grants the municipalities the right to manage their own affairs.10 This
10Most municipalities are affiliated to a county, only a minority is organized as a municipality with
county status. The major difference between these two types is that the latter are responsible for municipal
tasks (Gemeindeaufgaben) and county tasks (Kreisaufgaben), while the former are only responsible for
municipal tasks (the county is then responsible for county tasks). County-affiliated municipalities can
either be independent (Einheitsgemeinde), or – depending on the federal state – they might be associated
on a below-county level (Verwaltungsgemeinschaft, Amtsgemeinde, Samtgemeinde or Verbandsgemeinde
to name the most important German terms). With respect to this chapter only two of these lower
level layers are of relevance: 1) Association of administration (Verwaltungsgemeinschaft): Associations of
administration represent a form of intercommunal administrative cooperation. 2) Municipal association
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guarantees a high degree of autonomy with regard to municipal task execution and bor-
rowing for municipalities.11 The local government law of the individual federal states (for
Saxony-Anhalt Kommunalverfassungsgesetz) defines the concrete legislative framework for
the municipalities. The local government law differs between federal states, but it is the
same for all municipalities within one federal state. The basic principles, however, are
common to all German municipalities. This allows a generalization of the results of this
study. All German municipalities are in charge of a variety of tasks for which they enjoy
ultimate decision-making authority (voluntary tasks). Consequently, the municipalities
are also responsible for a wide array of public infrastructure projects (e.g., public kinder-
gartens or swimming pools). The local government laws allow municipalities to take on
debt for investment purposes. They rule out debt for consumption purposes. This, in
general, restricts possible opportunistic behavior materializing in excessive borrowing to
investment expenditures.12
4.2.2 Municipal territorial reform
Background.13 Before the municipal territorial reform between 2007 and 2011, in 2007,
there were 1,039 municipalities in Saxony-Anhalt. Most of them were very small munici-
palities with little administrative and financial power. There were only three municipalities
with county status. Around 70 percent of the county-affiliated municipalities had less than
1,000 inhabitants and 40 percent even less than 500 inhabitants. 996 of these municipal-
ities were affiliated to 94 associations of administration. All efforts in the early 2000s to
induce voluntary mergers were unsuccessful. Saxony-Anhalt’s negative demographic trend
and diminishing financial resources (expiring of reconstruction aid for the New Länder)
further increased the pressure to act.14
(Verbandsgemeinde): Municipal associations have a common elected council and mayor and are by law
obliged to perform certain tasks for their member municipalities (for more information see Ministry of the
Interior and Sports Facilities Saxony-Anhalt 2007a, page 76 f.).
11To the best of my knowledge being a member of an association of administration or a municipal
association does not limit a municipality in taking on debt in Saxony-Anhalt.
12See Section 4.6 for a deeper discussion on further channels of opportunistic behavior.
13Unless indicated otherwise, the overall concept of regional policy (Ministry of the Interior and Sports
Facilities Saxony-Anhalt 2007a) is the source of information on the municipal territorial reform.
14Before the municipal territorial reform described here, there had already been other endeavors to
increase the administrative municipal power in Saxony-Anhalt (e.g., introduction of the administrative
layer association of administration). Furthermore, two county territorial reforms (Kreisgebietsreformen)
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Timeline. In response, the coalition agreement on April 24, 2006 contained a mu-
nicipal territorial reform to reduce the number of municipalities and increase their size.
Already on November 17, 2006 the state parliament of Saxony-Anhalt decided to draft the
key points of the overall concept of regional policy (Leitbild) until December 2006. The
municipal head organizations were closely involved. They got a short preliminary version
of the key points already in mid 2006. On August 7, 2007 the overall concept of regional
policy was concluded. It was the basis for the relevant law (Gemeindeneugliederungs-
Grundsätzegesetz) which came into force on February, 21 2008. See Figure 4.1 for a clear
display of the time line.
Figure 4.1: Time line of the municipal territorial reform
Notes: Illustration by author.
The reform was divided into two phases: The non-mandatory phase lasted from mid
2007 to June 30, 2009. During the non-mandatory phase municipalities could territorially
restructure according to their preferences as long as it was within the scope of the guidelines
of the regional policy. The mandatory phase, in which the state passed laws to force
municipalities to merge or incorporate, began on July 1, 2009. The government aimed
for voluntary mergers by creating public awareness, working closely with the respective
municipalities (and their citizens) and incentivizing them financially.15 The reform was
preceded the municipal territorial reform.
15The overall concept of regional policy scheduled around 45 million euros for financial incentives and
already outlined the distribution mechanisms. Two circular decrees in 2007 provided the legal basis
(Ministry of the Interior and Sports Facilities Saxony-Anhalt 2007b, 2007c). Municipalities taking part in
the restructuring in accordance with the overall concept of regional policy received 20 euro per capita (p.c.)
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concluded in 2011.
The municipal territorial reform met some resistance.16 Most mergers took place
during the voluntary phase (2007 to mid 2009). However, in the mandatory phase 151 mu-
nicipalities were, through 11 laws (Gemeindeneugliederungsgesetze), forced into regional-
policy-consistent mergers and incorporations. 53 of them filed a lawsuit at the constitu-
tional court (Ministry of the Interior and Sports Facilities Saxony-Anhalt 2015). Some
municipalities withdrew their lawsuit later on. All others were rejected except for two due
to procedural errors. Only in 2014 were all lawsuits settled at the constitutional court.
At the beginning of 2011, there were 219 municipalities in Saxony-Anhalt. 104
were non-associated municipalities. All others were associated with the 18 municipal
associations. Figure 4.2 presents the change in pre- and post-reform territorial status.
It highlights the extent of the territorial reform (additionally, it already refers to the
econometric specifications by pointing out the (spatial) distribution of control, treatment
and alternative control group (for more information see Section 4.4.3). Figure 4.7 in
Appendix 4.7 also provides the evolution of the municipal territorial reform.
of municipal transfers for investment (with a limit of 5,000 inhabitants being considered). The maximum
amount provided accumulated to 10,000 euros. Furthermore, the new municipalities (and newly founded
municipal associations) received transfers for investment equal to 100,000 euros and consolidation transfers
depending on their needs. According to the Ministry of Finance Saxony-Anhalt (2015) the financial
incentives provided in the non-mandatory phase summed up to 61.1 million euros.
16Immediately after announcing the reform, a people’s initiative (Volksinitiative gegen flächendeckende
Einheitsgemeinden und Zwangseingemeindungen im Umfeld von Ober- und Mittelzentren-Sachsen-Anhalt
2011 ) to prevent the reform was founded. It was joined by over 170 municipalities. However, on July 13,
2007 the state parliament decided against their complaints. 178 municipalities filed a lawsuit with the
constitutional court against the initiating legislative packages (Begleitgesetz zur Gemeindegebietsreform
from February 14, 2008). It was rejected by the constitutional court on April 21 and September 15, 2009.
The plan to launch a petition for a referendum (Volksbegehren) of 26 municipalities in response to the first
rejection in April 2009 failed the minimum number of signatures required (Gundlach 2013, page 133).
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Figure 4.2: Pre-reform (left) and post-reform territorial status (right)
Notes: The figure depicts the pre-reform 2006 territorial status (left) and post-reform 2011 territorial
status (right). Control and treatment group refers to the municipalities which were not and were
affected by reform, respectively. Alternative control group refers to those municipalities which were
forced to merge and fought against this in court. Own compilation with geoinformation provided by
the GeoDataCenter (Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy).
Principles and criteria. The reform effort was guided by the following principles:
It favored the amalgamation of non-associated municipalities. It abolished the adminis-
trative layer of associations of administration. It implemented a new local administrative
unit (municipal associations). However, municipal associations were supposed to be an
exception and were only permitted during the voluntary phase. The reform protected the
already existing 37 non-associated municipalities. Amalgamations (into non-associated
municipalities and municipal associations) were to be consistent with the boundaries of
former associations of administration. This extremely limited the autonomy of decision
during the non-mandatory phase. Amalgamations were supposed to consider long-standing
economic, ecological and historic relationships as well as aspects concerning the general
regional-planning policy.
The most important formal criteria were: Non-associated municipalities should not
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have less than 10,000 inhabitants. Municipal associations should have a minimum of three
and a maximum of eight associated municipalities. Municipal associations should have a
minimum of 10,000 inhabitants, all of their associated municipalities not less than 1,000
inhabitants. Certain exceptions applied with regard to the minimum population size, for
example, in particular geographic positions. Only the 61 associations of administration
with a joint administrative unit (Verwaltungsgemeinschaft nach dem Modell “Gemein-
sames Verwaltungsamt”) could vote to amalgamate into a municipal association (but only
if they had no dominating municipality). The 33 associations of administration with a lead-
ing municipality (Verwaltungsgemeinschaft nach dem Modell “Trägergemeinde”) should be
transformed into non-associated municipalities.
Politicians. The local government law of Saxony-Anhalt provides detailed transi-
tional arrangements for the mayors and municipal councils of the affected municipalities
until the time of the next election.17 At the next elections all voters of the new munic-
ipalities elected a new mayor and municipal council; the distribution of voters, hence,
was the important factor for the political power constellation. Municipalities associated
with a municipal association remained legally independent. Mayor and municipal council
continued their term.18
4.3 The free-riding effect
In this section I propose the five hypotheses underpinning the empirical approach and their
operationalization. Hypotheses 1a and b are at the center of previous empirical research.
Hypothesis 1a picks up the implications of the “tragedy of the commons.” It addresses
whether the mere availability of a common pool already triggers an incentive to free-ride.
17In case of a merger electing a new municipal council was obligatory. If there was only one salaried
mayor in the merging municipalities, he or she became the new mayor. In the unlikely case that there was
more than one salaried mayor in the merging municipalities the procedure was more complicated: Either
the merging agreement already designated one of them to become the new mayor or one of them was elected
by the new municipal council. In case of an incorporation the incorporated municipality could either
transform its council into a council of locality (Ortschaftsrat)(merging or incorporating municipalities
could form a locality (Ortschaft)). Alternatively, there were elections for a new municipal council. If the
absorbing municipality had a salaried mayor, he or she staid in power, if it had only an honorary one
there were re-elections.
18Besides that, the municipal association also has its own mayor (Verbandsgemeindebürgermeister) and
council (Verbandsgemeinderat).
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Hypothesis 1a: Being in a common pool triggers an incentive to free-ride.
However, in view of the previous literature Hypothesis 1b and not 1a may be seen as the
actual starting point.
Hypothesis 1b: The incentive to free-ride is greater, the smaller the municipality’s own
size relative to the size of its common pool.
The first study on this research interest (Hinnerich 2009) concentrates on the theoretical
predictions in the spirit of the “law 1/n.” It suggests that the incentive to behave oppor-
tunistically is increasing, the smaller the municipality’s own size relative to its common
pool (note, as explained before, the original formulation relates the number of common
pool members to public project size). Hinnerich (2009) operationalizes this – also called
continuous – incentive to free-ride of municipality i as:
Fi = 1− ni/nj ∈ [0, 1) (4.1)
with ni being the population size of municipality i and nj being the population size of
the incorporating municipalities and the absorbing municipality or the merging partners.19
I follow his definition. See Figure 4.3 in Section 4.4.2 for the distribution of the free-riding
measure Fi.
De facto, Hinnerich (2009) abstains from studying Hypothesis 1a by only referring
to the continuous measure. In line with Jordahl and Liang (2010) and Saarimaa and
Tukiainen (2015), I argue that solely employing the continuous measure hinges on various
assumptions: On the assumption that the theoretical predictions of the “law 1/n” are
interpreted correctly. On the assumption that the municipalities understand the under-
lying incentives fully. On the assumption that they anticipate their free-ride incentive
correctly. And, last, on the assumption that they are not limited in their ability to exploit
the common pool. To account for the fact that the simple formation of a common pool
19Due to the complexity of the municipal territorial reform in Saxony-Anhalt the definition of the
common pool nj was not straightforward. Most incorporations took place at one point in time, but there
were certain cases of multiple mergers or incorporations. As far as the latter is concerned, the definition
of the common pool refers to the last (and not the first) amalgamation status. Given the level of detail
of the overall concept of the regional policy and the short time horizon, it seems reasonable to assume
that municipalities were aware of the additional mergers and incorporations. Nevertheless, this decision
is subject to a robustness check. I calculate the free-riding effect by using the population size of the year
2006.
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might trigger free-riding independently of its size (as stated by Hypothesis 1a) Jordahl
and Liang (2010) add a so-called discrete effect besides the continuous effect. Saarimaa
and Tukiainen (2015) follow their approach. This discrete effect is modeled as a dummy
variable which takes the value 1 if the municipality is affected by the reform (merged,
incorporated or absorbing) and 0 otherwise. All municipalities which were not affected by
the reform (neither merging nor incorporating nor absorbing) constitute the control group
(note they have no incentive to free-ride and hence Fi = 0).20
Hypotheses 1a and 1b are captured by the econometric model specified in Equation
4.3 outlined in Section 4.4.3 with the operationalization of the discrete and continuous
effect being based upon previous reserach.
Hypothesis 2a: Municipalities which remain accountable after the execution of the reform
do not engage in free-riding.
Hypothesis 2b: The more municipalities identify with the reform, the lower is the free-
riding effect.
However, to allege that all municipalities being part of a common pool engage in free-
riding is shortsighted in the light of the recent developments in the literature on the “com-
mons.” There might exist implicit control mechanisms attenuating opportunistic behavior
or keeping municipalities from behaving opportunistically at all. This leads to Hypotheses
2a and b. I suggest that municipalities (and politicians) which (and politicians who) are in
public perception considered to be accountable (for handling public debt and infrastruc-
ture) after the reform will not engage in free-riding. This applies for municipalities which
are only absorbing or are keeping their name when merging. The more the members of the
common pool identify with the amalgamation, the lower presumably is the incentive to
free-ride. Consequently, it seems reasonable to believe that voluntary mergers or incorpo-
rations are less affected by opportunistic behavior than mandatory mergers. Saarimaa and
Tukiainen (2015) present evidence supporting opportunistic behavior in case of voluntary
20In light of Hansen’s (2014) advocation of the original formulation I expand my analysis and also
examine if the size of the free-riding effect is greater the more municipalities are in a common pool as
originally proposed by the “law 1/n.” In accordance with Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015) I call it coalition
size. I define it as:
Ci = 1− 1/pm ∈ [0, 1) (4.2)
with pm being the number of merging partners (or the sum of the incorporating municipalities plus the
absorbing municipality).
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mergers. However, their research design does not allow a distinction between voluntary
and mandatory mergers.
I capture these hypotheses by dividing the treated municipalities into three treatment
groups. I define dummy variables to compute the difference between the treatment and
the control groups. Treatment group 1 (group of survivors): This group of municipalities
consists of absorbing municipalities and merging municipalities which keep their name.
This treatment group refers to Hypothesis 2a while the two other treatment groups refer
to Hypothesis 2b. Treatment group 2 (group of non-survivors with weak incentives): It
consists of municipalities which were incorporated or merged during the non-mandatory
phase. Treatment group 3 (group of non-survivors with strong incentives): This group
comprises all municipalities which were incorporated or merged mandatorily and did not
dispute this at the constitutional court. Hypotheses 2a and b refer to Equation 4.4 in
Section 4.4.3.
Hypothesis 3: The size of the free-riding effect is greater, the later the incorporation or
merger takes place.
The last hypothesis refers to the timing of the merger or incorporation. I suggest that
the timing of the merger or the incorporation has a positive effect on the size of the free-
riding effect. The later it takes place, the more time the municipalities have to behave
opportunistically and to coordinate opportunistic behavior. A decisive factor is that there
are public projects which do not qualify to be financed through free-riding on debt at all
if there is a strong time limitation. In particular, cost-intensive public projects (for which
the municipalities take on debt for investment purposes) are time-sensitive. They may
involve planning, tendering and adjustment of the budget-bye laws. Evidence in favor of
this hypothesis has already been brought forward by Hinnerich (2009). Hypothesis 3 is
reflected in Equation 4.5 (see Section 4.4.3).
4.4 Empirical approach
This section starts by explaining the data sources. Next, I report the relevant descriptive
statistics. Last, I outline the econometric model and provide a discussion on identification
and robustness.
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4.4.1 Data
Data sources. I collected a panel dataset on the full universe of municipalities in Saxony-
Anhalt from 2000 to 2010 to study the free-riding incentive in the course of the municipal
territorial reform.21 All data comes from official public administrative statistics, but from
different sources. My research interest hampers the data collection. In Germany, the sta-
tistical offices typically only provide data (ready for use) on the latest territorial status
after a territorial reform took place. This implies that all data is aggregated to post-reform
boundaries. However, for my research interest using data which reflects the territorial sta-
tus of the respective year is crucial. Information on municipal debt comes from the annual
statistical reports of local debt for Saxony-Anhalt, which is published by the Statistical
Office of Saxony-Anhalt.22 While the latest reports (2006 to 2010) are available online,
the ministry retains only paper versions for the earlier years. To the best of my knowl-
edge, this data has not been used for academic research so far. I obtained data for all
usual municipal-level controls except for employees from the Regional Database Germany
(Regionaldatenbank Deutschland) for the year 2009. Data for the years from 2001 to
2008 emanates from the Statistical Local (Statistik Lokal) publications. Data for the year
2000 was requested from the Statistical Office of Saxony-Anhalt. Data on employees is
provided by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). All data on
variables which are only available at county level are also provided online by the Regional
Database Germany.23
Detailed information on the distinct features of the territorial reform were provided
by the Ministry of the Interior and Sports Facilities and the Ministry of Finance of Saxony-
Anhalt at request. Information on the municipalities which were merged or incorporated
on a mandatory basis were gathered directly from the respective laws. The overall concept
of regional policy is a further important data source. The Federal Statistical Office provides
information to connect pre- and post-county-reform identifiers. The Statistical Office of
Saxony-Anhalt makes available detailed information on the municipal territorial reform
(type of change in territorial status and respective change of identifier).
21However, data for 2010 is only provided for the territorial status of 2011. This is why this year is
missing in the empirical analysis.
22The municipal debt comprises credit market debt and debt from public households.
23Data on outlays and revenues is missing for the municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt due to their ongoing
reform of municipal accounting procedures. This prevents me from complementing my research with an
empirical analysis of the impact of this reform on fiscal outcomes.
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Data cleaning. Due to the reporting rules of the German administrative statistic
there is the need for data cleaning: A municipality which is incorporated is no longer
reported. The absorbing municipality, on the other hand, remains in the sample, con-
stitutes the aggregate of the two and does not change its identifier. The same holds for
municipal mergers if one of the municipalities’ names is maintained. In case of a merger,
a new identifier is only assigned if the merging municipalities choose a new name. In the
pre-reform period I drop all absorbing municipalities in the years before the incorporation.
The same holds for merging municipalities which maintain the name of one municipality.24
All merging municipalities as well as municipalities which were incorporated in the pre-
reform period (2000 to 2006) are excluded.25 I also exclude mergers and incorporations
which took place in 2007. In the post-reform period (2007 to 2009) I drop absorbing
municipalities after their first incorporation and merging municipalities which maintained
their name after their first mergers. I also exclude new municipalities from the analysis.
4.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for the baseline sample for the period 2006 to 2009.
Table 4.8 in the Appendix 4.7 complements it by presenting the equivalent statistics for
the full sample (2000 to 2009). It first lists the dependent variable debt in euro p.c. (all
nominal variables are deflated to 2000 prices). The average municipal debt in the sample
is 575.56 (in euro p.c.) (for the period 2006 to 2009). While the minimum is 0 (not having
any debt at all), there is a municipality with 17,254.84 euro p.c. debt. The next four
variables refer to the treatment dummies: On average there are 7% of the municipalities
in the control group (CG) and 93% of the municipalities in the treatment group (TG). To
be more concrete 11%, 72% and 11% are in treatment group 1 (TG1), treatment group
2 (TG2), and treatment group 3 (TG3), respectively. Table 4.7 in Appendix 4.7 provides
supplementary information on the absolute number of municipalities by group and year.
The average free-riding measure (Fi) is 0.786 with a minimum of 0 (municipalities of
24Alternatively, I could have assigned a new identifier for artificial separation. However, since I am only
interested in municipalities existing in the pre- and post-reform period, dropping was the most practical
solution.
25There were some mergers and incorporation before the state-wide reform between mid-2007 and
2011. I considered to include the incorporations and mergers during the pre-reform period as further little
reforms in the difference-in-differences design. However, modeling the actual reform is challenging and
there is reason to believe that free-riding behavior of these municipalities differs. Including them without
dealing with this aspect could affect the estimates.
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the control group) and a maximum of almost 1 (0.9998714) (see Equation 4.1 and 4.2 for
the definition of Fi and Ci). The coalition size (Ci) averages around the same value (0.784),
again with a minimum of 0 (municipalities of the control group), but with a maximum of
0.967. This means that the greatest common pool consists of 30 members (0.967 = 1− 130).
Table 4.1 furthermore displays descriptive statistics for the most important municipal-level
control variables (population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue (both
in euro p.c.)) and county-level control variables (disposable income of private households
and gross domestic product (GDP) (both in euro p.c.)).




Debt 575.559 909.506 0 17254.838 3595
TG 0.934 0.248 0 1 3595
TG1 0.106 0.308 0 1 3595
TG2 0.717 0.451 0 1 3595
TG3 0.111 0.315 0 1 3595
F 0.786 0.296 0 1 3595
C 0.784 0.241 0 0.967 3595
Population 1707.117 4263.638 47 46384 3595
Employees 0.173 0.238 0.009 5.003 3071
Business tax rev. 182.498 1881.666 -6977.196 53784.978 3595
Property tax rev. 58.762 29.104 0 575.853 3595
Priv. income 13321.462 418.565 12513.075 14324.152 3595
GDP 17248.617 2142.751 13177.412 22673.803 3595
Notes: Main sample for the period 2006 to 2009 with 3,595 municipalities. Fi and Ci are the
continuous free-riding and coalition size measures, respectively. Debt (in euro p.c.), population,
employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue (both in euro p.c.) are municipal-level variables.
Income of private households and GDP (both in euro p.c.) are county-level variables. TGi is a
dummy variable and equals 1 if the municipality is treated and 0 if not. TG1i, TG2i, and TG3i
are equal to 1 if the municipality is part of the group of survivors, group of non-survivors (weak
incentives) and the group of non-survivors (strong incentives), respectively, and 0 otherwise. All
nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices.
Table 4.2 allows to compare the mean of the pre-reform and post-reform period for
Chapter 4 Empirical Essays on Fiscal Federalism 98
the control and treatment group. The pre-reform mean refers to the years 2000 to 2006
and concerns 6,175 and 374 municipalities of treatment and control group, respectively.
The post-reform period is shorter (2007 to 2009) and consists only of 2,450 (treatment
group) and 177 (control group) municipalities.26
It catches one’s eye that the mean debt (in euro p.c.) for control and treatment
group is higher in the pre-reform period than in the post-reform period. This is rather
unexpected (note that I work with 2000 prices). However, the mean of the control group
falls more (17%) than the mean of the treatment group (14%). This is in line with my
expectations.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics (mean) for control and treatment group









































Control group 1077.50 0.00 0.00 3708.45 0.20 146.38 56.71 13255.60 16129.32
Treatment group 619.24 0.85 0.84 1389.92 0.17 116.49 55.61 13170.82 16015.21
Total 645.41 0.80 0.79 1522.33 0.17 118.20 55.67 13175.66 16021.73
Post-reform (2007-2009)
Control group 897.11 0.00 0.00 4243.45 0.21 195.12 60.23 13462.01 17288.54
Treatment group 531.51 0.84 0.84 1477.60 0.17 179.80 58.85 13365.71 17306.48
Total 556.14 0.79 0.78 1663.95 0.18 180.83 58.94 13372.20 17305.28
Notes: Main sample for the period 2000 to 2009 with 9,176 municipalities (except for employees:
8,090 observations). Fi and Ci are the continuous free-riding and coalition size measures, respectively.
Debt (in euro p.c.), population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue (both in euro
p.c.) are municipal-level variables. Income of private households and GDP (both in euro p.c.) are
county-level variables. Pre-reform and post-reform period refer to 2000 to 2006 and 2007 to 2009,
respectively. All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices.
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of the free-riding measure Fi for all 909 municipal-
26Except for employees there are no missings. The number of observations for employees is 5,514 and
2,026 (treatment group), and 374 and 176 (control group) for pre- and post-reform period, respectively.
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ities of the treatment group in 2006. It highlights that the distribution is right skewed.
This implies that there are more small municipalities than big municipalities in the com-
mon pools. The median is rather high (.94). The 15th percentile and the 85th percentile
equals .63 and .98, respectively. By definition none of the municipalities of the treatment
group has a free-ride measure Fi = 0 or Fi = 1 (keep in mind Fi = 0 for all municipalities
of the control group).
Figure 4.3: Distribution of the free-riding effect for treatment group, 2006
Notes: Distribution of the free-ride measure for all 909 municipalities of the treatment group in 2006.
Figure 4.8 in Appendix 4.7 provides the equivalent depiction for the coalition size.
Note that the coalition size is less scattered since all municipalities of one common pool
have the same effect.
4.4.3 Econometric model
My identification strategy relies on a difference-in-differences approach in a panel data
environment.
Equation 4.3. I start with Equation 4.3. It specifies the free-riding incentive as it
Chapter 4 Empirical Essays on Fiscal Federalism 100
prevails in previous empirical research. It refers to Hypotheses 1a and 1b. It is presented
in its basic form:27
di,t = α +
∑2009
t=2007 αtTGi × TPt +
∑2009
t=2007 βtFi × TGi × TPt
+ηXi,t + θZc,t + λi + Φt + εi,t
(4.3)
where i stands for a municipality in county c in year t for the period 2006 to 2009 with
2006 being the base year (pre-treatment point) and 2007 to 2009 being the post-treatment
points.28 The dependent variable di,t is debt in euro p.c. All nominal values are deflated
to 2000 prices. This specification combines the discrete and the continuous free-riding
effect. My independent variables of interest are: the interaction terms TGi×TPt between
the treatment group TGi and the treatment points TPt (discrete effect) and the triple
interaction term Fi×TGi×TPt29 between the municipality-specific continuous free-riding
measure Fi, the treatment group TGi and the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, 2008
and 2009 (continuous effect). TGi is equal to 1 if the municipality is affected by the reform
(merged, incorporated or absorbing) and 0 otherwise. TPt is equal 1 if t = 2007, 2008
and 2009, respectively, and 0 otherwise. I also run some regression where I replace the
continuous free-riding effect Fi by coalition size Ci.
I further add Xi,t, representing a vector of municipal-level variables (population,
employees p.c., property and business tax in euro p.c.), and Zc,t, representing a vector of
county-level variables (GDP and income of private households in euro p.c.), to account
for observable time-variant differences between municipalities. Furthermore, I add munic-
ipality and year fixed effects (λi,Φt). The municipality fixed effects control for unobserved
but time-invariant omitted municipal-level factors that may influence the dependent vari-
able. By employing year fixed effects I account for common shocks affecting the dependent
variable across all municipalities in a given year. The group of municipalities which were
merged or incorporated mandatorily, but filed a lawsuit against this, is excluded from the
27Empirically, I also test specifications only referring to Hypothesis 1a: di,t = α +
∑2009
t=2007 αt TGi ×
TPt + ηXi,t + θZc,t + λi + Φt + εi,t (Equation 4.3, Specification (I)) and Hypothesis 1b: di,t = α +∑2009
t=2007 βtFi × TGi × TPt + ηXi,t + θZc,t + λi + Φt + εi,t (Equation 4.3, Specification (II)). However,
the previous literature generally combines both effects.
28This may be hard to grasp: The treatment period refers to the time between the announcement of the
reform and the execution (and not the time after the execution as one might expect), since I am interested
in the chance of behavior after the announcement. Accordingly, the pre-treatment period refers to 2006
(and the years prior to 2006).
29Fi × TGi × TPt equals Fi × TPt.
Chapter 4 Empirical Essays on Fiscal Federalism 101
analysis. Standard errors are clustered on the municipality level.
Equation 4.4. Next I present Equation 4.4, which refers to Hypotheses 2a and 2b
and is specified as follows:
di,t = δ +
∑2009
t=2007 δ1,tTG1i × TPt +
∑2009
t=2007 δ2,tTG2i × TPt +
∑2009
t=2007 δ3,tTG3i × TPt
+ηXi,t + θZc,t + λi + Φt + εi,t
(4.4)
Treatment group TG1i is equal to 1 if the municipality is part of the survivor group
and 0 otherwise. Treatment groups TG2i and TG3i are equal to 1 if the municipality
is part of the group of non-survivors (weak incentives) and the group of non-survivors
(strong incentives), respectively, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables of interest
are the interaction terms TGji × TPt between the treatment groups TGji with j = 1, 2
and 3 and treatment point t = 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively. Treatment group TG1i
refers to Hypothesis 2a, while treatment group TG2i and TG3i refer to Hypothesis 2b.
Employing Equation 4.4 is necessary to tackle Hypothesis 2a and 2b. Equation 4.3 does not
consider how the municipality was affected by the territorial reform (surviving, voluntary
or mandatory merger). It focuses on relative common pool size.
Equation 4.5. The last equation refers to Hypothesis 3 and employs aggregated
data. I aggregate the pre-reform (2000 to 2006) and the post-reform (2007 to 2009) ob-
servations to one observation each. The main purpose of the aggregation is the sensitivity
analysis later. It is also convenient with respect to Hypothesis 3. It allows the analysis of
the effect of the year in which the merger or incorporation actually took place. I employ
a fixed effects model with only two time points (p = pre and post). Postp consequently
is the post-reform period dummy and is equal to 1 if p = post and 0 if not. To explore if
the free-riding effect depends on the timing of the merger or the incorporation, I use the
following specification:
di,p = γ +
2011∑
t=2008
γtChanget,i × Postp + ηXi,p + θZc,p + λi + Φp + εi,p (4.5)
Changet,i equals 1 if the municipality was merged or incorporated in t =
2008, ..., 2011, respectively, and 0 if it was not. Independent variables of interest are
the interaction terms between Changet,i × Postp between the timing of the merger or in-
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corporation Changet,i with t = 2008, ..., 2011 and the post-reform period dummy Postp.
4.4.4 Identification and robustness
The municipal territorial reform in Saxony-Anhalt can be interpreted as a quasi-experi-
ment. The decision by the state government to carry out a municipal territorial reform
represents an (exogenous) shock to the individual municipalities. The assignment to treat-
ment itself is not at random, but is clearly defined in the overall concept of regional policy
and is enforced in the mandatory phase. It mainly depends on population size besides
geographical and administrative characteristics. This is why population is an important
control variable. The implementation of a non-mandatory phase leaves the municipalities
a very limited degree of leeway regarding their decision with whom to merge or incorpo-
rate (within the close limits of the overall concept of regional policy). This might raise
minor endogeneity concerns, but only in relation to potential partners (and only in the
non-mandatory phase) and not in relation to whether or not the municipalities are affected
by the reform at all.30 However – and this is what is the important point for eliminating
selection bias concerns – there is no indication that the decisions related to the leeway
granted in the non-mandatory phase are correlated with the future trend of the dependent
variable in the absence of treatment. The same holds for the issue of self-selection into
mandatory and non-mandatory treatment. Nevertheless, I add property and business tax
revenue (local level) and GDP (county level, all three in euro p.c.) to account for potential
group-specific economic shocks coinciding with the reform.
To address even minor potential selection issues I, furthermore, perform a robustness
check where the treatment group only consists of municipalities which definitely could not
evade treatment and which are easily identifiable (see robustness check for self-selection).
These are municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants, municipalities that are part of
associations of administration with a leading municipality and municipalities that are part
of treatment group 3.
The main advantage of the difference-in-differences design is that it solves potential
identification issues (due to unobserved heterogeneity) by comparing the control group
– all municipalities which are not affected by the reform – to the treated municipalities
30Except for the small group of municipalities (municipalities being part of associations of administration
with a joint administrative unit which had no dominating municipality) which could become part of a
municipal association in the non-mandatory phase (and thereby remain independent). All already existing
non-associated municipalities were protected from the reform.
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before and after the reform. The validity of this approach is based on the assumption
that the trend in the dependent variable of the control and treatment groups would have
been the same in the absence of the treatment. Of course, this assumption cannot be
tested explicitly. A common way to explore the so-called common trend assumption is
to check whether the trends of control and treatment group developed in parallel in the
past. Given that all municipalities enjoy the same institutional environment, there is no
reason to believe these trends would not continue in the future in the absence of treatment.
This is why this paper relies heavily on the graphical analysis conducted in Section 4.5.1.
There are further ways to tackle the common trend assumption such as Placebo tests or
non-equivalent dependent variables (see, e.g., St. Clair and Cook [2015] for a discussion
of difference-in-differences methods in public finance).31 One pitfall of a difference-in-
differences approach with a long panel dimension – as pointed out by Bertrand et al.
(2004) – is the serial correlation problem, which can lead to a wrong rejection of the null
hypothesis. This problem is frequently disregarded by applied literature. I address it by
employing clustered standard errors and performing a robustness check where I ignore the
time series dimension of the data.
It is inherent to the study of municipal territorial reforms that treatment and control
groups differ with respect to certain characteristics, in particular, population size. The
treatment group specific fixed effects serve to capture average permanent differences be-
tween treatment and control groups. Nevertheless, the difference-in-differences design is
stronger, the closer the control group is to the treatment group. This is why I excluded the
three municipalities with county status. As part of my sensitivity analysis I also use the
group of municipalities which were merged or incorporated mandatorily, but filed a lawsuit
against this, as an alternative control group. Since those municipalities were designated
for a merger or an incorporation in the overall concept of regional policy, their relevant
characteristics (population size, geographical and administrative characteristics) are very
similar to the treatment group. Given that they tried to reverse their mandatory merger
or incorporation it is unlikely that they behaved opportunistically (see robustness check
for alternative control group). However, one drawback is that they selected themselves in
this group.
One particular strength of the municipal territorial reform in Saxony-Anhalt is that
31The latter is not an option because there is no variable which is available in public administrative
statistic, which is conceptually similar to the dependent variable and which is not affected by the territorial
reform.
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I can clearly separate the pre- and post-reform period. Pre-reform and post-reform refers
to the time before and after the reform was made public. The reform was announced
by the coalition agreement in April 2006 with the municipal head organizations having
information on the preliminary version of the key points in August. 2007 was therefore
the first year for which the budget bye-laws could be adjusted in response to the reform.
A possible limitation of this research lies in the calculation of the continuous free-ride
measure Fi (which is only employed in Equation 4.3). As outlined above, the formulation
of the common pool refers to the whole post-reform period (2007 to 2011). This implies
that early mergers or incorporations were aware of further, later mergers or incorporations.
However, it might be the case that early mergers or incoporations only considered their
current common pool. If this is the case the current definition would overestimate the
incentive to free-ride and downward bias the estimated coefficient. For a robustness check
I exclude all observations from the regression which are part of a common pool with
multiple mergers or incorporations (see robustness check b). A further concern relates to
the 178 municipalities which lost their lawsuit against the initiating legislative packages
in 2009. They might not have behaved opportunistically since they hoped to bring the
reform to an end (see robustness check a). This could also involve a downward bias. Of
minor importance but nevertheless subject to a robustness check are the few territorial
changes in the pre-reform period. It might be that the newly founded municipalities or
the absorbing municipalities were subject to a post-reform trend. This raises concerns
regarding the validity of the common trend assumption (see robustness check c).
For the sake of completeness I report a further minor drawback of my research:
There is no adequate data available for the year 2010.32 This concerns only municipalities
which were first dissolved mandatorily in 2011 (the last year of the reform). Municipalities
which were dissolved in 2010 were reported regularly for the last time in 2009. Lacking
this information mainly implies that we cannot estimate the interaction TG3i × TP2010.
4.5 Graphical evidence and results
In this section I first explore the relevant graphical evidence. Then I present the main
results. Last, I provide a number of robustness checks to validate my results.
32I could not retrieve data for 2010 reflecting the territorial status of 2010. See discussion in Section
4.4.1.
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4.5.1 Graphical evidence
I start by exploring the validity of the common trend assumption graphically. Figure 4.4
presents the development of average debt (in euro p.c., deflated to 2000 prices) of the
control group (gray line) and the treatment group (dashed black line) between 2000 and
2009. The dashed black vertical line separates the pre-reform (2000 to 2006) and the
post-reform (2007 to 2009) period. 2010 is missing due to data availability.
Figure 4.4: Development of average debt (in euro p.c.) by control and treat-
ment groups, 2000-2009
Notes: Unweighted mean, deflated to 2000 prices.
At first glance treatment and control groups seem to experience different pre-reform
trends between 2000 and 2006. The average public debt of the treatment group remains
rather stable. The average public debt of the control group is subject to a downwards
trend. At second glance, however, there seems to be a turning point in 2003. Before 2003
average debt of the control group is indeed decreasing, while that of the treatment group is
not. This changes after the hump in 2003, which is visible for both groups. Average debt
for both – treatment and control – groups is descending and evolves almost in parallel in
2004, 2005, and 2006.
What is surprising is that there is no break in the development of debt for the
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treatment group in the post-reform period, as one would have expected. One explanation
might be that the crude separation into control and treatment groups clouds the actual
free-riding effect. The development of average debt of municipalities with a low incentive
to behave opportunistically should be more akin to municipalities which have no incentive
to free-ride (control group) than to municipalities with a high incentive. This is accounted
for in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Development of average debt (in euro p.c.) by control and dif-
ferentiated treatment groups, 2000-2009
Notes: Unweighted mean, deflated to 2000 prices. Left figure refers to Equation 4.3. Treatment
group is divided into three groups depending on their value of Fi for illustrative purposes only (value
of Fi below or equal to the 15th percentile, above the 15th percentile and below or equal to the 85th
percentile and above the 85th percentile). Right figure refers to Equation 4.4. Treatment group 1,
2, and 3 refers to group of survivors, non-survivors (weak incentives) and the group of non-survivors
(strong incentives), respectively.
Figure 4.5 (left) relates to Equation 4.3 and refers to Fi. For illustrative purposes
only, I divided the treated municipalities into three groups depending on their incentive to
free-ride. I assign municipalities with a value of Fi below or equal to the 15th percentile
Fi ∈ (0, 0.63], above the 15th percentile and below or equal to the 85th percentile Fi ∈
(0.63, 0.98] and above the 85th percentile Fi ∈ (0.98, 1) to separate groups. Figure 4.5
(right) relates to Equation 4.4. Treatment group 1, treatment group 2, and treatment
group 3 refer to the group of survivors, the group of non-survivors with weak incentives
and the group of non-survivors, respectively. A similar pattern as above emerges: After
2003 there seems to be a rather parallel evolution of average debt of the control and
treatment groups for 2004, 2005, and 2006 on the one hand. On the other hand there
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is no obvious change in average debt for the treatment groups in the post-reform period.
Figure 4.10 in Appendix 4.7 (left) complements the graphical analysis by presenting the
evolution of the differences in average debt between the control and treatment groups (and
all subversions).
The graphical assessment casts some doubt on the validity of the common trend
assumptions. However, I have four attenuating comments: First, I present a rather long
pre-reform period with a much better picture in the later years (after 2003). As discussed
above in 2004, 2005, and 2006 the difference between treatment and control group remains
rather stable. The major problem related to a pre-reform trend is that this might violate
the identifying assumption of a common trend. Since I employ a difference-in-differences
design with a base year approach (2006) parallelism with respect to years directly before
the base year is of more importance than with respect to the years further away. Second,
the assessment of the pre-reform trends in the related literature (e.g., Hinnerich 2009 and
Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2015) is very optimistic with respect to the confirmation of the
common trend assumption. In my opinion, the graphical evidence presented by them is
not superior to mine. While I acknowledge that my findings are not ideal, I add to the
literature, because they are arguably and relatively better than those of the previous papers
in the literature. Third, the overall picture improves if we consider the alternative control
group instead of the control group (see Figure 4.9 and 4.10 (right)). Fourth, nonparallel
trends exposed visually might be due to confounding factors. However, exploring the
unconditional common trend assumption graphically enhances the overall transparency.
Nevertheless, my econometric strategy weakens the overall importance of the graphical
analysis. To tackle the conditional common trend assumption in an environment where I
control potential confounding factors, I run regressions using the extended dataset for the
years 2000 to 2009. Comparing 2006 (base year) and the other pre-reform years allows
me to assess if there are differences between the treatment and control period in the pre-
reform period. If such differences exist, this would be a conclusive argument against the
validity of the common trend assumption.
4.5.2 Main results
I start with specifications including only the base year (2006) and the three post-reform
years (2007 to 2009).
Hypothesis 1a and b. Table 4.3 depicts the main regression results for
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Equation 4.3. Specification (I) begins by controlling only for the discrete effect TGi×TPt
(for t = 2007, ..., 2009) while Specification (II) only considers the continuous effect
Fi × TGi × TPt (for t = 2007, ..., 2009). Specification (III) combines the discrete and
the continuous effect (as it prevails in the previous literature). The left column of each
specification presents the baseline regression without any further controls except for the
usual municipality and year fixed effects. The right column includes municipal-level con-
trols for population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue and county-level
controls for income of private households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). Note that the ad-
ditional controls are the same across all specifications (add. controls). See Appendix 4.7
for the unabridged version of all tables of this section.








TG×2007 20.156∗∗∗ 5.620 -11.063 -16.427
(4.72) (10.17) (8.91) (13.09)
TG×2008 39.697∗∗ 34.316∗∗ -20.567 -25.685
(15.44) (15.76) (23.20) (23.14)
TG×2009 21.221 19.225 -50.813 -55.823
(32.29) (32.64) (40.18) (41.32)
F×TG×2007 31.270∗∗∗ 16.695∗ 37.340∗∗∗ 27.574∗∗
(5.42) (9.87) (8.92) (12.72)
F×TG×2008 60.211∗∗∗ 58.663∗∗∗ 71.832∗∗∗ 77.079∗∗∗
(15.37) (16.87) (22.56) (24.90)
F×TG×2009 50.236∗ 54.312∗ 84.799∗∗∗ 97.060∗∗∗
(26.82) (30.04) (31.00) (36.90)
Observations 3595 3071 3595 3071 3595 3071
R2 .0752869 .075696 .0774994 .0777302 .0780647 .0783733
Municip. FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Add. controls no yes no yes no yes
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Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.3 with standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2006 to 2009. The unit of observation
is a single municipality. Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent
variables of interest are the interaction terms TGi × TPt between the treatment group TGi and
the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009 and the triple interaction term Fi × TGi × TPt
between the municipality-specific continuous free-ride measure Fi, the treatment group TGi and
the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009. Base year is 2006. All specifications include
year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for
population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue and county-level controls for income
of private households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices. For
unabridged version see Table 4.9 in Appendix 4.7.
Specification (I) generally supports Hypothesis 1a. The estimated effects for the
interaction terms TGi×TP2007 and TGi×TP2008 for the baseline are positive and statisti-
cally significant (α2007 = 20.156 and α2008 = 39.697). This implies that compared to 2006,
the treatment group has 20.156 euros p.c.more debt in 2007 and 39.697 euros p.c.more
debt in 2008 than the control group, ceteris paribus (c.p.). From an economic perspective
the size of the effect is also not negligible. The size effect corresponds to around 3% and
7% pre-reform debt stock in 2007 and 2008, respectively (the average debt of the treatment
group equals 604.813 euro p.c. in 2006). Adding controls changes the size of the coeffi-
cient of TGi×TP2008 slightly and results in a statistically insignificant coefficient for 2007
(TGi × TP2007). The interaction term TGi × TP2009 is statistically insignificant in both
specifications. Specification (II) speaks in favor of Hypothesis 1b. All triple interaction
terms Fi × TGi × TPt (for t = 2007, ..., 2009) have positive and statistically significant
coefficients. Based on the baseline regression, having a value of Fi close to 1 instead of 0
implies a rise in debt of 31.270, 60.211 and 50.236 (in euro p.c.) in 2007, 2008 and 2009,
respectively, in comparison to 2006, c.p. Again, the sizes are of economic importance.
It corresponds to up 10% (2008) pre-reform debt stock. Adding controls again changes
the coefficient size, but not the overall economic and statistical significance. Specification
(III) combines the discrete and the continuous effect – this approach is at the center of
the previous literature. What stands out is the performance of the (triple) continuous
interaction terms Fi × TGi × TPt. Their estimated coefficients are positive and statisti-
cally significant for all treatment points TPt (for t = 2007, ..., 2009). Specification (III)
suggests the superiority of the triple interaction term specification over the discrete inter-
action terms. The three discrete interaction terms TGi × TPt (for t = 2007, ..., 2009) are
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neither individually nor jointly statistically significant. My results stress the importance
of Hypothesis 1b by showing that the incentive effect is actually linked to the relative
common pool size.33 According to the baseline estimates of Specification (III), having a
value of Fi close to 1 instead of 0 increases per capita debt by 37.340 (6% of pre-reform
debt stock), 71.832 (12% of pre-reform debt stock), and 84.799 (14% of pre-reform debt
stock) euros p.c. in 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively, in comparison to 2006, c.p. In line
with my expectations the free-riding effect is lowest in 2007 and highest in 2009. The ad-
ditional controls are mainly individually insignificant (in Specification (I), (II) and (III))
and jointly statistically significant only in Specification (III).
Hypothesis 2a and b. Table 4.4 shows the main results for Equation 4.4 with the
left two columns referring to the short panel (2006 to 2009). As expected, the coefficients
for the interaction terms TG1i× TPt (for t = 2007, ..., 2009) are individually statistically
insignificant. This supports Hypothesis 2a. Municipalities which are only absorbing or
which keep their name when merging do not behave opportunistically. Next, I tackle
Hypothesis 2b: In 2007 and 2008 in comparison to 2006 the municipalities of treatment
group 2 – these are the municipalities which merged (but did not keep their name) or
incorporated voluntarily – had 19.692 and 42.335 higher debt (in euro p.c.) than the
control group, c.p.34 As expected, the effect was even higher for treatment group 3, which
comprises the municipalities which were forced to merge or incorporate (δ3,2007 = 37.683
and δ3,2008 = 58.073). With an average pre-reform debt stock of 564.564 and 603.920 euro
p.c. for treatment groups 2 and 3 (in 2006), the sizes of the effects again are of economic
relevance. For treatment groups 2 respective 3 the size of the effect corresponds to 3
respective 6% (2007) and 7 respective 10% (2008) average pre-reform debt stock. What
surprises is that the coefficients of the interactions terms TG2i×TP2009 and TG3i×TP2009
are statistically insignificant, even though 2009 was the last year of independence for many
municipalities affected by the municipal territorial reform. Again, adding controls almost
does not alter the coefficients of the interactions terms TG2i×TP2008 and TG3i×TP2008,
but affects the significance of TG2i × TP2007 and TG3i × TP2007. All in all, my results
are well in line with Hypothesis 2b. Municipalities which identified more with the reform
behave less opportunistically. While the additional controls are mainly not individually
33A potential explanation for the lack of significance lies in multicollinearity, which raises doubts about
combining the continuous and the discrete effect. However, this approach is established by the literature.
34Note that these municipalities also received financial incentives, which may have reduced the degree
of opportunistic behavior.
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statistically significant, they are jointly statistically significant.
Table 4.4: Regression results for Equation 4.4
Short (2006-2009) Extended (2000-2009)
Baseline Add. controls Baseline Add. controls
TG1×TPt indiv. insign.
for t = 2000, ..., 2005
TG1×2007 7.005 -6.020 7.005 3.350
(7.67) (11.76) (7.67) (8.66)
TG1×2008 4.581 -4.474 7.220 2.998
(20.84) (21.26) (21.14) (21.11)
TG1×2009 -33.925 -40.324 -46.164 -52.498
(39.00) (39.89) (41.69) (41.95)
TG2×TPt indiv. insign.
for t = 2000, ..., 2005
TG2×2007 19.692∗∗∗ 6.334 19.692∗∗∗ 19.548∗∗∗
(4.87) (10.66) (4.87) (7.13)
TG2×2008 42.335∗∗∗ 41.890∗∗ 43.861∗∗∗ 39.609∗∗
(16.28) (16.86) (16.31) (17.10)
TG2×2009 26.106 32.467 20.829 20.493
(33.01) (34.20) (34.19) (35.98)
TG3×TPt partly indiv. sign.
for t = 2000, ..., 2005
TG3×2007 37.683∗∗∗ 18.297 37.683∗∗∗ 7.166
(7.83) (15.41) (7.83) (29.15)
TG3×2008 58.073∗∗∗ 57.224∗∗∗ 52.162∗∗∗ 55.765∗∗∗
(16.25) (16.72) (17.68) (18.73)
TG3×2009 35.929 38.273 30.018 24.109
(40.52) (42.51) (41.06) (43.23)
Observations 3595 3071 9176 8090
R2 .0782382 .0792284 .0226043 .024872
Municip. FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Add. controls no yes no yes
Chapter 4 Empirical Essays on Fiscal Federalism 112
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.4 with standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2006 to 2009 (left two columns)
and 2000 to 2009 (right two columns). The unit of observation is a single municipality. Dependent
variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent variables of interest are the interac-
tion terms TGji × TPt between the treatment groups TGji with j = 1, 2 and 3 and the treatment
points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009 of the post-reform period. Pre-reform period 2000 to 2006 and
post-reform period 2007 to 2009. Base year is 2006. All specifications include year fixed effects and
municipality fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for population, employees
(p.c.), business and property tax revenue and county-level controls for income of private households
and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices. For unabridged version
see Table 4.4 in Appendix 4.7.
Extended dataset. Next, I run equivalent regressions using the extended dataset
for the years 2000 to 2009 to validate my results. Presenting a dataset with a longer pre-
reform period gives insight into possible differences between treatment and control group
when comparing 2006 (base year) and the other pre-reform years. If such differences exist,
this would be an argument against the validity of the common trend assumption. I start by
presenting the results for Equation 4.4, because they are provided in the right two columns
of Table 4.4. For the baseline model of Equation 4.4 Figure 4.6 (right) graphically depicts
the estimated coefficients δ1,t, δ2,t and δ3,t for the interaction terms of interest TGji×TPt
with j = 1, 2 and 3 graphically (for t = 2000, ..., 2005 and t = 2007, ..., 2009). The
capped spikes display the 95% confidence intervals. The interaction terms TGji × TPt
between the treatment groups TGji with j = 1 and 2 and the treatment points with
t = 2000, ..., 2005 are all individually statistically insignificant. The interaction terms
TG3i × TPt (for t = 2000, ..., 2005) are in parts individually statistically significant.
This raises doubt about the validity of the common trend assumption. However, what
is most important is that they are not jointly statistically significant (see Table 4.12 in
Appendix 4.7 for a summary on the tests for joint significance of Equation 4.3 and 4.4).
The coefficients of the interaction terms of interest for the years of the post-reform period
remain rather stable.
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Figure 4.6: Coefficients on interaction terms for Equation 4.3 (left) and
Equation 4.4 (right)
Notes: Left figure refers to the estimated coefficients αt and βt for the interaction terms of interest
TGi×TPt and TGi×Fi×TPt, respectively (for t = 2000, ..., 2005 and t = 2007, ..., 2009) (Equation
4.3, Specification (III), Baseline). Right figure refers to the estimated coefficients δ1,t, δ2,t and δ3,t
for the interaction terms of interest TG1i×TPt, TG2i×TPt, and TG3i×TPt (for t = 2000, ..., 2005
and t = 2007, ..., 2009) (Equation 4.4, Baseline). Base year is 2006. Capped spikes display the 95%
confidence intervals.
Table 4.5 depicts the results when running the specifications of Equation 4.3 with
the full panel (2000 to 2009). Figure 4.6 (left) graphically presents the respective esti-
mates αt and βt for the interaction terms of interest TGi × TPt and TGi × Fi × TPt
(for t = 2000, ..., 2005 and t = 2007, ..., 2009), respectively, for the baseline model of
Specification (III). Again, the size of the coefficients remains rather stable with those of
the triple interaction terms Fi × TGi × TPt (for t = 2007, ..., 2009) being affected the
most. In Specification (I) and (III) none of the pre-reform interaction terms TGi × TPt
(for t = 2000, ..., 2005) are statistically significant, which is not the case with respect to
Fi×TGi×TPt (for t = 2000, ..., 2005) in Specification (II) and (III). This is why I take a
closer look at the joint significance: Specification (I) and (II) are without concern when it
comes to the joint significance of the interaction terms of interest of the pre-reform period
TGi × TPt or Fi × TGi × TPt (for t = 2000, ..., 2005). Specification (III) suffers from
jointly statistically significant interaction terms Fi × TGi × TPt (for t = 2000, ..., 2005)
for the pre-reform period. This is not unproblematic with respect to the validity of the
common trend assumption. The severity of the problem might be mitigated by the fact
that the two individually statistically significant interaction terms triggering this are from
Chapter 4 Empirical Essays on Fiscal Federalism 114
early years Fi × TGi × TPt (for t = 2001 and 2002).








TG×TPt indiv. insign. indiv. insign.
for t = 2000, ..., 2005
TG×2007 20.156∗∗∗ 14.962∗∗ -11.063 -9.917
(4.72) (7.08) (8.91) (10.19)
TG×2008 40.652∗∗∗ 35.393∗∗ -20.832 -16.904
(15.49) (15.87) (23.65) (23.69)
TG×2009 18.257 14.754 -64.646 -62.017
(33.05) (34.31) (44.27) (45.10)
F×TG×TPt partly indiv. sign. partly indiv. sign.
for t = 2000, ..., 2005
F×TG×2007 31.270∗∗∗ 25.329∗∗ 37.340∗∗∗ 32.244∗∗
(5.42) (9.97) (8.92) (13.92)
F×TG×2008 61.390∗∗∗ 53.769∗∗∗ 73.230∗∗∗ 65.384∗∗
(15.56) (17.44) (23.16) (25.71)
F×TG×2009 50.016 45.398 96.276∗∗ 93.235∗∗
(30.85) (35.30) (40.17) (46.01)
Observations 9176 8090 9176 8090 9176 8090
R2 .0191573 .0206718 .0207753 .0223042 .0211508 .0227885
Municip. FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Add. controls no yes no yes no yes
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Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.3 with standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2000 to 2009. The unit of observation
is a single municipality. Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent
variables of interest are the interaction terms TGi × TPt between the treatment group TGi and
the treatment points TPt with t = 2000, ..., 2005 and 2007, ..., 2009 and the triple interaction term
Fi × TGi × TPt between the municipality-specific continuous free-ride measure Fi, the treatment
group TGi and the treatment points TPt with t = 2000, ..., 2005 and 2007, ..., 2009. Base year is
2006. Pre-reform period 2000 to 2006 and post-reform period 2007 to 2009. Base year is 2006.
All specifications include year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. Add. controls includes
municipal-level controls for population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue and
county-level controls for income of private households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal values
are deflated to 2000 prices. For unabridged version see Table 4.10 in Appendix 4.7.
Coalition effect. Table 4.13 in the Appendix considers the coalition size mea-
sure which refers to the original formulation of the “law 1/n” (see Equation 4.2).
Specification (IV) includes the triple interaction terms Ci × TGi × TPt between the
municipality-specific continuous coalition measure Ci, the treatment group TGi, and the
treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009 as the only variables accounting for op-
portunistic behavior. Specification (V) adds them to Specification (III). While coalition
size performs well in Specification (IV) without controls, this does not hold after adding
controls. Specification (V), furthermore, points out that Fi × TGi × TPt performs much
better. In Specification (V) the triple interaction terms Ci × TGi × TPt are jointly sta-
tistically insignificant for the post-reform period (t = 2007, ..., 2009) (in the short and in
the extended panel). The triple interaction terms Fi× TGi× TPt, on the other hand, are
all individually statistically significant for the post-reform period (t = 2007, ..., 2009) (in
the short and in the extended panel). This is why this research focuses on the continuous
free-ride measure referring to population size (and not, as the original formulation would
suggest, to the number of municipalities).
Hypothesis 3. Last I approach Hypothesis 3. After addressing it implicitly in
the previous specifications, I also explicitly examine it by using the aggregated dataset
(as explained in the outline to Equation 4.5). When estimating Equation 4.5, I exclude
the observations belonging to treatment group 1, since the previous results suggest that
these municipalities do not engage in opportunistic behavior.35 Table 4.6 presents the
results for Equation 4.5. The interaction term Change2008i × Postp – which refers to
35This also accounts for the fact that a number of municipalities absorb or merge in more than one
year.
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the municipalities which merged or incorporated in 2008 – is not statistically signifi-
cant in the baseline regression, but only in the one with controls. The interaction terms
Change2009i×Postp, Change2010i×Postp and Change2011i×Postp are statistically sig-
nificant. Municipalities incorporated or merged in 2009, 2010 and 2011 had 90.681, 51.478
and 146.883 euros p.c.more debt in the post-reform period than the municipalities of the
control group in the pre-reform period. With an average pre-reform-period debt stock of
619.238 Euro p.c. for the treatment group, again, the sizes of the effects are of economic
relevance, too. Surprisingly, the coefficient Change2010i × Postp is the lowest (γ2010).
However, Change2011i × Postp has the highest coefficient (in the baseline regression),
thus supporting Hypothesis 3 that the timing of the merger might have an impact on
the degree of free-riding. This changes when adding controls.36 In light of the results of
Equation 4.3 and 4.4 (interaction terms with TP2009 were mainly insignificant), the results
of Equation 4.5 do not justify the acceptance of Hypothesis 3. Hence, I report inconclusive
results with respect to Hypothesis 3.














Municip. FE yes yes
Period dummy yes yes
Add. control no yes
36Keep in mind the data for 2010 is lacking, which concerns only municipalities which were merged or
incorporated in 2011.
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Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.5 with standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Panel consists of only two time points:
Observations of the pre-period (2000 to 2006) and post-period (2007 to 2009) are each aggregated to
their unweighted means. All observations belonging to treatment group 1 are dropped. The unit of
observation is a single municipality. Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The
independent variables of interest are the interaction terms Changet,i×Postp with t = 2008, ..., 2011
between the timing of the mergers or incorporation Changet,i with t = 2008, ..., 2011 and 2011 and
the post-reform period dummy Postp. All specifications include period fixed effects and municipality
fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for population, employees (p.c.), business
and property tax revenue and county-level controls for income of private households and GDP (all
in euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices. For unabridged version see Table 4.16
in Appendix 4.7.
4.5.3 Sensitivity analysis
Next, I present a number of robustness checks to validate my results.37
Serial correlation. I start my sensitivity analysis by explicitly addressing the issue
of serial correlation (note that I employ clustered standard errors in all regressions).38 For
this I continue to use the aggregated dataset.39 I thus run the specifications of Equation
4.3 and 4.4 using a fixed effects model with only two time points (p = pre and post). My
interaction terms of interest are TGi×Postp and Fi×TGi×Postp and TGji×Postp with
j = 1, ..., 3 with respect to Equation 4.3 and 4.4. Postp consequently is the post-reform
period dummy and is equal to 1 if p = post and 0 otherwise. Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 (left
two columns) in Appendix 4.7 present the results. Again, the interaction term TGi×Postp
is statistically significant in Specification (I), but becomes insignificant in Specification
(III), which combines the discrete and the continuous effect. Fi × TGi × Postp is highly
statistically and economically significant in Specifications (II) and (III). The interaction
term TG1i×Postp is statistically insignificant, while TG2i×Postp and TG3i×Postp are
statistically significant with a much higher coefficient for treatment group 3. The results
are consistent with those using time series data. Consequently, a wrong rejection of the
null hypothesis of no effect does not seem to be an issue.
37Since my main results do not support Hypothesis 3, I do not provide a robustness check on it.
38Bertrand et al. (2004) propose ignoring time series information as one possible solution to the serial
correlation problem (for the case that all observations are treated at the same time).
39Observations belonging to treatment group 1 are included.
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Self-selection. To address even the slightest concerns about self-selection into treat-
ment I run Equation 4.3 and 4.4 again considering only those municipalities as treated for
which the overall concept of regional policy left no doubt regarding their treatment and
which could be clearly identified. These are municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants,
municipalities which are part of an association of administration with a leading municipal-
ity and municipalities which belong to treatment group 3. For the baseline regression (add.
controls) this reduces the number of observations from 3,595 (3,071) to 3,014 (2,493) and
9,176 (8,090) to 7,565 (6,482) in the short (2006 to 2009) and the extended panel (2000
to 2009), respectively. Table 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19 in Appendix 4.7 depict the results for
Equation 4.3 and 4.4 for the short (2006 to 2009) and the extended (2000 to 2009) panel.
In general the results of this robustness check confirm the previous results, even though
there are some deviations with respect to size and significance.
Further robustness checks. As explained in Section 4.4.4, I identified three fur-
ther potential threats to validity: a) lawsuit against initiating legislation, b) common pool
with multiple mergers or incorporations and c) mergers or incorporations in pre-reform
period. For the sake of brevity only an abridged version of the results for the period 2006
to 2009 (short) is provided in Table 4.20 in the Appendix. The column “Main results”
depicts the results already provided in the previous section as a point of reference. Besides
robustness checks a), b) and c) a combination of robustness checks a) and b) is presented,
where all municipalities which were engaged in the initial lawsuit or were part of a common
pool with multiple mergers are dropped. I find no systematic discrepancies. Hence, these
robustness checks reveal a consistent picture supporting my main results.
Alternative control groups. Last, an alternative control group is proposed. The
control group as employed in this paper so far (municipalities which were not concerned by
the municipal territorial reform through merger, incorporation or absorption) is replaced
by all those municipalities which were forced to merge or incorporate in the mandatory
phase and filed a lawsuit against this at the constitutional court. This group of municipal-
ities is an interesting alternative control group, since these municipalities were selected for
treatment through the overall concept of regional policy.40 Hence, they bear close resem-
blance to the treatment group. See Table 4.7 (bottom) in Appendix 4.7 for the number of
observations by year in the alternative control group.
This group of municipalities is suitable as a control group since there is no reason to
40Note that this group is naturally subject to self-selection.
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believe that they engaged in opportunistic behavior. The respective municipalities aimed
to stay independent and fought for this at the constitutional court even after the reform
had already been executed. Table 4.21, 4.22 and 4.23 in Appendix 4.7 present the results.
The results of this last robustness check are twofold: The results of the estimates of the
triple interaction terms Fi × TGi × Postp and TG3i × TPt are relatively “close” to those
in the main section. On the other hand, there are considerable deviations with respect to
TGi×TPt and TG2i×TPt. This casts doubt on the robustness of my results. Furthermore,
I cannot confirm my conclusion suggested in Section 4.5.1 that the common trend with
respect to the alternative control group is superior to that of the actual control group.
The findings with respect to the interaction terms of interest of the pre-reform period are
not more convincing than those using the actual control group.
4.6 Discussion and concluding remarks
Motivated by the mixed findings of the previous empirical literature and the recent de-
velopments in the literature on the “commons” this study explores the incentive patterns
triggering free-riding behavior during the time window between the announcement of a
municipal territorial reform and its actual execution. My research strategy draws on a
difference-in-differences approach for the case of an interesting recent municipal territorial
reform in the German federal state of Saxony-Anhalt to credibly identify the causal effects
of interest. It uses a new and unique panel dataset with almost 10,000 observations from
seven pre-reform years and three post-reform years.
In line with prior research I start with specifications in the spirit of Weingast et al.
(1981). I confirm that being in a common pool triggers an incentive to free-ride (Hy-
pothesis 1a). However, the size of the incentive is linked to the theoretical predictions
based on the “law 1/n.” It is greater, the smaller the municipality’s own size relative to
the size of its common pool (Hypothesis 1b). My results consequently support the find-
ings of Hinnerich (2009) and Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015). In the light of the recent
developments in the literature on the “commons” this paper goes one step further and
takes a broader perspective on the underlying incentive mechanisms. It emphasizes that
there might as well be factors which reduce or prevent free-riding. Thanks to the specific
features of the reform I can provide evidence that municipalities which remain accountable
after the execution of the reform do not engage in free-riding. These are municipalities
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which absorb other municipalities and municipalities which merge, but keep their name
(Hypothesis 2a). Furthermore, I study if mergers or incorporations which are more in
line with municipal preferences trigger less incentive to free-ride. My findings indeed con-
firm that: Municipalities which merge or are incorporate during the non-mandatory phase
behave less opportunistically than those in the mandatory phase (Hypothesis 2b). These
results are in line with Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015), who only consider voluntary merg-
ers and show that they are also affected by free-riding. Last, I study if the size of the effect
is greater, the later the merger or incorporation takes places (Hypothesis 3). Contrary to
Hinnerich (2009) my results are inconclusive, I cannot confirm Hypothesis 3.
Along with the previous findings, my results support the notion that governments
should consider the opportunistic behavior when announcing a municipal territorial re-
form. In particular, in light of the economic relevance of the effects. Governments should
take into account that the incentives structure differs depending on relative common pool
size and further characteristics (voluntary vs. mandatory mergers and accountability).
The results have important policy implications: First, to prevent (or at least mitigate)
opportunistic behavior, governments could constrain municipal autonomy after a munic-
ipal territorial reform is made public. However, at least in Germany the implementation
of spending restrictions might prove to be difficult due to the guarantee of municipal
autonomy granted by the Basic Law. Furthermore, the findings of Blom-Hansen (2010)
insinuate how difficult the design of effective spending restrictions is. Second, governments
should be aware of the fact that free-riding also occurs in the case of voluntary mergers,
but to a lesser extent. This is a particularly important point for Germany. Aside from
extensive state-wide municipal territorial reforms, there are constantly voluntary mergers
or incorporations of individual municipalities. Governments could encourage self-binding
inter-municipal contracts to reduce free-riding. Third, they could mitigate the incentives
to free-ride by giving the municipalities more leeway to merge or incorporate according
to their preference. Last, they could reduce the number of free-riding municipalities by
fostering incorporations and mergers where one municipality keeps its name. In the light
of the controversy regarding the long-term benefits of municipal territorial reforms (see
Footnote 7), my findings cast a further cloud over their success.
This research can be considered as a first milestone when it comes to understanding
the side-effects of municipal territorial reforms in Germany. A minor caveat is that it
concentrates solely on debt for investment purposes. By disregarding liquidity credits,
liquid assets and asset liquidation as further channels for opportunistic behavior I might
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have underestimated the actual size of the free-riding effect. However, considering these
aspects is challenging on various grounds (mainly data availability issues) and goes far
beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, I have reason to believe that debt for
investment purposes is the main channel. The municipalities’ potential to reduce liquid
assets is very limited, since German municipalities suffer from a funding shortfall. Due
to the restricted time span between the announcement and execution of the reform it
is very unlikely that asset liquidations are a serious issue. Liquidity credits might be a
more interesting channel, but German local government law officially restricts their use
to balancing short-term liquidity shortcomings. In practice, however, nowadays they are
used in some federal states to finance consumption (and other) expenditures and might
qualify for free-riding.41 In those states, which strictly enforce credit rationing of liquidity
credits, the institutional setting rules out free-riding on debt for consumption purposes
and limits it to investment purposes. This reduces the problems related to opportunistic
behavior.
To unleash a controversy at the end: To investigate the spending patterns coinciding
with opportunistic behavior should be of utmost interest to the applied literature. To
show that the municipalities behave opportunistically does not yet establish that they
overspend and finance only inefficient public projects. In view of the German debate on
underinvestment in public infrastructure, it might as well be that municipalities use the
reform as a chance to finance efficient, but so far unrealized public projects which turn
out to be welfare-enhancing in the long run.
41It would go beyond the scope of this research to study if liquidity credits were a further channel for
opportunistic behavior, since this demands a careful analysis of the evolution of institutional arrangements
and regulatory authorities’ practice. Chapter 5 provides an introduction to the differing institutional
arrangements in Germany and a first fundamental institutional analysis.
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4.7 Appendix
Figure 4.7: Evolution of municipal territorial reform, 2000-2012
Notes: Light and dark gray bars depict number of incorporations and mergers between 2000 and
2012 (y-axis left). Black line depicts total number of municipalities between 2000 and 2012 (y-axis
right).
Table 4.7: Number of municipalities by group and year, extended, 2000-2009
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Control group 46 49 52 52 57 59 59 59 59 59 551
Treatment group 865 865 870 875 887 904 909 909 884 657 8,625
Total 911 914 922 927 944 963 968 968 943 716 9,176
Treatment group
Treatment group 1 79 79 82 86 93 107 110 110 102 60 908
Treatment group 2 687 687 689 689 693 696 698 698 683 498 6,718
Treatment group 3 99 99 99 100 101 101 101 101 99 99 999
Alternative control group 49 49 50 50 51 51 51 51 51 51 504
Notes: Number of municipalities of main sample by group. Middle part pinpoints the distribution
by treatment groups. Bottom part provides information on the alternative control group.
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of the coalition effect for treatment group, 2006
Notes: Distribution of the coalition effect measure Ci for all 909 municipalities of the treatment group in
2006.
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Debt 619.852 889.642 0 19907.01 9176
TG 0.940 0.238 0 1 9176
TG1 0.099 0.299 0 1 9176
TG2 0.732 0.443 0 1 9176
TG3 0.109 0.311 0 1 9176
F 0.797 0.286 0 1 9176
C 0.788 0.234 0 0.967 9176
Population 1562.876 3987.382 47 46837 9176
Employees 0.172 0.23 0.009 5.003 8090
Business tax rev. 136.126 1734.37 -6977.196 81780.199 9176
Property tax rev. 56.608 34.982 -67.568 1788.82 9176
Priv. income 13231.93 385.952 12513.075 14324.152 9176
GDP 16389.194 1936.112 12977.342 22673.803 9176
Notes: Main sample for the period 2000 to 2009 with 9,176 municipalities. Debt (in euro p.c.),
population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue (both in euro p.c.) are municipal-
level variables. Income of private households and GDP (both in euro p.c.) are county-level variables.
Fi and Ci are the continuous free-riding and coalition size measures, respectively. TGi is a dummy
variable and equals 1 if the municipality is treated and 0 if not. TG1i, TG2i and TG3i are equal to
1 if the municipality is part of the group of survivors, group of non-survivors (weak incentives) and
the group of non-survivors (strong incentives), respectively, and 0 otherwise. All nominal values are
deflated to 2000 prices.
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Figure 4.9: Development of average debt in euro p.c. (deflated to 2000 p.c.)
by control group, alternative control, and treatment group, 2000-2009
,
Notes: Unweighted mean, deflated to 2000 prices.
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Figure 4.10: Difference in average debt (in euro p.c.) between control
(left)/alternative control group (right) and treatment group/differentiated
treatment groups, 2000-2009
Control group Alternative control group
Notes: Unweighted mean, deflated to 2000 prices. Second row: Treatment group is divided into three
groups depending on their value of Fi for illustrative purposes only (value of Fi below or equal to the
15th percentile, above the 15th percentile and below or equal to the 85th percentile and above the
85th percentile). Third row: Treatment groups 1, 2, and 3 refer to group of survivors, non-survivors
(weak incentives), and the group of non-survivors (strong incentives), respectively.
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Table 4.9: Unabridged version of Table 4.3.








TG×2007 20.156∗∗∗ 5.620 -11.063 -16.427
(4.72) (10.17) (8.91) (13.09)
TG×2008 39.697∗∗ 34.316∗∗ -20.567 -25.685
(15.44) (15.76) (23.20) (23.14)
TG×2009 21.221 19.225 -50.813 -55.823
(32.29) (32.64) (40.18) (41.32)
F×TG×2007 31.270∗∗∗ 16.695∗ 37.340∗∗∗ 27.574∗∗
(5.42) (9.87) (8.92) (12.72)
F×TG×2008 60.211∗∗∗ 58.663∗∗∗ 71.832∗∗∗ 77.079∗∗∗
(15.37) (16.87) (22.56) (24.90)
F×TG×2009 50.236∗ 54.312∗ 84.799∗∗∗ 97.060∗∗∗
(26.82) (30.04) (31.00) (36.90)
2007 -54.883∗∗∗ -43.258∗∗∗ -60.506∗∗∗ -51.653∗∗∗ -54.883∗∗∗ -45.323∗∗∗
(4.14) (9.65) (4.49) (8.28) (4.15) (9.85)
2008 -109.804∗∗∗ -130.542∗∗∗ -119.949∗∗∗ -145.482∗∗∗ -109.804∗∗∗ -135.498∗∗∗
(13.75) (18.52) (11.51) (17.95) (13.75) (18.57)
2009 -112.184∗∗∗ -152.887∗∗∗ -131.821∗∗∗ -180.008∗∗∗ -112.184∗∗∗ -161.042∗∗∗
(30.50) (45.15) (21.73) (37.76) (30.52) (45.27)
Population 0.003 -0.041 -0.058∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Employees -21.446 -11.582 -9.711
(101.47) (102.54) (102.71)
Business tax rev. -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Property tax rev. 0.440 0.464 0.472
(0.71) (0.74) (0.75)
Priv. income 0.092 0.091∗ 0.087
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
GDP 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 622.746∗∗∗ -622.824 622.643∗∗∗ -510.423 622.594∗∗∗ -418.448
(3.79) (766.16) (3.79) (746.12) (3.78) (769.13)
Observations 3595 3071 3595 3071 3595 3071
R2 .0752869 .075696 .0774994 .0777302 .0780647 .0783733
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.3 with standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2006 to 2009. The unit of observation
is a single municipality. Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent
variables of interest are the interaction terms TGi × TPt between the treatment group TGi and
the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009 and the triple interaction term Fi × TGi × TPt
between the municipality-specific continuous free-ride measure Fi, the treatment group TGi, and the
treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009. Base year is 2006. All specifications include year fixed
effects and municipality fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for population,
employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue and county-level controls for income of private
households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices.
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Table 4.10: Unabridged version of Table 4.5.








TG×2000 -88.282 -87.110 16.222 33.534
(53.67) (55.01) (86.44) (90.64)
TG×2001 -58.496 -54.795 87.176 109.445
(48.08) (48.50) (69.57) (73.92)
TG×2002 -44.176 -44.524 65.928 78.222
(44.43) (46.06) (63.39) (65.72)
TG×2003 -24.541 -24.194 -26.367 -19.352
(29.90) (29.70) (43.21) (44.95)
TG×2004 -13.016 -26.706 -38.953 -25.186
(26.49) (28.66) (47.01) (46.80)
TG×2005 -11.629 -13.607 -11.019 -11.139
(10.30) (10.56) (15.40) (15.62)
TG×2007 20.156∗∗∗ 14.962∗∗ -11.063 -9.917
(4.72) (7.08) (8.91) (10.19)
TG×2008 40.652∗∗∗ 35.393∗∗ -20.832 -16.904
(15.49) (15.87) (23.65) (23.69)
TG×2009 18.257 14.754 -64.646 -62.017
(33.05) (34.31) (44.27) (45.10)
F×TG×2000 -110.515∗ -119.147∗ -120.771 -142.076
(62.47) (67.52) (94.76) (104.20)
F×TG×2001 -115.776∗∗ -123.751∗∗ -168.669∗∗ -192.768∗∗
(55.87) (59.89) (80.53) (89.07)
F×TG×2002 -87.071 -95.110 -127.622∗ -145.153∗
(53.02) (58.18) (75.92) (83.71)
F×TG×2003 -12.080 -13.136 2.832 -3.083
(26.61) (27.98) (38.27) (41.64)
F×TG×2004 8.805 -16.249 31.048 -2.797
(22.23) (27.95) (39.32) (44.55)
F×TG×2005 -6.566 -9.891 -0.595 -3.977
(9.50) (10.21) (13.93) (14.94)
F×TG×2007 31.270∗∗∗ 25.329∗∗ 37.340∗∗∗ 32.244∗∗
(5.42) (9.97) (8.92) (13.92)
F×TG×2008 61.390∗∗∗ 53.769∗∗∗ 73.230∗∗∗ 65.384∗∗
(15.56) (17.44) (23.16) (25.71)
F×TG×2009 50.016 45.398 96.276∗∗ 93.235∗∗
(30.85) (35.30) (40.17) (46.01)
2000 110.603∗∗ 145.737∗∗∗ 117.480∗∗∗ 155.822∗∗∗ 110.603∗∗ 142.764∗∗∗
(47.07) (54.67) (42.32) (58.45) (47.09) (54.37)
2001 79.722∗ 101.223∗∗ 119.042∗∗∗ 148.362∗∗∗ 79.722∗ 101.320∗∗
(41.73) (47.20) (34.08) (49.05) (41.75) (47.52)
2002 77.749∗∗ 93.532∗∗ 106.989∗∗∗ 126.345∗∗∗ 77.749∗∗ 93.082∗∗
(37.89) (40.88) (31.04) (40.49) (37.91) (40.99)
2003 91.906∗∗∗ 99.343∗∗∗ 78.922∗∗∗ 89.278∗∗∗ 91.906∗∗∗ 100.541∗∗∗
(28.16) (30.90) (21.51) (24.72) (28.17) (31.44)
2004 53.919∗∗ 64.320∗∗ 34.933 53.434∗∗ 53.919∗∗ 67.225∗∗
(23.88) (25.87) (22.85) (26.50) (23.90) (26.25)
2005 37.901∗∗∗ 52.976∗∗∗ 32.231∗∗∗ 47.161∗∗∗ 37.901∗∗∗ 53.098∗∗∗
(9.42) (14.60) (7.72) (13.41) (9.42) (14.58)
2007 -54.883∗∗∗ -61.350∗∗∗ -60.506∗∗∗ -66.629∗∗∗ -54.883∗∗∗ -63.205∗∗∗
(4.15) (12.47) (4.49) (13.66) (4.15) (12.99)
2008 -109.804∗∗∗ -131.498∗∗∗ -120.019∗∗∗ -136.513∗∗∗ -109.804∗∗∗ -129.150∗∗∗
(13.75) (19.54) (11.66) (16.15) (13.76) (19.09)
2009 -112.184∗∗∗ -137.373∗∗∗ -135.035∗∗∗ -153.037∗∗∗ -112.184∗∗∗ -132.211∗∗∗
(30.51) (39.70) (23.25) (34.91) (30.52) (39.79)
Population -0.016 -0.034∗∗ -0.042∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Employees 22.800 35.169 37.032
(123.85) (123.98) (123.81)
Business tax rev. -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property tax rev. 0.197 0.201 0.203
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Priv. income 0.077 0.059 0.055
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)








GDP 0.014 0.013 0.013
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 615.685∗∗∗ -583.288 615.472∗∗∗ -308.062 615.399∗∗∗ -243.154
(7.94) (823.28) (7.95) (778.28) (7.96) (768.35)
Observations 9176 8090 9176 8090 9176 8090
R2 .0191573 .0206718 .0207753 .0223042 .0211508 .0227885
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.3 with standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2000 to 2009. The unit of observation
is a single municipality. Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent
variables of interest are the interaction terms TGi × TPt between the treatment group TGi and the
treatment points TPt with t = 2000, ..., 2005 and t = 2007, ..., 2009 and the triple interaction term
Fi × TGi × TPt between the municipality-specific continuous free-ride measure Fi, the treatment
group TGi and the treatment points TPt with t = 2000, ..., 2005 and t = 2007, ..., 2009. Pre-reform
period 2000 to 2006 and post-reform period 2007 to 2009. Base year is 2006. All specifications include
year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for
population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue and county-level controls for income
of private households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices.
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Table 4.11: Unabridged version of Table 4.4.
Regression results for Equation 4.4
Short (2006-2009) Extended (2000-2009)













TG1×2007 7.005 -6.020 7.005 3.350
(7.67) (11.76) (7.67) (8.66)
TG1×2008 4.581 -4.474 7.220 2.998
(20.84) (21.26) (21.14) (21.11)
TG1×2009 -33.925 -40.324 -46.164 -52.498













TG2×2007 19.692∗∗∗ 6.334 19.692∗∗∗ 19.548∗∗∗
(4.87) (10.66) (4.87) (7.13)
TG2×2008 42.335∗∗∗ 41.890∗∗ 43.861∗∗∗ 39.609∗∗
(16.28) (16.86) (16.31) (17.10)
TG2×2009 26.106 32.467 20.829 20.493













TG3×2007 37.683∗∗∗ 18.297 37.683∗∗∗ 7.166
(7.83) (15.41) (7.83) (29.15)
TG3×2008 58.073∗∗∗ 57.224∗∗∗ 52.162∗∗∗ 55.765∗∗∗
(16.25) (16.72) (17.68) (18.73)
TG3×2009 35.929 38.273 30.018 24.109
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Short (2006-2009) Extended (2000-2009)
Baseline Add. controls Baseline Add. controls
(9.43) (14.69)
2007 -54.883∗∗∗ -45.396∗∗∗ -54.883∗∗∗ -65.308∗∗∗
(4.15) (9.81) (4.15) (12.70)
2008 -109.804∗∗∗ -136.191∗∗∗ -109.804∗∗∗ -130.332∗∗∗
(13.76) (18.82) (13.76) (19.34)
2009 -112.184∗∗∗ -161.825∗∗∗ -112.184∗∗∗ -131.067∗∗∗





Business tax rev. -0.008 -0.008∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00)
Property tax rev. 0.453 0.195
(0.74) (0.17)




Constant 622.574∗∗∗ -491.508 615.699∗∗∗ -358.399
(3.77) (793.96) (7.95) (806.45)
Observations 3595 3071 9176 8090
R2 .0782382 .0792284 .0226043 .024872
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.4 with standard errors in parentheses. Stan-
dard errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ <
0.01. Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2006 to 2009 (left two columns)
and 2000 to 2009 (right two columns). The unit of observation is a single municipality. Dependent
variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent variables of interest are the interac-
tion terms TGji × TPt between the treatment groups TGji with j = 1, 2 and 3 and the treatment
points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009 of the post-reform period. Pre-reform period 2000 to 2006 and
post-reform period 2007 to 2009. Base year is 2006. All specifications include year fixed effects and
municipality fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for population, employees
(p.c.), business and property tax revenue and county-level controls for income of private households









Table 4.12: Testing for joint significance, extended, 2000-2009
Variable of interest Baseline Add. controls
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
Specification Equation 4.3
(I) TG×TP jointly insign. jointly sign.∗∗∗ jointly insign. jointly sign.∗∗
(II) F×TG×TP jointly insign. jointly sign.∗∗∗ jointly insign. jointly sign.∗∗∗
(III) TG×TP jointly insign. jointly insign. jointly insign. jointly insign.
F×TG×TP jointly sign.∗ jointly sign.∗∗∗ jointly sign.∗∗ jointly sign.∗∗
Equation 4.4
TG1×TP jointly insign. joinily insign. jointly insign. jointly insign.
TG2×TP jointly insign. jointly sign.∗∗∗ jointly insign. jointly sign.∗∗∗
TG3×TP jointly insign. jointly sign.∗∗∗ jointly insign. jointly sign.∗∗
Notes: Standard Wald test on composite linear hypotheses. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10,
∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
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Table 4.13: Regression results for Equation 4.3 with coalition, short, 2006-
2009
IV V













C×2007 24.382∗∗∗ 2.869 -18.784 -59.835∗
(6.20) (11.33) (25.00) (33.47)
C×2008 56.603∗∗∗ 47.965∗∗ 13.705 -14.988
(20.23) (21.53) (53.39) (67.24)
C×2009 40.866 34.798 23.891 -21.602
(34.92) (35.74) (79.82) (97.25)
2007 -55.094∗∗∗ -40.147∗∗∗ -54.883∗∗∗ -45.189∗∗∗
(4.96) (9.11) (4.15) (9.94)
2008 -116.976∗∗∗ -135.751∗∗∗ -109.804∗∗∗ -136.717∗∗∗
(13.39) (19.84) (13.76) (18.27)
2009 -124.326∗∗∗ -162.383∗∗∗ -112.184∗∗∗ -163.299∗∗∗





Business tax rev. -0.008 -0.008
(0.01) (0.01)
Property tax rev. 0.443 0.469
(0.72) (0.75)




Constant 622.677∗∗∗ -595.923 622.596∗∗∗ -469.055
(3.79) (757.09) (3.80) (779.66)
Observations 3595 3071 3595 3071
R2 .0761569 .0765253 .0782065 .0786368
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered on
the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01. Administrative data on
municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2006 to 2009. The unit of observation is a single municipality.
Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent variables of interest are
the interaction terms TGji × TPt between the treatment groups TGji with with j = 1, 2 and 3
and the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009, the triple interaction term Fi × TGi × TPt
between the municipality-specific continuous free-ride measure Fi, the treatment group TGi, and
the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009 and the triple interaction term Ci × TGi × TPt
between the municipality-specific continuous coalition measure Ci, the treatment group TGi, and
the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009. Base year is 2006. All specifications include
year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for
population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue and county-level controls for income
of private households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices.
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Table 4.14: Regression results for Equation 4.3 with coalition, extended,
2000-2009
IV V





































C×2000 -142.469∗∗ -126.411∗ -181.871 -75.040
(70.52) (72.86) (154.58) (148.45)
C×2001 -135.508∗∗ -132.294∗∗ -216.236∗ -192.342
(63.76) (65.75) (126.59) (136.49)
C×2002 -105.388∗ -94.787 -185.069 -103.317
(59.76) (62.57) (113.61) (103.40)
C×2003 -18.860 -17.355 6.627 24.987
(31.99) (32.58) (65.18) (73.03)
C×2004 15.121 -5.461 99.404 111.289
(25.08) (30.08) (72.22) (83.26)
C×2005 -9.581 -8.671 2.902 29.064
(10.64) (11.03) (31.44) (35.30)
C×2007 24.382∗∗∗ 12.263 -18.784 -60.709
(6.20) (11.70) (25.01) (44.71)
C×2008 58.916∗∗∗ 47.526∗∗ 20.739 -2.454
(20.53) (22.74) (55.83) (63.45)
C×2009 36.742 26.823 29.791 -16.158
(37.95) (42.13) (93.17) (96.47)
2000 140.353∗∗∗ 159.507∗∗∗ 110.603∗∗ 142.012∗∗∗
(46.11) (60.09) (47.11) (54.22)
2001 132.049∗∗∗ 151.950∗∗∗ 79.722∗ 100.802∗∗
(40.35) (52.80) (41.77) (47.43)
2002 119.528∗∗∗ 124.303∗∗∗ 77.749∗∗ 92.759∗∗
(36.60) (43.68) (37.93) (40.95)
2003 83.758∗∗∗ 90.584∗∗∗ 91.906∗∗∗ 100.439∗∗∗
(24.77) (27.30) (28.19) (31.43)
2004 29.809 43.676 53.919∗∗ 66.709∗∗
(24.75) (27.97) (23.91) (26.18)
2005 34.520∗∗∗ 46.086∗∗∗ 37.901∗∗∗ 52.655∗∗∗
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IV V
Baseline Add. controls Baseline Add. controls
(8.93) (14.63) (9.43) (14.43)
2007 -55.094∗∗∗ -56.675∗∗∗ -54.883∗∗∗ -62.899∗∗∗
(4.96) (12.88) (4.15) (12.91)
2008 -117.915∗∗∗ -132.524∗∗∗ -109.804∗∗∗ -128.536∗∗∗
(13.57) (17.49) (13.76) (18.96)
2009 -124.484∗∗∗ -140.673∗∗∗ -112.184∗∗∗ -131.500∗∗∗





Business tax rev. -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Property tax rev. 0.197 0.200
(0.17) (0.17)




Constant 615.672∗∗∗ -421.250 615.458∗∗∗ -231.872
(7.95) (794.47) (7.97) (761.32)
Observations 9176 8090 9176 8090
R2 .0205356 .0216659 .0219383 .0232575
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered on
the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01. Administrative data on
municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2000 to 2009. The unit of observation is a single municipality.
Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent variables of interest are
the interaction terms TGji × TPt between the treatment groups TGji with with j = 1, 2 and 3
and the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009, the triple interaction term Fi × TGi × TPt
between the municipality-specific continuous free-ride measure Fi, the treatment group TGi, and
the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009 and the triple interaction term Ci × TGi × TPt
between the municipality-specific continuous coalition measure Ci, the treatment group TGi and
the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009. Pre-reform period 2000 to 2006 and post-reform
period 2007 to 2009. Base year is 2006. All specifications include year fixed effects and municipality
fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for population, employees (p.c.), business
and property tax revenue and county-level controls for income of private households and GDP (all
in euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices.
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TG×Post 58.508∗∗ 58.931∗∗ -15.074 -55.968
(26.92) (28.32) (38.23) (46.56)
F×TG×Post 79.739∗∗∗ 111.412∗∗∗ 88.010∗∗ 148.941∗∗∗
(25.93) (33.44) (36.42) (53.03)
Post -150.199∗∗∗ -131.598∗∗∗ -157.861∗∗∗ -152.146∗∗∗ -150.199∗∗∗ -120.764∗∗
(24.64) (50.35) (19.14) (36.11) (24.64) (51.85)
Population -0.005 -0.088∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Employees 74.449 98.224 101.373
(149.53) (148.37) (147.37)
Business tax rev. -0.023∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.023∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Property tax rev. 3.034∗ 3.137∗ 3.171∗
(1.69) (1.75) (1.78)
Priv. income -0.081 -0.124 -0.148
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
GDP -0.010 -0.012 -0.012
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 660.087∗∗∗ 1751.136 660.087∗∗∗ 2525.310∗ 660.087∗∗∗ 2866.535∗
(5.15) (1299.08) (5.14) (1391.33) (5.14) (1547.79)
Observations 1936 1732 1936 1732 1936 1732
R2 .0830176 .0887327 .0862291 .0942756 .0862921 .0950511
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.3 with standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Panel consists of only two time points:
Observations of the pre-period (2000 to 2006) and post-period (2007 to 2009) are each aggregated
to their unweighted means. The unit of observation is a single municipality. Dependent variable
municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent variables of interest are the interaction terms
TGi × Postp between the treatment group TGi and the period dummy Postp. Pre-reform (2000
to 2006) and post-reform (2007 to 2009) observations are aggregated to one observation each. All
specifications include period fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. Add. controls include
municipal-level controls for population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue and
county-level controls for income of private households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal values
are deflated to 2000 prices.
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Table 4.16: Regression results for Equation 4.4 and 4.5, aggregated pre- and
post- reform period
Equation 4.4 Equation 4.5















Post -150.199∗∗∗ -108.930∗∗ -150.199∗∗∗ -220.628∗∗∗





Business tax rev. -0.023∗∗ -0.016
(0.01) (0.01)
Property tax rev. 3.139∗ 1.837
(1.75) (2.29)




Constant 660.087∗∗∗ 3129.791∗∗ 626.434∗∗∗ 440.612
(5.13) (1392.44) (5.63) (2117.80)
Observations 1936 1732 1716 1512
R2 .0905968 .1008895 .0759741 .0757337
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.4 (left two columns) and Equation 4.5 (right
two columns) with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered on the municipality
level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01. Administrative data on municipalities
of Saxony-Anhalt. Panel consists of only two time points: Observations of the pre-period (2000 to
2006) and post-period (2007 to 2009) are each aggregated to their unweighted means. The unit of
observation is a single municipality. Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c). The
independent variables of interest for Equation 4.4 are the interaction terms TGji × Postp between
the treatment groups TGji with with j = 1, 2 and 3 and period dummy Postp. Equation 4.5 is only
applied to the aggregated data. All observations belonging to treatment group 1 are dropped. The
independent variables of interest are the interaction terms Changet,i×Postp with t = 2008, ..., 2011
between the timing of the mergers or incorporation Changet,i with t = 2008, ..., 2011 and 2011
and the period dummy Postp. All specifications include period fixed effects and municipality fixed
effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for population, employees (p.c.), business and
property tax revenue and county-level controls for income of private households and GDP (all in
euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices.
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Table 4.17: Robustness check (self-selection).








TG×2007 24.493∗∗∗ 10.884 -2.810 -15.285
(4.81) (10.31) (11.86) (15.70)
TG×2008 40.343∗∗∗ 35.563∗∗ -15.793 -27.744
(14.54) (14.70) (25.91) (28.13)
TG×2009 18.962 19.381 -38.864 -50.115
(31.57) (31.59) (47.30) (48.55)
F×TG×2007 29.193∗∗∗ 19.349∗ 31.208∗∗ 31.510∗∗
(5.66) (10.44) (12.27) (15.95)
F×TG×2008 52.374∗∗∗ 53.874∗∗∗ 63.926∗∗∗ 77.020∗∗∗
(13.59) (15.58) (24.15) (29.49)
F×TG×2009 32.696 41.074 65.232 85.787∗
(28.61) (30.80) (39.62) (45.40)
2007 -54.883∗∗∗ -43.915∗∗∗ -55.850∗∗∗ -49.212∗∗∗ -54.883∗∗∗ -45.143∗∗∗
(4.15) (9.85) (4.69) (9.20) (4.15) (10.13)
2008 -109.804∗∗∗ -122.341∗∗∗ -115.019∗∗∗ -133.724∗∗∗ -109.804∗∗∗ -126.380∗∗∗
(13.75) (18.91) (11.73) (18.98) (13.76) (19.10)
2009 -112.184∗∗∗ -140.212∗∗∗ -121.075∗∗∗ -157.443∗∗∗ -112.184∗∗∗ -147.078∗∗∗
(30.51) (46.26) (25.27) (41.36) (30.53) (46.78)
Population -0.035 -0.068∗ -0.082∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Employees -99.554 -95.587 -94.841
(85.02) (84.48) (84.62)
Business tax rev. -0.024 -0.023 -0.023
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Property tax rev. -0.428 -0.440 -0.446
(0.41) (0.40) (0.41)
Priv. income 0.052 0.053 0.050
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
GDP 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 575.305∗∗∗ 20.885 575.174∗∗∗ 76.287 575.148∗∗∗ 144.036
(2.95) (732.80) (2.95) (713.47) (2.94) (739.04)
Observations 3014 2493 3014 2493 3014 2493
R2 .1572495 .1770936 .159225 .1796468 .1597607 .1805121
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.3 with standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2006 to 2009. Robustness check
(self-selection): Treatment group is restricted to municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants,
municipalities which are part of an association of administration with a leading municipality and
municipalities belonging to treatment group 3. The unit of observation is a single municipality.
Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent variables of interest are
the interaction terms TGi × TPt between the treatment group TGi and the treatment points TPt
with t = 2007, ..., 2009 and the triple interaction term Fi × TGi × TPt between the municipality-
specific continuous free-ride measure Fi, the treatment group TGi, and the treatment points TPt with
t = 2007, ..., 2009. Base year is 2006. All specifications include year fixed effects and municipality
fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for population, employees (p.c.), business
and property tax revenue and county-level controls for income of private households and GDP (all
in euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices.
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Table 4.18: Robustness check (self-selection).








TG×2000 -103.051∗ -104.235∗ 47.482 55.604
(56.10) (58.68) (98.89) (103.29)
TG×2001 -65.020 -62.791 123.300 137.244
(50.41) (51.63) (85.51) (91.04)
TG×2002 -46.937 -47.964 110.900 113.489
(46.86) (50.15) (79.04) (82.24)
TG×2003 -26.772 -26.669 -13.307 -15.458
(30.56) (30.46) (48.22) (51.03)
TG×2004 -18.048 -37.012 -75.980 -62.912
(27.63) (31.68) (72.33) (71.05)
TG×2005 -12.779 -16.097 -3.359 -1.686
(10.62) (11.23) (14.39) (14.78)
TG×2007 24.466∗∗∗ 22.162∗∗∗ -2.845 -7.258
(4.82) (8.09) (11.87) (15.42)
TG×2008 38.695∗∗∗ 31.224∗∗ -26.244 -18.351
(14.86) (15.09) (26.79) (29.29)
TG×2009 12.754 6.594 -42.464 -32.964
(32.70) (34.93) (51.68) (53.83)
F×TG×2000 -131.229∗∗ -136.002∗ -168.026 -181.627
(64.17) (70.88) (113.15) (125.82)
F×TG×2001 -114.864∗ -116.949∗ -210.478∗∗ -226.326∗
(60.18) (65.06) (104.25) (116.02)
F×TG×2002 -89.805 -92.173 -176.445∗ -183.690∗
(57.15) (64.32) (99.02) (110.74)
F×TG×2003 -24.508 -21.727 -14.743 -10.809
(27.63) (28.98) (43.38) (48.37)
F×TG×2004 8.378 -18.191 65.735 29.068
(23.10) (30.34) (64.31) (68.09)
F×TG×2005 -12.836 -17.440∗ -10.593 -17.124
(8.84) (10.40) (11.29) (13.72)
F×TG×2007 29.175∗∗∗ 28.794∗∗∗ 31.217∗∗ 35.844∗
(5.67) (10.85) (12.28) (19.70)
F×TG×2008 54.484∗∗∗ 44.053∗∗∗ 73.853∗∗∗ 59.381∗
(13.79) (16.23) (24.83) (30.50)
F×TG×2009 24.107 15.895 61.399 47.109
(32.00) (37.36) (48.92) (57.62)
2000 110.603∗∗ 153.083∗∗∗ 124.179∗∗∗ 165.009∗∗∗ 110.603∗∗ 150.547∗∗
(47.08) (58.80) (42.08) (63.33) (47.11) (58.45)
2001 79.722∗ 104.030∗∗ 115.059∗∗∗ 141.727∗∗ 79.722∗ 104.877∗∗
(41.74) (50.07) (36.77) (55.00) (41.76) (50.59)
2002 77.749∗∗ 95.286∗∗ 108.909∗∗∗ 125.257∗∗∗ 77.749∗∗ 95.272∗∗
(37.90) (42.54) (33.68) (45.22) (37.93) (42.74)
2003 91.906∗∗∗ 98.178∗∗∗ 87.527∗∗∗ 93.659∗∗∗ 91.906∗∗∗ 100.389∗∗∗
(28.17) (32.24) (22.96) (26.47) (28.18) (33.08)
2004 53.919∗∗ 65.230∗∗ 30.505 47.623 53.919∗∗ 68.419∗∗
(23.89) (27.16) (26.40) (30.48) (23.91) (27.75)
2005 37.901∗∗∗ 55.616∗∗∗ 36.591∗∗∗ 54.292∗∗∗ 37.901∗∗∗ 55.679∗∗∗
(9.42) (17.02) (7.28) (16.25) (9.43) (17.02)
2007 -54.883∗∗∗ -61.517∗∗∗ -55.860∗∗∗ -64.192∗∗∗ -54.883∗∗∗ -63.822∗∗∗
(4.15) (14.90) (4.69) (16.38) (4.15) (15.74)
2008 -109.804∗∗∗ -137.031∗∗∗ -118.312∗∗∗ -139.414∗∗∗ -109.804∗∗∗ -133.472∗∗∗








(13.75) (21.19) (11.92) (18.17) (13.76) (20.46)
2009 -112.184∗∗∗ -146.453∗∗∗ -120.217∗∗∗ -145.827∗∗∗ -112.184∗∗∗ -138.498∗∗∗
(30.52) (41.30) (25.88) (38.68) (30.54) (41.68)
Population -0.023 -0.037 -0.046∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Employees -62.557 -58.108 -57.697
(116.99) (115.35) (114.42)
Business tax rev. -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property tax rev. 0.160 0.161 0.164
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Priv. income 0.102 0.084 0.077
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
GDP 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 574.071∗∗∗ -969.742 573.928∗∗∗ -703.351 573.886∗∗∗ -605.055
(9.15) (963.95) (9.16) (911.13) (9.17) (880.45)
Observations 7565 6482 7565 6482 7565 6482
R2 .0179386 .0204076 .019158 .0215078 .0196957 .0220831
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.3 with standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2000 to 2009. Robustness check
(self-selection): Treatment group is restricted to municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants,
municipalities which are part of an association of administration with a leading municipality and
municipalities belonging to treatment group 3. The unit of observation is a single municipality.
Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent variables of interest are
the interaction terms TGi×TPt between the treatment group TGi and the treatment points TPt with
t = 2000, ..., 2005 and t = 2007, ..., 2009 and the triple interaction term Fi×TGi×TPt between the
municipality-specific continuous free-ride measure Fi, the treatment group TGi, and the treatment
points TPt with t = 2000, ..., 2005 and t = 2007, ..., 2009. Base year is 2006. Pre-reform period
2000 to 2006, and post-reform period 2007 to 2009. Base year is 2006. All specifications include
year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for
population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue and county-level controls for income
of private households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices.
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Table 4.19: Robustness check (self-selection).
Regression results for Equation 4.4
Short (2006-2009) Extended (2000-2009)













TG1×2007 9.485 -5.399 9.485 8.372
(11.39) (13.74) (11.39) (12.98)
TG1×2008 14.079 -2.277 14.651 11.846
(26.58) (28.08) (27.01) (27.87)
TG1×2009 -25.797 -36.544 -33.113 -40.065













TG2×2007 23.447∗∗∗ 11.671 23.375∗∗∗ 26.494∗∗∗
(4.94) (11.01) (4.95) (8.05)
TG2×2008 39.301∗∗∗ 38.453∗∗ 37.945∗∗ 30.157∗
(14.79) (15.21) (15.23) (15.95)
TG2×2009 18.312 24.752 8.142 2.927













TG3×2007 37.683∗∗∗ 20.400 37.683∗∗∗ 7.355
(7.83) (15.30) (7.84) (28.95)
TG3×2008 58.073∗∗∗ 57.647∗∗∗ 52.162∗∗∗ 55.374∗∗∗
(16.26) (16.92) (17.69) (19.05)
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Short (2006-2009) Extended (2000-2009)
Baseline Add. controls Baseline Add. controls
TG3×2009 35.929 40.926 30.018 21.757













2007 -54.883∗∗∗ -45.354∗∗∗ -54.883∗∗∗ -66.117∗∗∗
(4.15) (10.11) (4.15) (15.21)
2008 -109.804∗∗∗ -125.724∗∗∗ -109.804∗∗∗ -134.819∗∗∗
(13.77) (19.45) (13.77) (21.03)
2009 -112.184∗∗∗ -145.397∗∗∗ -112.184∗∗∗ -137.258∗∗∗





Business tax rev. -0.023 -0.011∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.00)
Property tax rev. -0.448 0.159
(0.41) (0.16)




Constant 575.173∗∗∗ 122.631 574.178∗∗∗ -755.821
(2.93) (766.22) (9.17) (950.50)
Observations 3014 2493 7565 6482
R2 .1594569 .1805495 .0209003 .024187
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.4 with standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2006 to 2009 (left two columns) and
2000 to 2009 (right two columns). Robustness check (self-selection): Treatment group is restricted
to municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants, municipalities which are part of an association of
administration with a leading municipality and municipalities belonging to treatment group 3. The
unit of observation is a single municipality. Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.).
The independent variables of interest are the interaction terms TGji × TPt between the treatment
groups TGji with j = 1, 2 and 3, and the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009 of the
post-reform period. Pre-reform period 2000 to 2006 and post-reform period 2007 to 2009. Base year
is 2006. All specifications include year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. Add. controls
include municipal-level controls for population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue
and county-level controls for income of private households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal
values are deflated to 2000 prices.
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Table 4.20: Further robustness checks, short, 2006-2009












TG×2007 20.156∗∗∗ 5.620 17.015∗∗∗ -0.617 19.638∗∗∗ 3.390 18.674∗∗∗ 3.531 18.674∗∗∗ 2.800
(4.72) (10.17) (5.20) (13.24) (4.95) (12.13) (4.97) (10.65) (4.97) (12.34)
TG×2008 39.697∗∗ 34.316∗∗ 45.017∗∗ 31.098 45.586∗∗∗ 34.514∗ 39.759∗∗ 34.385∗∗ 39.759∗∗ 42.995∗∗
(15.44) (15.76) (17.93) (21.65) (16.67) (18.97) (16.43) (16.76) (16.43) (18.74)
TG×2009 21.221 19.225 18.179 21.185 20.613 21.676 19.907 18.953 19.907 26.930
(32.29) (32.64) (38.62) (35.53) (37.58) (35.13) (33.14) (33.60) (33.14) (38.12)
Observations 3595 3071 2333 2012 2993 2541 2809 2440 2809 1972
R2 .0752869 .075696 .0607058 .0674536 .0698029 .0747954 .0644647 .0652725 .0644647 .0586299
Equation 4.3 II
F×TG×2007 31.270∗∗∗ 16.695∗ 28.005∗∗∗ 4.580 30.002∗∗∗ 12.231 31.088∗∗∗ 12.674 31.088∗∗∗ 5.931
(5.42) (9.87) (6.48) (14.40) (5.81) (12.08) (6.11) (11.45) (6.11) (13.97)
F×TG×2008 60.211∗∗∗ 58.663∗∗∗ 62.915∗∗∗ 53.402∗∗ 65.006∗∗∗ 61.059∗∗∗ 59.047∗∗∗ 55.985∗∗∗ 59.047∗∗∗ 53.607∗∗
(15.37) (16.87) (21.75) (25.95) (17.52) (20.50) (18.59) (20.33) (18.59) (25.22)
F×TG×2009 50.236∗ 54.312∗ 48.767 55.699 53.443∗ 60.766∗ 47.528 50.889 47.528 50.408
(26.82) (30.04) (35.85) (38.31) (31.89) (34.38) (29.87) (33.51) (29.87) (40.39)
Observations 3595 3071 2333 2012 2993 2541 2809 2440 2809 1972
R2 .0774994 .0777302 .0623458 .0691899 .0720328 .0770337 .066222 .06693 .066222 .0596455
Equation 4.3 III
TG×2007 -11.063 -16.427 -10.844 -9.431 -8.904 -13.348 -13.916 -14.392 -13.916 -3.191
(8.91) (13.09) (10.85) (15.95) (9.39) (14.28) (10.20) (14.49) (10.20) (18.71)
TG×2008 -20.567 -25.685 -11.217 -19.473 -14.713 -26.243 -17.846 -19.479 -17.846 5.039
(23.20) (23.14) (27.67) (28.36) (24.78) (26.16) (25.51) (24.20) (25.51) (27.73)
TG×2009 -50.813 -55.823 -53.616 -50.695 -56.752 -58.332 -48.552 -50.085 -48.552 -32.616
(40.18) (41.32) (47.77) (46.59) (45.74) (44.63) (41.78) (42.94) (41.78) (49.25)
F×TG×2007 37.340∗∗∗ 27.574∗∗ 34.600∗∗∗ 11.541 34.693∗∗∗ 21.185 39.768∗∗∗ 22.951 39.768∗∗∗ 8.879
(8.92) (12.72) (11.47) (17.88) (9.41) (14.41) (10.83) (15.59) (10.83) (20.90)
F×TG×2008 71.832∗∗∗ 77.079∗∗∗ 69.772∗∗ 68.512∗ 73.008∗∗∗ 79.724∗∗∗ 70.236∗∗ 71.041∗∗ 70.236∗∗ 51.314
(22.56) (24.90) (32.21) (35.17) (25.18) (28.56) (28.08) (29.73) (28.08) (37.70)
F×TG×2009 84.799∗∗∗ 97.060∗∗∗ 87.521∗∗ 96.704∗ 92.383∗∗ 105.765∗∗ 82.258∗∗ 90.856∗∗ 82.258∗∗ 78.408
(31.00) (36.90) (43.39) (51.76) (36.38) (44.07) (36.37) (42.61) (36.37) (52.54)
Observations 3595 3071 2333 2012 2993 2541 2809 2440 2809 1972
R2 .0780647 .0783733 .0629161 .0696802 .0726905 .0776874 .0667101 .0674378 .0667101 .0599267
Equation 4.4
TG1×2007 7.005 -6.020 4.094 -8.542 7.450 -5.525 4.354 -8.247 4.354 -1.658
(7.67) (11.76) (9.54) (14.07) (8.04) (12.64) (8.98) (12.98) (8.98) (15.71)
TG1×2008 4.581 -4.474 12.343 -5.177 9.668 -6.074 7.737 -1.161 7.737 18.333
(20.84) (21.26) (23.24) (25.57) (22.01) (23.92) (21.82) (21.73) (21.82) (22.90)
TG1×2009 -33.925 -40.324 -42.042 -47.336 -37.405 -42.935 -37.017 -42.576 -37.017 -30.672
(39.00) (39.89) (46.38) (45.46) (44.16) (43.14) (40.88) (41.99) (40.88) (45.80)
TG2×2007 19.692∗∗∗ 6.334 18.004∗∗∗ 1.281 19.493∗∗∗ 4.214 19.250∗∗∗ 5.222 19.250∗∗∗ 3.693
(4.87) (10.66) (5.44) (14.18) (5.06) (12.87) (5.24) (11.21) (5.24) (12.79)
TG2×2008 42.335∗∗∗ 41.890∗∗ 49.418∗∗ 41.531∗ 49.148∗∗∗ 44.123∗∗ 43.829∗∗ 43.499∗∗ 43.829∗∗ 48.867∗∗
(16.28) (16.86) (19.45) (23.81) (17.62) (20.20) (17.66) (18.62) (17.66) (21.29)
TG2×2009 26.106 32.467 28.108 42.684 27.473 39.874 28.372 35.582 28.372 42.698
(33.01) (34.20) (39.64) (37.92) (38.36) (36.80) (34.00) (35.59) (34.00) (40.47)
TG3×2007 37.683∗∗∗ 18.297 30.486∗∗∗ 1.422 41.482∗∗∗ 13.911 32.912∗∗∗ 12.835 32.912∗∗∗ 15.910
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Table 4.20: Further robustness checks, short, 2006-2009











(7.83) (15.41) (6.05) (27.08) (10.41) (21.60) (6.99) (19.62) (6.99) (24.15)
TG3×2008 58.073∗∗∗ 57.224∗∗∗ 58.331∗∗∗ 45.057∗∗ 68.789∗∗∗ 58.826∗∗∗ 47.815∗∗∗ 46.700∗∗ 47.815∗∗∗ 65.069∗∗∗
(16.25) (16.72) (18.15) (22.19) (17.39) (20.27) (18.05) (18.22) (18.05) (18.90)
TG3×2009 35.929 38.273 11.952 14.658 34.704 33.800 16.341 20.759 16.341 17.585
(40.52) (42.51) (68.78) (70.32) (55.10) (56.80) (50.84) (52.76) (50.84) (65.96)
Observations 3595 3071 2333 2012 2993 2541 2809 2440 2809 1972
R2 .0782382 .0792284 .0635715 .0716101 .0729887 .078974 .0671558 .0685937 .0671558 .0616701
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.3 and 4.4 with standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05,
∗∗∗ < 0.01. Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2006 to 2009. Robustness
check (a and b): All municipalities which are engaged in the initital lawsuit or are part of a common
pool with multiple mergers are dopped. Robustness check a: All municipalities which are engaged
in the initital lawsuit are dopped. Robustness check b: All municipalities which are part of a
common pool with multiple mergers are dopped. Robustness check c: All municipalities affected
by mergers or incorporation in pre-reform period are dropped. The unit of observation is a single
municipality. Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent variables
of interest for Equation 4.3 are the interaction terms TGi × TPt between the treatment group TGi
and the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009 and the triple interaction term Fi×TGi×TPt
between the municipality-specific continuous free-ride measure Fi, the treatment group TGi, and
the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009. The independent variables of interest for Equation
4.4 are the interaction terms TGji × TPt between the treatment groups TGji with j = 1, 2 and 3
and the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009. Base year is 2006. All specifications include
year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for
population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue and county-level controls for income
of private households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices.
Unabridged version is not presented.
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Table 4.21: Robustness check (alternative control group).








TG×2007 44.939∗ 40.293 48.120∗ 41.505
(27.09) (29.89) (27.13) (30.07)
TG×2008 57.803 52.772 63.637 58.419
(38.58) (40.48) (38.74) (40.48)
TG×2009 14.301 4.236 20.422 10.865
(61.02) (64.33) (61.05) (63.95)
F×TG×2007 33.918∗∗∗ 22.562 38.104∗∗∗ 27.051∗∗
(9.06) (13.73) (8.98) (13.66)
F×TG×2008 66.783∗∗∗ 69.091∗∗∗ 72.412∗∗∗ 75.235∗∗∗
(22.32) (26.51) (22.49) (26.19)
F×TG×2009 86.189∗∗∗ 98.111∗∗ 87.570∗∗∗ 99.005∗∗
(31.32) (40.73) (30.91) (39.10)
2007 -79.666∗∗∗ -75.708∗∗ -65.622∗∗∗ -59.158∗∗∗ -114.704∗∗∗ -101.337∗∗∗
(26.99) (31.02) (7.89) (11.78) (28.74) (34.17)
2008 -127.909∗∗∗ -159.510∗∗∗ -129.549∗∗∗ -167.438∗∗∗ -194.494∗∗∗ -228.648∗∗∗
(37.94) (38.54) (18.57) (25.97) (43.72) (45.03)
2009 -105.265∗ -157.364∗∗∗ -165.028∗∗∗ -234.616∗∗∗ -185.788∗∗∗ -248.296∗∗∗
(60.09) (60.68) (26.16) (41.08) (65.64) (65.65)
Population 0.018 -0.059 -0.060
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Employees -105.427 -103.008 -97.704
(121.58) (126.64) (121.91)
Business tax rev. -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Property tax rev. 0.493 0.539 0.523
(0.69) (0.72) (0.73)
Priv. income 0.140∗∗ 0.127∗∗ 0.131∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
GDP 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 623.150∗∗∗ -1285.582 622.865∗∗∗ -977.212 622.995∗∗∗ -1026.736
(4.11) (785.03) (4.08) (760.96) (4.10) (788.19)
Observations 3563 3019 3563 3019 3563 3019
R2 .0699309 .0708256 .0707353 .0714247 .0726539 .0731018
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.3 with standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2006 to 2009. Control group is
replaced by all those municipalities which were forced to merge or incorporate in the mandatory
phase and filed a lawsuit against this at the constitutional court (alternative control group). The
unit of observation is a single municipality. Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.).
The independent variables of interest are the interaction terms TGi × TPt between the treatment
group TGi and the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009 and the triple interaction term
Fi×TGi×TPt between the municipality-specific continuous free-ride measure Fi, the treatment group
TGi, and the treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009. Base year is 2006. All specifications
include year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls
for population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue and county-level controls for
income of private households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000
prices.
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Table 4.22: Robustness check (alternative control group).








TG×2000 -83.807 -165.145∗ -91.405 -175.758∗
(102.24) (95.10) (102.90) (96.74)
TG×2001 -52.209 -125.788 -62.748 -140.208
(94.42) (83.55) (95.16) (85.46)
TG×2002 -38.289 -96.659∗ -46.210 -107.913∗
(66.59) (55.06) (67.77) (57.92)
TG×2003 -30.500 -55.047 -29.966 -56.498
(42.82) (34.48) (42.90) (34.74)
TG×2004 -5.471 -35.308 -3.038 -37.410
(32.92) (25.22) (32.46) (25.29)
TG×2005 -21.775 -21.729 -21.716 -22.595
(14.20) (16.05) (14.26) (16.17)
TG×2007 44.939∗ 59.452∗ 48.120∗ 63.748∗
(27.09) (34.69) (27.14) (34.90)
TG×2008 58.757 48.610 64.661∗ 54.140
(38.61) (39.82) (38.76) (39.94)
TG×2009 11.337 -0.619 17.185 5.766
(61.43) (64.08) (61.62) (64.25)
F×TG×2000 -119.430 -133.258 -127.708 -152.973
(93.22) (103.93) (94.25) (105.98)
F×TG×2001 -167.905∗∗ -183.363∗∗ -173.600∗∗ -199.965∗∗
(78.88) (88.27) (80.12) (90.53)
F×TG×2002 -127.582∗ -136.075∗ -131.726∗ -149.009∗
(73.85) (82.08) (75.45) (84.56)
F×TG×2003 3.154 -0.762 0.458 -8.207
(38.02) (43.78) (38.08) (43.90)
F×TG×2004 28.680 -1.178 28.385 -6.415
(39.54) (45.22) (39.06) (45.35)
F×TG×2005 1.227 -1.852 -0.679 -4.476
(13.76) (15.46) (13.84) (15.73)
F×TG×2007 33.918∗∗∗ 25.778∗ 38.104∗∗∗ 34.926∗∗
(9.06) (14.52) (8.98) (14.28)
F×TG×2008 68.057∗∗∗ 63.641∗∗ 73.875∗∗∗ 70.183∗∗∗
(22.91) (27.34) (23.08) (27.17)
F×TG×2009 98.053∗∗ 99.961∗∗ 100.415∗∗ 102.761∗∗
(40.00) (46.61) (40.02) (46.56)
2000 106.128 223.687∗∗ 130.541∗ 180.490∗ 224.199∗ 362.430∗∗
(98.93) (96.77) (71.91) (93.29) (129.65) (149.07)
2001 73.435 174.071∗∗ 169.582∗∗∗ 212.066∗∗∗ 233.891∗∗ 360.045∗∗∗
(91.34) (84.98) (55.12) (76.05) (115.30) (130.88)
2002 71.863 146.192∗∗∗ 146.141∗∗∗ 170.840∗∗∗ 193.414∗∗ 283.858∗∗∗
(62.42) (52.35) (50.15) (63.63) (92.03) (102.59)
2003 97.866∗∗ 134.333∗∗∗ 66.876∗∗ 84.855∗∗ 97.543∗ 146.948∗∗∗
(41.62) (37.04) (32.62) (38.43) (53.38) (53.36)
2004 46.374 75.771∗∗∗ 17.156 44.534 20.273 85.841∗
(30.86) (23.03) (40.39) (44.77) (46.32) (50.16)
2005 48.047∗∗∗ 60.677∗∗∗ 26.510∗∗ 41.214∗∗ 48.671∗∗∗ 64.717∗∗∗
(13.57) (18.51) (12.10) (17.14) (18.62) (23.84)
2007 -79.666∗∗∗ -107.325∗∗∗ -65.622∗∗∗ -72.488∗∗∗ -114.704∗∗∗ -141.002∗∗∗
(27.00) (38.19) (7.89) (17.03) (28.74) (41.56)
2008 -127.909∗∗∗ -138.049∗∗∗ -129.821∗∗∗ -145.030∗∗∗ -195.839∗∗∗ -198.345∗∗∗








(37.94) (38.83) (19.12) (23.15) (44.00) (42.95)
2009 -105.265∗ -109.444∗ -179.880∗∗∗ -196.312∗∗∗ -197.600∗∗∗ -196.564∗∗∗
(60.10) (62.86) (31.96) (42.81) (69.97) (74.41)
Population -0.015 -0.058∗∗ -0.060∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Employees -100.521 -94.129 -87.457
(194.29) (202.42) (194.35)
Business tax rev. -0.008∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property tax rev. 0.122 0.118 0.126
(0.19) (0.20) (0.19)
Priv. income 0.053 0.045 0.031
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
GDP 0.015 0.013 0.014
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 616.020∗∗∗ -258.656 615.754∗∗∗ -66.432 615.728∗∗∗ 111.369
(8.09) (853.01) (8.11) (798.55) (8.11) (801.28)
Observations 9129 7996 9129 7996 9129 7996
R2 .018595 .0222896 .0198246 .0223046 .0206578 .0244516
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation 4.3 with standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01.
Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2000 to 2009. Control group is
replaced by all those municipalities which are forced to merge or incorporate in the mandatory
phase and file a lawsuit against this at the constitutional court (alternative control group). The unit
of observation is a single municipality. Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The
independent variables of interest are the interaction terms TGi × TPt between the treatment group
TGi and the treatment points TPt with t = 2000, ..., 2005 and t = 2007, ..., 2009 and the triple
interaction term Fi×TGi×TPt between the municipality-specific continuous free-ride measure Fi, the
treatment group TGi, and the treatment points TPt with t = 2000, ..., 2005 and t = 2007, ..., 2009.
Base year is 2006. Pre-reform period 2000 to 2006 and post-reform period 2007 to 2009. Base year
is 2006. All specifications include year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. Add. controls
include municipal-level controls for population, employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue
and county-level controls for income of private households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal
values are deflated to 2000 prices.
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Table 4.23: Robustness check (alternative control group).
Regression results for Equation 4.4
Short (2006-2009) Extended (2000-2009)













TG1×2007 31.788 27.842 31.788 47.315
(27.78) (31.07) (27.79) (35.46)
TG1×2008 22.687 10.532 25.325 11.724
(41.07) (44.76) (41.23) (43.35)
TG1×2009 -40.845 -60.740 -53.083 -72.819













TG2×2007 44.475 39.220 44.475 63.868∗
(27.14) (29.96) (27.15) (34.57)
TG2×2008 60.440 55.848 61.966 50.350
(38.95) (40.74) (38.98) (40.31)
TG2×2009 19.187 10.746 13.909 3.475













TG3×2007 62.466∗∗ 51.214 62.466∗∗ 52.336
(27.82) (32.55) (27.83) (44.69)
TG3×2008 76.178∗ 71.000∗ 70.267∗ 67.227
(38.94) (40.66) (39.57) (41.06)
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Short (2006-2009) Extended (2000-2009)
Baseline Add. controls Baseline Add. controls
TG3×2009 29.009 15.264 23.098 6.104













2007 -79.666∗∗∗ -76.824∗∗ -79.666∗∗∗ -111.671∗∗∗
(27.02) (31.09) (27.03) (38.25)
2008 -127.909∗∗∗ -160.872∗∗∗ -127.909∗∗∗ -134.925∗∗∗
(37.97) (38.73) (37.98) (38.81)
2009 -105.265∗ -159.122∗∗∗ -105.265∗ -101.696





Business tax rev. -0.012 -0.009∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00)
Property tax rev. 0.499 0.118
(0.72) (0.20)




Constant 622.977∗∗∗ -1113.319 616.034∗∗∗ -8.707
(4.09) (817.77) (8.11) (838.82)
Observations 3563 3019 9129 7996
R2 .0726889 .0738118 .0219274 .026467
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions based on Equation refeq:-4.2 with standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered on the municipality level. Significance levels are ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗∗∗ <
0.01. Administrative data on municipalities of Saxony-Anhalt. Years 2006 to 2009 (left two columns)
and 2000 to 2009 (right two columns). Control group is replaced by all those municipalities which
are forced to merge or incorporate in the mandatory phase and file a lawsuit against this at the
constitutional court (alternative control group). The unit of observation is a single municipality.
Dependent variable is municipal-level debt (in euro p.c.). The independent variables of interest are
the interaction terms TGji × TPt between the treatment groups TGji with j = 1, 2 and 3 and the
treatment points TPt with t = 2007, ..., 2009 of the post-reform period. Pre-reform period 2000 to
2006 and post-reform period 2007 to 2009. Base year is 2006. All specifications include year fixed
effects and municipality fixed effects. Add. controls include municipal-level controls for population,
employees (p.c.), business and property tax revenue and county-level controls for income of private
households and GDP (all in euro p.c.). All nominal values are deflated to 2000 prices.
Chapter 5
Tax smoothing and credit access
5.1 Introduction
In the context of the recent debt crises, political practitioners emphasize risks associated
with high public debt levels, and try to design effective measures for limiting debt build-
up. Public debate often portrays debt as something that is best avoided or at least strictly
limited. Otherwise, countries might one day have to suffer the consequences in the form
of debt crises, recessions, fiscal austerity and painful reforms to clean up the mess.1
On the other hand, economic theory suggests that public debt can be a useful tool
to maximize social welfare. In his seminal contribution, Barro (1979) puts forward his
theory of tax smoothing. From a welfare perspective, deadweight losses and hence tax
rates should be smoothed over time in order to minimize distortionary costs from taxation.
While the ability to run budget deficits and access debt is not a necessary condition for
tax smoothing, it greatly improves chances of tax smoothing in practice. Credit rationing
could thus inhibit tax smoothing. However, the proliferation of public debt and political
efforts for restraining debt demonstrate that it is not used solely for this laudable purpose.2
Rules on debt and budget deficits may therefore be warranted.
1In the aftermath of Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) disputable contribution “Growth in a time of debt”
a big controversy on the risk of high debt levels unleashed among economist and politicians. Advocates of
fiscal austerity policy underpinned their call for an end to expansionary policy with Reinhart and Rogoff’s
(2010) research (they claim that there is a link between rising debt level and weak economic growth).
However, the replication by Herndon et al. (2014) casts doubt on this research, nurturing the critics.
2Further purposes of debt established by economic theory are counter-cyclical fiscal policy or intergen-
erational equity.
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The question about whether debt access should be limited is not only relevant at the
national level. In federal states where subnational levels of governments enjoy tax auton-
omy, higher-level governments set the legal framework which determines budget and debt
rules for lower levels. As this paper argues, governments may face a trade-off between
enforcing budget discipline and easing tax smoothing when designing these rules. Ac-
cording to the standard recommendation of the fiscal federalism literature, lower levels of
government should not be granted access to debt, at least not for financing current deficits
(e.g., Oates 2005). However, ruling out debt finance could prevent subnational govern-
ments that enjoy tax autonomy over certain taxes from engaging in welfare-enhancing tax
smoothing.
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between credit access and tax
smoothing using the case of municipalities in Germany. Two distinguishing characteristics
make German municipalities particularly suitable for the analysis: First, all municipal-
ities in Germany enjoy autonomy over the business tax and the property tax, with the
former being highly volatile. Their (in)ability to smooth these tax rates over time is thus a
salient issue. Second, in the last two decades some German federal states have eased their
municipalities’ access to credits, while other states still strictly enforce credit rationing of
municipalities for current expenditures. Hence, the case of German municipalities consti-
tutes an ideal setting to analyze whether credit access is used by policy makers to smooth
taxes. Given local tax autonomy and the variation in local credit rationing amongst Ger-
man federal states, this paper asks: Are local tax rates less volatile in federal states where
municipalities have easy access to credits?3 If the answer is affirmative, there is some
benefit to allowing public debt and the aforementioned trade-off between tax smoothing
and budget discipline arises. If the answer is negative, the potential benefits of credit
access do not materialize in practice and local credit rationing is advisable.
We contribute to the literature, first, by developing and using an innovative and
intuitive approach to investigating the strength of tax smoothing behavior. In contrast to
existing studies, we do not ask whether governments do or do not engage in tax smoothing.
Instead, we analyze whether tax rates become smoother and thus closer to Barro’s ideal if
the institutional setting becomes more accommodating. We focus on smoothing taxes over
the business cycle, factoring out the structural, long-term tax smoothing component. The
sizable empirical and theoretical literature on tax smoothing following the pioneering work
3Note, in this chapter we use tax rate as synonym for tax multiplier.
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of Barro (1979) and Bohn (1990) typically defines tax smoothing as constant tax rates in
the case of perfect foresight. In case of imperfect foresight tax rates are changed whenever
new information about the expected permanent expenditure path arises.4 On this basis we
define “smoother tax rates” as tax rates that are subject to a smaller number of changes
within a given time period. This measure constitutes an intuitive and straightforward
translation of theoretical tax smoothing definitions found in the literature into the context
of local tax policy. Our approach also allows us to use tax rate data and investigate tax
rate volatility directly.5 This is in contrast to the indirect tax smoothing tests prevalent
in existing literature which rely on the behavior of the budget balance or government
expenditure over time.6
Second, we establish a link between tax smoothing and actual credit access that is
to the best of our knowledge almost entirely missing from the literature to date. While
credit access is typically not an issue at the national level, it becomes crucial once we
move to subnational levels of government.7 The empirical analysis yields an original
index of local credit access based on the differing institutional, legal and administrative
environment in each state. This index allows us to investigate the relationship between
credit access and the strength of tax smoothing at the local level based on a dataset of
over 10,000 municipalities in all German territorial states. In our empirical analysis we
find no evidence in favor of a tax smoothing effect of credit access.
Third, we show that a rising number of German municipalities is making abusive
4See, e.g., Adler (2006), Bohn (1990), Ghosh (1995) and Strazicich (1997).
5We draw on the tax rate (tax multiplier) instead of the tax revenue, because German municipalities
enjoy autonomy over it. The federal level defines the basic tax rate and the tax base on the other hand
(see Section 5.2.1 for more information). Along with other local policies the municipality’s tax rates choice
might implicitly affect the tax base by attracting business and property. See Chapter 3 for more on this
regard.
6Indirect tests of tax smoothing typically rely on a theoretical model which derives a clear relationship
between tax rates and the budget surplus. They use the theoretical model to predict how the budget sur-
plus should evolve if the government engages in tax smoothing. There is an array of different econometric
tests (depending on the particular question, the available data, and model) to examine if the development
of the budget surplus found in the actual data is in line with the predicted path of the model. Depending
on the degree of divergence tax smoothing is confirmed or rejected. See, e.g., Adler (2006), Barro (1979,
1995), Bohn (1990), Olekalns (1997) and Strazicich (1997).
7Most existing studies focus on tax smoothing at the national level, where free credit access can be
assumed. Notable exceptions are Strazicich (1997) and Reitschuler (2010). Strazicich (1997) investigates
tax smoothing at the subnational level with data from states of the United States and Canadian provinces,
pointing out that results differ by federal level. Reitschuler (2010) introduces the notion that fiscal rules
such as those of the European Union, which limit debt access, may inhibit tax smoothing.
Chapter 5 Empirical Essays on Fiscal Federalism 153
use of easier credit access and carries a high burden of short-term debt. So-called liquid-
ity credits that are meant to fill temporary liquidity gaps are increasingly used to cover
persistent budget deficits over a medium- to long-term horizon. Our results suggest that
granting credit access is an (un)successful attempt of the respective federal states to com-
pensate for a lack of sufficient revenue to cover rising spending needs and to limit upward
pressure on tax rates. Credit access triggers unsustainable behavior, making calls for bail-
outs more likely. Our paper provides support for the notion that strict credit rationing
of the local level may be the best institutional choice for higher-level governments even if
there is substantial tax autonomy at the local level.
Section 5.2 starts by explaining the institutional setting. Section 5.2.1 portrays the
rules governing local borrowing in the territorial states and provides information on local
tax autonomy. Section 5.2.2 details the construction of an original index of local credit
access and proposes a measure for tax rate volatility. In Section 5.3 we provide evidence
against a contribution of credit access to tax smoothing; we present it in four steps. The
first three steps in Section 5.3.1 are based on a descriptive analysis. This is complemented
with an econometric approach in Step 4 in Section 5.3.2. Section 5.4 summarizes, discusses
the findings and concludes.
5.2 Local credit access and tax autonomy
In the first part of this section we provide information on the institutional background:
We outline the rules governing local borrowing in the territorial states and then turn to
local tax autonomy. In the second part of this section we present our index of credit access
and introduce our measure for tax rate volatility.
5.2.1 Institutional background
Local credit access. Federal states grant municipalities varying access to debt. The legal
framework for local government finances is defined by local government laws (Gemeinde-
ordnungen) and associated regulation in each state. In the following, we analyze legal
provisions and their evolution in each of the 13 territorial states. The three city-states, in
which a separate municipal level does not exist, are excluded.
When talking about local public debt in Germany, debt for consumption and invest-
ment purposes needs to be distinguished. As per state law in all states and contrary to the
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state and federal level, municipalities may only go into debt to finance investment, invest-
ment assistance, or to restructure existing debt. Formally, debt for consumption purposes
is ruled out. Accordingly, local government laws in all states stipulate that municipalities
ought to balance their budget each year.
However, liquidity gaps that may arise throughout the budget year even when rev-
enues do not fall short of expenditures make (short-term) credits for consumption purposes
a necessity. Unlike financing credits, which are used to fund investment, such liquidity
credits (Liquiditätskredite or Kassenkredite) are not part of local revenues in a legal sense.
They are meant to ensure the timely settlement of liabilities and to fill short-term liquidity
gaps until “real” revenues become available.8
In principle, municipalities cannot plan a budget deficit. This would seemingly con-
stitute a violation of the balanced budget rules that are enshrined in all local government
laws. At first sight, it thus seems that there is barely any scope for tax smoothing at the
local level. In practice, however, (planned) budget deficits are commonplace.
First, the balanced budget rules of some states give municipalities some leeway by
allowing the use of reserves to finance temporary deficits. Second, the regulatory authority
in question may reject unlawful budgets, but it is not obliged to intervene. Regulatory
authorities may tacitly approve deficits. Third, even if the budget is rejected, the deficit
does not necessarily disappear. Instead, municipalities without a valid budget operate
under the rules of provisional budget management, which allows them to carry out their
most important tasks and, among other things, levy taxes at previous rates. Changes to
tax rates are typically prohibited.
In addition, budgets containing a deficit can be made legal under certain circum-
stances. A number of states require municipalities that do not achieve budgetary equi-
librium to submit a budget consolidation plan, which specifies how the municipality will
return to budget balance in the coming years. In most cases, this plan requires approval
by the regulatory authority. If approval is denied, the municipality once again finds itself
under provisional budget management. Although they were intended as an instrument
for enhancing fiscal sustainability, budget consolidation plans also provide a legal avenue
for running deficits without the restrictions of provisional budget management. What was
once devised as an arrangement for fiscal emergency situations has become widespread.
Estimates claim that about a third of all municipalities in Germany was operating either
8Given that liquidity credits are not classified as revenues, they cannot be used to balance the budget.
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under a budget consolidation plan or provisional budget management as of 2010 (Spars
et al. 2010).
All local government laws contain a paragraph specifically on the purpose of and
rules relating to liquidity credits. The wording of these paragraphs gives a first indication
of the degree of local credit rationing in the respective state. Table 5.9 in Appendix 5.5
provides an overview of the current wording of these paragraphs in each of the federal
states. All provisions emphasize that liquidity credits serve the timely settlement of ex-
penses and the prevention of late payments. This purpose implies their temporary nature.
Another common theme is the subsidiarity of liquidity credits: They may only be used if
no other funds are available. Moreover, all local government laws require the municipality
to define a ceiling up to which liquidity credits may be taken in a given budget year.9 In all
states except Brandenburg, this ceiling must be set in the budget by-law. The budget by-
law typically has to be submitted to the competent regulatory authority, which checks its
lawfulness.10 In addition, some states specify that liquidity credit ceilings have to be ap-
proved by the regulatory authority if they exceed a threshold (Baden-Württemberg, Hesse,
Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia), which is
defined relative to the municipalities’ expenses or revenues. Bavaria goes one step further
by ruling out credit ceilings above a threshold level.
A higher degree of local credit rationing can be assumed in states where approval
clauses for liquidity credit ceilings (or fixed ceilings) exist. In these states, regulatory
authorities are required by law to formally approve or reject problematic credit ceilings.
A priori, this suggests stricter oversight. It also gives regulatory authorities an additional
lever to limit municipal budget deficits, apart from rejecting budgets or, where applicable,
budget consolidation plans.
State regulations regarding liquidity credit ceilings have evolved over time. In fact,
all local government laws included an approval clause of credit ceilings at one time or
another. Table 5.1 lists the most recent approval clauses that once were or still are in
effect in state laws.11 The time of abolishment of approval clauses varies greatly across
9This ceiling continues to hold under provisional budget management.
10In case of cities with county status and some big non-associated cities, the state interior ministry is
usually the competent regulatory authority. In some states, lower public authorities fulfill this role. For
municipalities belonging to a county, regulatory control is exercised by the county.
11Where current local government laws still contain approval clauses, the state listing corresponds to
Table 5.9.
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states. North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate were the first to abolish such
clauses in 1994. Brandenburg enacted the most recent abolishment in 2008. Interestingly,
there seems to be a trend reversal given that two states, Hesse and Saxony-Anhalt, have
reintroduced approval clauses in recent years. This may have been in response to soaring
levels of short-term local debt.
Table 5.1: Abolishment and introduction of approval clauses
Federal states Approval clause
abolished on
Wording of current or abolished approval clause
Baden-
Württemberg
– § 89 (3) GemO The liquidity credit ceiling set in the
budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory
authority if it exceeds one fifth of the profit and loss
budget’s ordinary expenses.
Bavaria 01.09.1997 Art. 73 (2) GO The liquidity credit ceiling set in the
budget by-law requires approval if 1. the ceiling for the
core budget exceeds one sixth of the administrative
budget’s revenues, 2. the ceiling for owner-operated
municipal enterprises exceeds one sixth of the profit
plan’s revenues.
Brandenburg 01.01.2008 § 87 (2) GO The liquidity credit ceiling set in the
budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory
authority if it exceeds one sixth of the administrative
budget’s revenues.
Hesse 01.01.1999 § 105 (2) HGO The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it
exceeds one fifth of the administrative budget’s
revenues.
Lower Saxony – § 122 (2) NKomVG The ceiling set in the budget
by-law requires approval by the regulatory authority if
it exceeds one sixth of the cash-flow budget’s revenues
for current administrative activities.
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
– § 53 (3) KV M-V The liquidity credit ceiling set in the
budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory
authority if it exceeds ten percent of the cash-flow
budget’s current revenues for administrative activites.
North
Rhine-Westphalia
17.10.1994 § 74 (2) GO NRW The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it




12.06.1994 § 105 (2) GemO The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it
exceeds one sixth of the administrative budget’s
revenues.
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Federal states Approval clause
abolished on
Wording of current or abolished approval clause
Saarland 01.01.2007 § 94 (2) KSVG The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it
exceeds one sixth of the administrative budget’s
revenues.
Saxony – § 84 (3) SächsGemO The liquidity credit ceiling set in
the budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory
authority if it exceeds one fifth of the profit and loss
budget’s ordinary expenses.
Saxony-Anhalt 31.08.2003 § 91 (2) GO LSA The liquidity credit ceiling set in the
budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory
authority if it exceeds one fifth of the administrative
budget’s revenues.
Schleswig-Holstein 31.03.2006 § 87 (2) GO The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority.
Thuringia – § 65 (2) ThürKO The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval if 1. the ceiling for the core budget
exceeds one sixth of the administrative budget’s
revenues, 2. the ceiling for owner-operated municipal
enterprises or municipal institutions exceeds one sixth
of the profit plan’s revenues.
Approval clause
reintroduced on
Wording of reintroduced approval clause
Hesse 24.12.2011 § 105 (2) HGO The ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority.
Saxony-Anhalt 01.07.2014 § 110 (2) KVG LSA The liquidity credit ceiling set in
the budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory
authority if it exceeds one fifth of the cash budget’s
revenues for current administrative activities.
Notes: Local government laws. Translation by authors.
Yet, the effective degree of credit rationing does not only depend on the letter of
the law, but also on its enforcement by regulatory authorities. For instance, approval
clauses would not make a difference if all credit ceilings were approved indiscriminately.
The administrative and political culture in each federal state may have an impact on
how rules are interpreted when legal terms leave scope for discretion. For example, the
requirement of a balanced budget and the stated purpose of liquidity credits imply that
maturities should normally not exceed one fiscal year. However, local and state policy
makers have started to argue that the law does not stipulate rules on permissible maturities
for liquidity credits. On these grounds, credit periods of several years have been declared
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acceptable. The political weight, personal beliefs and competence of individual decision-
makers both in municipalities and regulatory authorities may also influence enforcement.
In addition, the equipment and staffing of regulatory authorities may be pivotal both in
their capacity to detect breaches in the rules and in their decision to intervene or to refrain
from intervention when they do. Capacities may soon be exhausted when a large share
of municipalities within the authority’s jurisdiction is struggling with fiscal weakness and
mounting liquidity credit stocks.
In order to grasp differences in law enforcement and interpretation across states, Ta-
ble 5.10 in Appendix 5.5 provides information on relevant state circular decrees, ordinances
and other official statements regarding the treatment of municipal liquidity credits and
budget deficits. Through decrees and ordinances, state governments give instructions that
are binding for regulatory authorities (Heinemann et al. 2009). Other official statements
also shed light on the prevalent interpretation of legal rules.
A couple of findings emerge from Table 5.10. First, strictness of state enforcement
and interpretation of their – very similar – legal rules relating to balanced budgets and
liquidity credits differ markedly. While many states show a progressive trend towards a
loosening of rules by lengthening acceptable maturities or allowing larger permanent stocks
of liquidity credits, others maintain a stricter reading of the law. Moreover, the instructions
given to regulatory authorities once again illustrate that a breach of the balanced budget
rule often becomes acceptable once municipalities submit a budget consolidation plan.
The circular decrees also highlight that there is a link between such budget consolidation
plans and local tax policy, as regulatory authorities are urged to ensure that tax rates are
sufficiently high in the municipalities in question. Provisional budget management, much
like budget consolidation plans, has become widespread and has triggered increasingly lax
responses by the authorities.
Thus, even if liquidity credits are not intended to be a tax smoothing tool, local
governments may use them as such: Municipalities located in states where they can access
liquidity credits to fill budget deficits may delay or even altogether avoid adjustments to
their business and property tax rates. The question remains whether they make use of
this theoretical possibility in practice.
Tax autonomy. Municipalities in Germany draw revenues from a variety of sources
such as taxes, transfers from the state level, and duties and charges. Among the taxes,
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two stand out: The business tax (Gewerbesteuer) and the property tax (Grundsteuer)12
not only make up a significant share of local revenue, but in contrast to most other taxes
their tax rates are set autonomously by municipalities. Every year, each of the more than
11,000 municipalities in Germany sets its own tax multipliers. In 2013, gross business tax
revenue in Germany summed up to 43 billion (bn) euros while property tax revenue stood
at nearly 12 bn euros. Net revenue from business and property taxes accounted for 15.8%
and 5.8% of aggregate municipal income, respectively.
German municipalities do not enjoy full autonomy over business taxation. The
federal government uniformly defines the tax base as well as a basic tax rate (Steuer-
messzahl)13 for the entire country. The actual business tax rate, which will be levied on
firm profits, is determined by multiplying the basic federal rate with a multiplier (Hebe-
satz) set by each municipality. Municipalities are free in their choice of a multiplier, as
long as it does not fall below 200%.14
As in the case of business taxation, the property tax base and a basic tax rate
are set at the federal level. The tax base is constituted by the so-called uniform values
(Einheitswerte) of the property, which are meant to reflect the property’s value as of a
reference date (not its current market value) and which are fixed by federal tax author-
ities according to standardized procedures. Municipalities in turn fix the multiplier that
produces the final tax rate in conjunction with the basic federal rate.15 The latter is not
uniform. It depends on the type of property to be taxed and its location (East versus
West Germany).16 For simplicity, we will refer to local business tax multipliers and local
property tax multipliers as business tax rates and property tax rates in the remainder of
this paper.
Business and property tax rates have to be set in the budget by-law at the beginning
of each year. The budget by-law and hence applicable tax rates may be amended until
the end of the budgetary year. However, tax rates changes within the budgetary year are
rare in practice.
12When referring to the property tax, we mean the Grundsteuer B, which is one of two types of property
taxes in Germany. The other, called Grundsteuer A, which is also levied by municipalities, only accounts
for roughly 3% of total property tax revenue.
13The basic federal tax rate is currently set at 3.5%.
14This floor was introduced in 2004 in order to restrain detrimental tax competition. However, only a
very small number of communities had multipliers below the threshold prior to the reform.
15There are no restrictions on admissible property tax multipliers.
16It currently varies between 2.6‰ and 10‰.
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5.2.2 Measuring credit access and tax rate volatility
An index of credit access. In order to assess the impact of local credit access on the
volatility of local tax rates, the information on institutional features discussed in Section
5.2.1 needs to be condensed into an index of credit rationing and credit access. The
index presented in this paper reflects the qualitative and quantitative analysis of credit
access in all states. The index takes into account observable institutional characteristics
that have an influence on local credit access, as discussed in Section 5.2.1. We also aim
to capture unobservable institutional characteristics relating to the enforcement of legal
rules by regulatory authorities. To do so we consider quantitative information on local
liquidity credit stocks. The resulting index will be the primary variable of interest in the
descriptive analysis and the empirical model presented in Section 5.3.
More precisely, the qualitative part of the index accounts for institutional charac-
teristics that were found to ease or limit credit access for municipalities. Three of the
included characteristics relate to the existence and design of approval clauses for liquidity
credit ceilings (Component 1). The fourth takes into account circular decrees or ordinances
which expand local credit access by extending permissible maturities or allowing larger
permanent stocks of liquidity credits, amongst others (Component 2). Yet, as discussed in
Section 5.2.1, the effective degree of credit rationing does not only depend on the letter of
the law, but also on the way in which regulatory authorities choose to act when it comes
to approving credit ceilings or responding to rule breaches, for instance. Circular decrees
can shed some light on the practice of regulatory authorities, but a lot remains unobserv-
able. In part, such unobservable parameters may be captured by quantitative information
on local liquidity credit stocks, which is thus used to complement the qualitative side of
the index. By using data on local liquidity credit stocks, we assess the effective strength
and credibility of the rules which also flow into the index (Component 3 and 4). Data
on liquidity credits were obtained from North Rhine-Westphalia’s statistical office. It is a
panel dataset covering all German municipalities from 1998 to 2013.17
We decided to put equal weight on the qualitative and quantitative information (with
a heavier weight on Components 1 and 3). We assessed our decisions with respect to index
construction and our scoring system carefully. For instance, we talked with a number of
experts working in the field of local government finance in Germany to get a more detailed
17The percentiles employed in the index construction are calculated using the full, unbalanced panel of
all municipalities.
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understanding on the nature of the evolution of local debt rules in Germany and to reflect
our ideas. The credit access index starts from zero (no credit access/complete credit
rationing). Index scores are assigned as follows.
We begin by considering the qualitative information gathered in Section 5.2.1. We
translate it into index points running from zero to three. Component 1 concerns the
wording of the approval clause:
• 0 points if the local government law contains an unconditional approval clause or an
upper limit for liquidity credit ceilings (Component 1.1),
• + 1 point if the local government law contains a conditional approval clause for
liquidity credit ceilings (Component 1.2),
• + 2 points if the local government law contains no approval clause for liquidity credit
ceilings (Component 1.3).
Component 2 concerns circular decrees or ordinances:
• + up to 1 point if circular decrees are in force which expand credit access beyond
what is suggested by the letter of the law, but 0 points if there is no relevant circular
decree in place (Component 2).
Quantitative information on yearly liquidity credit stocks in all municipalities will be used
as a proxy for severity of enforcement with corresponding index points from zero to three.
The first three bullet points concern Component 3, the latter concerns Component 4:
• + 0 points if the aggregate stock of municipal liquidity credits per person is below
the 15th percentile (14.8 euros per person) of all territorial states (Component 3.1),
• + 1 point if the aggregate stock of municipal liquidity credits per person is above
the 15th percentile and below 85th percentile (544 euros per person) of all territorial
states (Component 3.2),
• + 2 points if the aggregate stock of municipal liquidity credits per person is above
the 85th percentile of all territorial states (Component 3.3),
• + 1 point if more than one third of municipalities in the respective federal state have
a liquidity credit stock of more than 544 euros per person, but 0 points otherwise
(Component 4).
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Rules relating to the existence and approval of budget consolidation plans do not flow
into the index as their impact on credit access is ambiguous. It would be desirable to also
include a criterion relating to the percentage of municipalities with liquidity credit stocks
of more than a certain percentage of their annual administrative revenues. However, we
refrained from doing so due to data availability issues (see Section 5.3.2).


































Württemberg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
Bavaria 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Brandenburg 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Hesse 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3
Lower Saxony 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
North Rhine-
Westphalia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.5 4.5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6
Rhineland-
Palatinate 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
Saarland 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5
Saxony 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Saxony-
Anhalt 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Schleswig-
Holstein 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Thuringia 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Notes: Index based on institutional characteristics that ease or limit credit access for municipalities
and on quantitative information on local liquidity credit stocks, developed by authors. See Table
5.14 in Appendix 5.5 for more detailed information on the assignment of index scores.
The index suffers from some caveats. In particular, some of the points can be assigned
objectively, while others require the authors’ individual assessment and interpretation.
The latter is particularly true for the translation of circular decrees into index scores.
Moreover, the thresholds involved in the construction of the quantitative part of the index
are somewhat arbitrary, as is the weighting of the criteria. However, these caveats are
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common when it comes to index constructions, see, e.g., Ciagala and Heinemann (2012).18
According to the above set of rules, the index of local credit access is calculated
for each federal state for each year between 1998 and 2013. It runs from zero (no credit
access/complete credit rationing) to six (complete credit access/no credit rationing). Table
5.2 lists the resulting index values. Table 5.14 in Appendix 5.5 details the points given for
each characteristic in each year.
A measure of tax rate volatility. We propose the number of tax rate changes per
municipality within a given time period as a measure of tax rate volatility. The number
of tax rate changes gives equal importance to each tax rate adjustment regardless of its
magnitude. A smaller number of changes would seem more in line with tax smoothing,
ceteris paribus. Steady tax rates reduce the distortionary costs of taxation. Changes to
tax rates not only raise distortionary costs but also induce further costs, e.g., bargaining
costs between the administration and the public (inhabitants and firms). Over the business
cycle, automatic stabilizers should be left to work without any intervention in tax rates.19
The number of tax rate changes will be used in the descriptive analysis in Section
5.3.1 (Step 2 and 3) and as the dependent variable in the empirical model presented in Sec-
tion 5.3.2. We calculate the number of tax rate changes for the business and the property
tax, respectively. In addition, the sum of changes for both taxes is considered to obtain
a full picture of local tax policy. For this purpose, we built a panel dataset covering all
German municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013. Data on local tax rates at the munici-
pal level from 2009 to 2013 are made available online by the Regional Database Germany
(Regionaldatenbank Deutschland). Tax rates between 2001 and 2008 were obtained from
the Statistical Local (Statistik Lokal) publications. Data on all years before 2001 were re-
quested directly from the respective statistical office of the federal state in question. Most
analyses that follow were carried out for the balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for
which we have information on the business and property tax rates as well as on liquidity
18There are more advanced index construction procedures such as, for instance, indexes based on the
principal component analysis (see, e.g., International Monetary Fund 2009). However, they are far beyond
the scope of this research.
19Apart from this cyclical component, which is the focus of this paper, tax smoothing also has a
strucutral, long term component. It demands that all available information on long-term future spending
needs should be used to devise an optimal tax rate today that takes into account future developments,
allowing for a steady tax rate and a smaller adjustment than if adjustment were delayed. Nevertheless,
the number of changes necessary to deal with new information on spending needs should be kept to a
minimum, too.
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credits in all 16 years.20
5.3 Analyzing tax smoothing at the local level
It is plausible to assume that local governments that enjoy credit access find it easier
to smooth taxes over time. They can afford to refrain from adjusting tax rates over
the business cycle to ensure stable tax revenues. Allowing automatic stabilizers to work
can easily cause deficits during economic downturns. The optimal response to adverse
temporary economic shocks may also be to run a budget deficit rather than exacerbate
economic costs through tax rate increases. Thus, we should see more stable tax rates
in federal states where municipalities can make use of liquidity credits to finance current
deficits. In other words, there should be a positive link between credit access and tax
smoothing, as credit access contributes to smoother tax rates. In the following, we refute
such a positive association for the case of German municipalities, based on four steps of
empirical, i.e. descriptive and econometric, analysis.
5.3.1 Descriptive analysis
We start with our descriptive analysis by first taking a closer look at the actual devel-
opment of liquidity credits (Step 1). Next, we study tax rate volatility (Step 2), before
linking tax rate volatility and credit access (Step 3).
Step 1: Development of liquidity credits is not cyclical
If liquidity credits were used as a tax smoothing tool, the stock of liquidity credits should
behave cyclically. However, this is not the case empirically. Figure 5.1 pinpoints that easier
credit access has coincided with dramatic increases in local per capita short-term liquidity
credits in some federal states (Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and
Saarland) over the past decades. Levels of local per capita short-term liquidity credits
20The total number of municipalities in the balanced panel dataset is smaller than the actual total
number of municipalities in some states where not all municipalities exist in all 16 years due to territorial
reforms. This is particularly true for Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt. The balanced panel dataset is the
data basis for Table 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 as well as Table 5.11 in the Appendix. It is furthermore employed
to calculate the average number of tax rate changes by state presented in Figure 5.3 and 5.4 and in the
econometric analysis. For a deeper discussion on potential related issues and information on data see
Section 5.3.2.
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do not behave cyclically – at least at the aggregate level. Instead of showing alternating
increases and reductions, they exhibit a steady rise with varying slopes over time. This
suggests a misuse of liquidity credits to cover rising spending needs. It is a valid argument
that this behavior does not rule out the simultaneous use of liquidity credits for tax
smoothing. However, as the results of the next steps show, tax rates tend to be rather
stable overall. In particular, the number of changes of municipalities in federal states
affected by high local liquidity credit burdens are at the upper end of the scale. Thus,
the evolution of liquidity credits suggests that credit access is not (mainly) used for tax
smoothing purposes.
Figure 5.1: Evolution of short-term liquidity credits (in euro p.c.), 1991-2013
Notes: Own compilation with data retrieved from the Fachserie 14 Reihe 5 2013 by the Federal
Statistical Office. Data cover the entire municipal level (municipalities, municipal associations and
counties).
Step 2: Tax rate changes are overall rather rare
If local credit access facilitated tax smoothing at the local level, tax rate changes should
be particularly rare in federal states where municipalities have ample access to credit.
However, local tax rates are remarkably stable across Germany, regardless of local credit
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access. Table 5.3 provides information on the proportion of municipalities with property
and business tax rate changes within the reference period 1998 to 2013 by federal state.
Table 5.3: Proportion of municipalities with tax rate changes, 1998-2013



























































Baden-Württemberg 10.3 34.7 51.1 3.9 21 54.1 24.4 .5
Bavaria 41.1 37.5 21.1 .3 48.4 33.6 17.7 .2
Brandenburg 20.7 44.8 31 3.4 53.4 31 15.5 0
Hesse 6.7 22.1 63.7 7.6 16.2 35.2 47.5 1.2
Lower Saxony 4 23.8 67.2 5.1 6.2 27.3 61.5 5
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 22.3 41.1 35.9 .7 34.1 38 25.6 2.3
North Rhine-Westphalia 0 4.5 74.7 20.7 1 13.9 78.8 6.3
Rhineland-Palatinate 2.3 10.1 83.9 3.6 13.8 43.1 42.6 .4
Saarland 9.8 43.1 41.2 5.9 2 5.9 80.4 11.8
Saxony 4.8 19 63.8 12.4 19.3 30 46.9 3.8
Saxony-Anhalt 10.6 12.4 51.6 25.5 16.1 13 42.9 28
Schleswig-Holstein 11.8 24.8 53.5 10 14.1 35.8 47.4 2.7
Thuringia 8.9 57.3 33 .8 7.1 57.6 34.5 .8
Total 14.2 27.3 53.6 4.9 21.4 38.3 38.2 2.1
Notes: Proportion of municipalities with tax rate changes calculated for the balanced panel of 10,160
municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013.
Table 5.11 in Appendix 5.5 gives the equivalent information in terms of absolute
numbers of municipalities.21 From the tables, it is clear that tax rate changes are overall
21The total number of municipalities indicated in the Table 5.11 is smaller than the actual total number
of municipalities in some states where not all municipalities exist in all 16 years due to territorial reforms.
This is particularly true for Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt.
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rather rare. In case of property taxes, the majority of municipalities changed their tax
rate two to four times within our 16-year-horizon. Less than 5% enacted five or more
changes, with a maximum of eleven changes. Roughly a quarter changed their tax rate
only once, while 14.2% left their tax rate completely unchanged. Two to four is also the
most frequent number of changes in most of the federal states. Only in Brandenburg,
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saarland and Thuringia, the majority of municipalities had
only one tax rate change, but not by a big margin. Bavaria stands out in that a majority
of its municipalities enacted no property tax rate change during the reference period.
Business tax rates show similar patterns, but with even more overall tax rate stability.
Roughly a fifth of municipalities did not change their business tax rate at all from 1998
to 2013. One change or two to four changes were each carried out by about 38% of
municipalities. Only 2% changed their business tax rate five to eleven times. It is also
worth noting that changes in both property and business tax rates are most often in the
direction of higher tax rates. 96% of property tax rate changes and 93% of business tax
rate changes were increases. This might be a reflection of increased spending pressure at
the local level in recent years. This suggests that German municipalities in general aim
to smooth taxes (i.e. keep them stable) – cyclical tax policy would involve tax reductions
as well as tax jumps.22
22During economic downturns German municipalities suffer from a shortfall of own tax revenue (business
tax) while facing a rise in obligatory expenditures (social expenditures). The municipal fiscal equalization
system works as an automatic stabilizer, but does not close the revenue gap completely. Municipalities
face the choice of either crowding out other non-compulsory expenditures, raising their tax rates or taking
on debt (if possible). Their leeway to engage in discretionary fiscal policy is very limited if it exists at all.
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Table 5.4: Proportion of municipalities with property tax rate change from































































































1999 6.9 4.2 8.5 11.4 12.4 1.4 9.6 4.5 5.9 24.5 9.2 7.9 2.6 6.6
2000 4.0 3.7 6.8 10.2 17.0 2.7 10.6 45.5 5.9 26.9 14.1 7.0 1.6 15.9
2001 6.5 3.7 3.4 3.1 10.9 2.4 14.9 23.6 2.0 22.8 8.6 27.8 4.0 12.7
2002 6.8 4.2 16.9 14.0 20.7 2.9 18.2 9.4 7.8 19.0 12.3 13.8 2.9 9.7
2003 15.2 12.7 10.2 9.0 22.6 2.4 77.5 6.6 19.6 22.1 19.0 11.1 3.2 13.8
2004 28.3 13.7 15.3 17.8 22.4 2.9 8.3 4.2 2.0 26.6 21.5 19.1 1.6 13.3
2005 34.4 8.5 11.9 17.1 19.8 8.9 15.9 16.0 13.7 19.7 20.2 10.2 5.9 15.1
2006 17.6 5.0 15.3 6.9 8.5 10.3 14.6 9.1 9.8 12.8 17.8 17.8 3.0 10.0
2007 6.1 3.5 3.4 10.2 8.7 11.5 8.1 2.0 5.9 11.7 14.1 6.7 3.2 5.5
2008 4.6 2.6 3.4 7.8 7.6 8.4 6.3 1.7 5.9 6.9 14.7 6.5 2.2 4.5
2009 2.8 2.6 6.8 5.9 10.0 5.0 4.8 1.5 3.9 9.0 33.1 10.0 2.2 4.9
2010 18.6 7.0 8.5 18.1 19.8 20.4 18.9 2.0 11.8 19.3 57.1 20.7 5.2 12.5
2011 20.5 7.7 13.6 22.1 11.4 19.2 49.0 76.5 17.6 13.1 38.0 30.8 60.1 35.0
2012 9.3 5.3 10.2 33.5 17.8 13.4 41.9 36.0 33.3 19.3 26.4 13.5 23.8 20.1
2013 5.1 3.9 11.9 50.4 22.6 20.2 40.7 14.6 33.3 13.4 27.0 19.1 15.6 15.8
Total 11.7 5.5 9.1 14.8 14.5 8.3 21.2 15.8 11.2 16.7 20.8 13.9 8.6 12.2
Notes: Proportion of municipalities with property tax rate change from previous year to current year
calculated for the balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 complement the above information by looking at the timing of
tax rate changes. The tables present the share of municipalities in each federal state that
changed their tax rate in a given year compared to the previous year’s tax rate.
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Table 5.5: Proportion of municipalities with business tax rate change from































































































1999 3.5 2.9 6.8 6.4 8.3 3.1 7.3 3.7 2.0 19.7 9.8 4.1 4.1 4.8
2000 2.1 2.4 3.4 9.7 13.0 4.3 8.1 21.0 2.0 19.7 11.7 4.5 2.7 9.1
2001 5.0 4.9 5.1 2.9 13.0 3.1 11.6 23.6 98.0 16.6 8.6 27.8 4.9 13.2
2002 3.0 3.3 1.7 7.6 21.4 3.3 12.6 10.3 0.0 9.7 10.4 14.9 3.3 8.6
2003 4.0 6.5 3.4 4.5 20.4 2.9 64.6 7.1 2.0 12.1 12.9 9.6 3.0 9.9
2004 8.7 8.2 0.0 9.0 17.5 5.1 7.1 4.9 2.0 14.8 16.6 15.7 2.7 8.8
2005 24.1 5.4 5.1 9.0 15.3 6.7 12.1 14.5 82.4 7.2 16.0 7.6 5.2 11.6
2006 19.4 3.7 10.2 4.5 7.5 7.2 10.1 6.1 7.8 6.2 14.1 16.3 3.3 8.3
2007 5.3 2.6 3.4 5.9 6.2 8.9 6.1 2.1 11.8 8.6 14.1 5.4 2.7 4.4
2008 3.1 4.5 1.7 5.2 7.7 4.8 6.1 1.7 5.9 5.2 10.4 4.8 3.3 4.2
2009 2.3 4.2 3.4 6.4 11.3 3.4 4.5 1.1 5.9 6.6 23.9 8.1 2.4 4.7
2010 7.4 7.9 5.1 11.4 19.3 14.8 10.6 1.8 13.7 13.4 49.1 16.0 6.1 9.7
2011 12.9 8.3 10.2 16.4 13.0 16.6 38.6 20.7 13.7 13.1 42.9 16.2 60.6 19.7
2012 6.3 5.8 1.7 21.1 18.1 12.7 31.8 15.0 37.3 13.1 42.3 9.3 24.4 13.9
2013 4.4 4.5 10.2 38.5 20.2 17.8 30.6 10.0 19.6 11.0 35.6 12.5 15.1 12.8
Total 7.0 4.7 4.4 9.9 13.3 7.2 16.4 9.0 19.0 11.1 19.9 10.8 9.0 9.0
Notes: Proportion of municipalities with business tax rate change from previous year to current year
calculated for the balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013.
In Bavaria and Brandenburg, the share of municipalities with either property or
business tax rate changes never exceeds 20%.23 In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony,
this is true for business tax rates only. In all other states, there is at least one year and up
to seven years of high tax rate volatility where more than 20% of all municipalities enacted
23Information on Brandenburg needs to be treated with caution given the high number of missing
municipalities due to territorial reforms, see above.
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tax rate changes.24 Often, such years coincide for property and business tax rates, although
business tax rates again show less overall volatility. However, years of high volatility do
not necessarily coincide between states. This suggests that municipalities adjust their tax
rates mostly in response to state-specific shocks. Such shocks could consist of changes
in expenditure requirements when states devolve parts of their tasks to the local level
or modify standards relating to the execution of local tasks. Changes in municipal fiscal
equalization schemes are also possible triggers of tax rate changes. Changes in the degree
of credit access granted by states could also constitute a shock to which local governments
react. The tables also point to higher overall volatility of tax rates in recent years, starting
in 2010, with many federal states experiencing high volatile years at the same time. The
rise in tax rate volatility towards the end of our time horizon is a further indication that
credit access does not seem to contribute to smoother tax rates, given that credit access
has generally increased and not decreased over the last two decades.
Figure 5.2 shows the patterns of property and business tax rate levels that result
from the observed tax rate adjustments. For each state, the figure displays the weighted
average of tax rates of all municipalities in the respective state over the period 1998 to
2013. The small number of changes is reflected in slow-moving average tax rates in most
states. An upward trend is discernible in most states concerning both taxes, which is
in general more pronounced for the property tax. North Rhine-Westphalia and Saxony
have seen particularly strong increases in their average property tax rate level. It is worth
noting that North Rhine-Westphalia has seen dramatic increases of municipal liquidity
credits over the same time period, while Saxony’s liquidity credit stocks have remained
low. Rising local spending pressures across Germany could explain the generalized upward
trend in local tax rates. In sum, local tax rates are relatively stable across Germany, with
little variation across states. They have followed a slow upward trend in recent decades,
without any visible cyclicality. Whether the federal state in question has seen simultaneous
increases in local credit access or built-ups in effective municipal liquidity credit stocks
has no apparent effect on tax rate volatility.
24The share of municipalities with tax rate changes can go up to more than 50, 70 or even 90%.
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Figure 5.2: Development of business and property tax rate (in %), 1998-2013
Notes: Own compilation. Data source for the evolution of property and business tax rate (in %) is
the Regional Database Germany (Regionaldatenbank). Data represents the weighted average for all
municipalties.
Step 3: Positive relationship between credit access and tax rate volatility
If local credit access contributed to tax smoothing, this positive association should be
visible in a joint analysis of the data. In the third step of our line of argument, we
approach such a possible relationship between credit access and tax rate volatility through
a graphical analysis. Figure 5.3 plots the relationship between credit access and property
and business tax rate changes. The y-axis represents the average number of tax rate
changes in the municipalities in the state in question during the same period. The scattered
triangles and crosses refer to the property and business tax, respectively. The x-axis shows
the average credit access index for each federal state. This corresponds to the average of
the index developed in Section 5.2.2 over the 16 years from 1998 to 2013.
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Figure 5.3: Relationship between average credit access and tax rate changes
Notes: Cross section aggregated at the state level derived from balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities
for the period 1998 to 2013. Average number of tax rate changes (differentiated by business and
property tax) in the municipalities for each federal state (y-axis). Average credit access index for each
federal state (x-axis). Lines represent linear fit predicting the average number of tax rate changes
from the average credit access index.
No clear relationship emerges from Figure 5.3. If anything, a positive association
seems discernible, with Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia marking the two ends of
the spectrum from low credit access and few tax rate changes to high credit access and
many tax rate changes. The indication of a possible positive relationship is supported by
the two lines representing the linear fit predicting the average number of (property and
business) tax rates changes from the the average credit access index (the dotted and the
dashed line refer to the property and business tax, respectively). Both lines ascend slightly
and run almost in parallel. A positive link between credit access and tax rate changes
would contradict the rationale of the tax smoothing hypothesis, whereby access to credit
financing should allow municipalities to smooth their taxes and thus limit the number of
tax rate changes.
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Figure 5.4: Relationship between average credit access and tax rate changes
Notes: Cross section aggregated at the state level derived from balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities
for the period 1998 to 2013. Average number of tax rate changes in the municipalities for each federal
state (y-axis). Average credit access index for each federal state (x-axis). The dotted line represents
the linear fit predicting the average number of tax rate changes from the average credit access index.
Figure 5.4 again investigates a possible relationship between credit access and the
frequency of tax rate changes, this time considering the state average of the sum of changes
in the business and property tax in the state’s municipalities. Jointly considering both
taxes allows for a more complete picture of the volatility of local tax rate policy. Empiri-
cally, a small number of property tax changes generally coincides with a small number of
business tax changes and vice versa. As a result, the fitted line in Figure 5.4 has a positive
and steeper slope than the fitted lines in Figure 5.3.
How can one explain that greater credit access does not seem to lead to less tax rate
volatility, as evidenced by the preliminary graphical analysis? One potential explanation
lies in the fact that we may have overlooked an important intervening variable: Local
spending pressure. As alluded to in the preceding section, municipalities in Germany
have in general witnessed an expansion of their spending responsibilities in recent years.
In light of Germany’s federal institutional design it stands to reason to evaluate this as a
structural, mainly exogenous phenomenon from the local perspective. A further important
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characteristic is that local spending pressure varies across federal states.25 Consequently,
the positive link between tax rate changes and the credit access index might be explained
by spending pressure.
The results of this graphical analysis need to be interpreted with great caution.
The plots show a supposed unconditional relationship, i.e. not controlling for potentially
important covariates (e.g., spending pressure). Moreover, the information available in our
dataset has been condensed to an exceptionally high level of aggregation to produce the
above graphs. Behind the 13 data points depicted here for each state lie more than 10,000
individual municipalities over 16 years. Thus, the preliminary conclusions drawn from the
graphical analysis should be verified by an econometric analysis at the municipal level that
makes the most of the available data potential. This is what we do next (Step 4).
5.3.2 Econometric analysis
In this section, we first provide information on our data sources and descriptive statis-
tics, before presenting our fourth step and last approach to our research question, an
econometric analysis.
Data sources. The empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset with yearly ad-
ministrative data on all German municipalities from 1998 to 2013. Data were retrieved
from different sources, depending on the variable and the time horizon in question. Data on
liquidity credits, which are part of the construction of the credit access index, was provided
by North Rhine-Westphalia’s statistical office. The indicator funding need growth was cal-
culated by the authors and is only available between 1998 and 2006. Its components are
obtained directly from the municipal financial statement statistic (Jahresrechnungsstatis-
tik der Gemeinden/Gemeindeverbände), which is compiled by the Research Data Centres
of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder (Forschungs-
datenzentren der Statistischen Ämter des Bundes und der Länder) (Source: FDZ der
Statistischen Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, Jahresrechnungsstatistik der Gemein-
den/Gemeindeverbände, 1998-2006, own calculation). Data on employees is provided by
the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). All other municipal-level
25Higher spending needs have arisen in particular in the area of social welfare, which is to a large degree a
local task although standards are prescribed by federal law. The exact extent of municipal responsibilities
depends on state law, as the states can choose to carry out (social and other) tasks themselves or to
devolve them to the local level. The extent to which spending is decentralized and the extent to which
potential spending increases are offset by increased state transfer allocations differ between federal states.
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variables, including local business and property tax rates, were obtained from a combi-
nation of sources. Municipal-level data from 2009 to 2013 is available online through the
Regional Database Germany (Regionaldatenbank Deutschland). Data for the years from
2001 to 2008 come from the Statistical Local (Statistik Lokal) publications. Data on all
previous years were requested separately from each of the 13 state statistical offices.26
Some control variables such as the gross domestic product (GDP) and income of private
households are only available at the county level. All such variables are provided online
by the Regional Database Germany for the full period of interest.
Our baseline sample covers all municipalities for which we have information on busi-
ness and property tax rates as well as liquidity credits. This original dataset is an unbal-
anced panel containing 198,113 observations. The unbalanced nature of the panel is due
above all to territorial reforms that took place in the New Länder and greatly reduced
the number of municipalities. Hence, the number of observations in the original sample
shrinks from 14,102 observations in 1998 to 11,112 observations in 2013. Table 5.12 in
Appendix 5.5 reports for each state the share of municipalities for which we have one,
two etc. years of observations. All Bavarian and North Rhine-Westphalian municipali-
ties are represented in the dataset in all 16 years. For the remaining states, the share of
municipalities that exist during the full time period varies from 9.1% in Brandenburg to
99.8% in Rhineland-Palatinate. In order to avoid biases caused by municipalities that only
existed in a fraction of years, the remaining analysis is limited to the balanced panel of
10,160 municipalities with 16 years of observations.27 The decision to employ the balanced
panel might raise selection concerns.28 However, employing the balanced panel dataset is
superior to employing the unbalanced panel. We handle this issue by providing detailed
information on the nature of the problem (see discussion for Table 5.12 and 5.13). We also
present our results by state while carefully pointing out the related problems (see, e.g.,
26Not all statistical offices were able to provide information on municipal-level data for the requested
time period on the basis of the territorial status of that time.
27To adjust for the territorial reforms by setting the current territorial status as, for example, done by
Fuest et al. (2016) is not an option. This requires data harmonization by, e.g., demeaning and would lead
to artifical variation in our variable of interest (tax rates). To maximize the number of municipalities
in the balanced panel, we corrected the identifiers of municipalities that were affected by county-level
territorial reforms. In such cases, the identity or size of the county a municipality belongs to is changed
without changing the municipality itself.
28Whether a municipality is affected by a territorial reform mainly depends on population size be-
sides geographical and administrative characteristics. See Chapter 4 for an introduction into municipal
territorial reforms using the example of the German federal state Saxony-Anhalt.
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Footnote 23). We furthermore discussed to employ weights, in particular, with respect to
the econometric analysis, but decided against it. Instead we employ state dummies. Table
5.13 in Appendix 5.5 lists the number of municipalities contained in the balanced panel by
state. While Saarland and Brandenburg are represented with less than 60 municipalities,
Rhineland-Palatinate and Bavaria each contribute more than 2,000 observations to the
sample. Such differences are partly due to the aforementioned territorial reforms, which
cause incomplete samples for some states. However, they also arise because of differing in-
stitutional landscapes with major differences in city size and number. The two states with
full samples are cases in point: The most populous federal state North Rhine-Westphalia
is divided into only 396 municipalities while Bavaria, the state with the biggest surface
area, is extremely fragmented with 2,056 municipalities.
Dependent variable and main independent variables of interest. Our re-
search interest – the impact of credit access on tax rate volatility – demands some degree
of data aggregation to derive meaningful volatility measures. It only makes sense to an-
alyze the number of tax rate changes within a sufficiently long time frame. That is why
we aggregate our dataset for our main analysis into a cross section without a time dimen-
sion. Our independent variable of interest is the credit access index, which is outlined in
detail in Section 5.2.2. Following our train of thought on spending pressure (outlined in
the previous section), another independent variable of importance is funding need growth
(in %). We define local funding need as the difference between total municipal current
outlays and non-autonomous municipal current revenue.29
Descriptive statistics. Table 5.6 shows summary statistics for the aggregated
dataset derived from the balanced panel. The table first lists the three dependent variables
tested in the regression analysis: The number of property tax (short: PT) changes, the
number of business tax (short: BT) changes, and the sum of changes of both taxes,
each calculated over the full 16 year-horizon. Next is our main independent variable of
interest: the credit access index. The rest of the table shows the most important control
variables: Funding need growth (in %), the dummy for municipal association status,
population, number of employees at place of employment (per capita (p.c.)), income of
29Non-autonomous revenues are transfers from the state level in the form of shared taxes, conditional
and unconditional transfers. Thus, local funding need measures local expenditures that need to be financed
out of municipal own revenue, in particular business and property taxes. Funding need growth is defined
as the percentage increase of funding need between 1998 and 2006. This is used as a proxy for funding
need growth from 1998 to 2013, as necessary information on local revenue is not available beyond 2006.
We excluded 121 observations that were outliers with respect to funding need growth.
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private households, GDP (both in euro p.c.) and left majority at state parliamentary
elections, respectively. Municipal association status is coded as 1 if the municipality
belongs to a municipal association (Amtsgemeinde, Samtgemeinde or Verbandsgemeinde)
and 0 otherwise. Municipal associations exist in seven out of the 13 territorial states. All
independent variables correspond to the municipality-specific average of the underlying
variable over the 16 years of the reference period.
Table 5.6: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Number of changes PT rate 1.956 1.414 0 11 10160
Number of changes BT rate 1.441 1.215 0 11 10160
Number of changes 3.397 2.365 0 21 10160
Index 2.277 1.139 0.875 4.375 10160
Funding need growth 42.562 118.138 -984.519 999.782 10160
Mun. assoc. status 0.468 0.499 0 1 10160
Population 6895.983 28791.314 6.25 1287749.375 10160
Employees 0.187 0.175 0 7.697 10031
Priv. income 17308.891 1890.876 13055.429 28235.133 10160
GDP 21587.731 6345.324 6119.703 79894.067 10160
Left majority 0.307 0.361 0 1 10160
Notes: Cross section derived from balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for the period 1998 to
2013. All variables except numbers of changes and funding need growth correspond to the mean
over the 16-year horizon. Funding need growth (in %) is defined as the growth in funding need
between 1998 and 2006. Number of changes, funding need growth (in %), municipal association
status, population, employees (p.c.) are municipal level variables, GDP, private income (both in
euro p.c.) and left majority at state elections are county level variables while the index of credit
access is a state level variable.
Tables 5.15 and 5.16 in Appendix 5.5 provide summary statistics for the same vari-
ables by state. All variables except for the number of employees are available for all 10,160
municipalities.
Step 4: Positive relationship between credit access and tax rate volatility not
rejected
Econometric model. To estimate the effect of credit access on tax rate volatility, we
use the following model:
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Ci,t = αIs + βXi + δYc + λs + εi (5.1)
where Ci,t is the number of tax rate changes per municipality i between 1998 and
2013. The index t denotes the tax type (business, property or both).
Our independent variable of interest is local credit access, which is measured by the
mean of the credit access index by federal state across time (IS). We aggregate our dataset
into a cross section in order to create the best possible volatility measures based on tax
rates during the full time period. The obvious drawback is that we have to work in a cross
section environment with significantly less observations.
We add a number of controls to account for further confounding factors: Xi and
Yc represent vectors of municipal-level controls (funding need growth (in %), population,
gross outlays (in euro p.c.), employees at place of employment, employees at place of
residence, in-commuters (all three p.c.), gross revenue excluding business and property
taxes, revenue from shared taxes per capita (both in euro p.c.), and municipal association
status) and county-level controls (GDP and income of private households (both in euro
p.c.), left majority at state parliamentary elections), respectively. We calculated the mean
and the standard deviation of all potential controls and tested them in the regressions.
Furthermore, we include state dummies λs. The error term εi is clustered at county level.
Discussion of identification. The main concern with identification lies in the
fact that our analysis is limited to a simple cross section due to the aggregation involved
in investigating volatility over a sufficiently long time period. Aggregation over the full
time horizon greatly reduces the number of observations from 162,560 to 10,160.30 Since
municipal fixed effects cannot be employed, it is essential to account for other covariates
that are potentially related to the volatility of local tax rates, including time-constant
information.
A priori, controlling for population and budgetary variables seems particularly im-
portant. The capacity of municipalities to adjust their tax rates to external requirements
may depend on the size of their population. Fluctuations in population, captured by its
30As an alternative to full aggregation, one might consider splitting the reference period into sub-periods,
thus maintaining a panel data structure. However, data availability limits our reference period to the 16
years between 1998 and 2013. 16 years is a sufficiently long time frame to derive volatility measures, but
eight or even four years is not enough in practice. Given the low incidence of changes in tax rates and
credit access, further limiting the time frame means there is not sufficient variation in the data to identify
the effect of our key variable.
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standard deviation over the covered time period, may also influence tax rate volatility. In
addition, gross outlays per capita are expected to have a significant impact. Due to an
array of tasks mandated by the federal level, municipalities in Germany have only limited
autonomy of decision over their spending. Rising spending pressures might cause frequent
(upward) adjustments in tax rates, which is why we consider funding need growth to be
an important control variable. The concept of funding need growth captures the possi-
bility that states may offset increased local spending responsibilities by allocating more
transfers to municipalities. As defined here, funding need growth will only occur where
spending rises without compensating transfers. Local revenue sources aside from business
and property taxes may also be crucial in the decision to alter tax rates, for instance in
hope of filling rising revenue gaps. Economic strength may also be an important inter-
vening factor. Municipalities that are well-off economically may face less financial distress
and may be in a position where raising tax rates is not necessary. Variables such as GDP
and income of private households, as well as the number of employees and in-commuters,
are meant to capture the economic position. Finally, past research found that the ideo-
logical identity of the government (left- or right-wing) may influence fiscal policy. This is
proxied by an indicator variable for a left majority at the most recent state parliamentary
elections.
The volatility of local tax rates may also differ systematically depending on the in-
stitutional characteristics of the municipalities. Some cities, particularly big ones, enjoy
county status and have additional responsibilities compared with municipalities belonging
to a county. Within the group of county-affiliated municipalities, one can further dif-
ferentiate between municipalities grouped within a municipal association (Amtsgemeinde,
Samtgemeinde or Verbandsgemeinde) and non-associated municipalities, with the latter
facing more responsibilities than the former. All cities with county status are also non-
associated. The regression controls for these administrative differences.
Results and discussion. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show the regression results from the
regression model in Equation 5.1. Columns I to III present the results from a regression
of the number of property tax changes while Columns IV to VI show the results for the
number of business tax changes (both in Table 5.7). To give a complete picture Columns
VII to IX in Table 5.8 pinpoint the results for the sum of tax rates changes of both taxes
(note the coefficients of Table 5.7 sum up to respective ones of Table 5.8, e.g., 0.47891 (I)
+ 0.47217 (IV) = 0.95108 (VII)).
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Table 5.7: Regression results with number of tax changes as dependent vari-
able
Property tax Business tax
I II III IV V VI
Index 0.47891***0.47810***0.44103*** 0.47217***0.47108***0.49288***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.053) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032)
Funding need growth 0.00024* 0.00020 0.00032** 0.00028**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)










Left majority 0.11729 -0.20938
(0.176) (0.158)
Constant 1.29872***1.29070*** 0.81940 0.55293***0.54209*** 0.57354
(0.147) (0.148) (0.501) (0.062) (0.062) (0.385)
Observations 10160 10160 10031 10160 10160 10031
Adjusted R2 .254785 .2550867 .2638504 .1952969 .196146 .2045603
State dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Estimation based on Equation 5.1. Cross section derived from balanced panel of 10,160
municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013. Dependent variable: Number of property (I to III ) and
business (IV to VI ) tax rate changes (municipal level). All independent variables (except for funding
need growth) are averaged over time. Independent variable of interest: Index of credit access (state
level). All specifications control for state dummies. Specification II and V additionally control for
funding need growth (in %). Specification III and VI add municipal association status, population,
employees (p.c.) (municipal level) and private income, GDP (both in euro p.c.) and left majority at
state elections (county level). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by county. Significance
levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
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The first column for each tax (Regressions I, IV and V II) presents baseline results
of a regression of tax rate changes on credit access without any control variables aside from
state dummy variables. In each case, the credit access index is strongly significant with
an estimated coefficient of about .48 and .47 for property and business tax, respectively,
and .95 for both taxes. These results are in line with the graphical analysis presented in
the previous section. Regressions II, V , and V III introduce the most important control
variable: Funding need growth (in %).31
Credit access is still estimated to have a positive, significant impact on the number of
tax rate changes, with the coefficients still ranging between .48 and .47 for the property and
the business tax, respectively, and .95 for both taxes. Introducing funding need growth
hence only has a marginal negative effect (and does not lead to a sign reversal). The
coefficient for funding need growth is statistically significant and positive, but so close to
zero that an economic significance is questionable. The last column (Regressions III, V I
and IX) adds a dummy for the municipal association status, population, the number of
employees at place of employment (p.c.), income of private households and GDP (both in
euro p.c.) and a dummy for a left majority at the most recent state elections. Of these,
only the municipal association status is significant. The introduction of the controls does
not significantly alter the results. Compared to the previous regressions, the estimated
coefficient of credit access dropped slightly to .44 for the property tax and to .93 for both
taxes, but it slightly increased to .49 for the business tax.
These results seem to contradict the existence of countercyclical tax smoothing at
the local level in Germany. Contrary to what one might expect, easy access to credit
is not used by municipalities to limit the frequency of tax rate adjustments. Instead,
credit access and tax rate volatility go hand in hand. One possible explanation lies in
the institutional link between local debt and tax rates established by budget consolidation
plans: Those municipalities that have ample credit access and have been making great
use of it may well be facing severe financial difficulties. Where budget consolidation plans
exist, they may be forced to raise their tax rates in order to ensure approval by the
regulatory authority (see Section 5.2.1). We aimed to account for fiscal pressure that
may lead to financial difficulties by controlling for funding need growth. Nevertheless,
we cannot reject a positive link between credit access and tax rate volatility. This result
31Besides funding need growth we employed an array of other variables related to funding need (mean
value of funding need over 1998-2006, funding need in 1998, average annual growth of funding need between
1998 and 2006). None of the specifications altered the coefficient of the credit access index significantly.
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suggests that credit access may be associated with unsustainable fiscal behavior. Possibly,
municipalities with credit access maintain unsustainable levels of spending, which need to
be financed through higher taxes and liquidity credits.
Table 5.8: Regression results with number of tax changes as dependent vari-
able
VII VIII IX
Index 0.95108*** 0.94918*** 0.93391***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.080)
Funding need growth 0.00056*** 0.00048**
(0.000) (0.000)












Constant 1.85165*** 1.83278*** 1.39295
(0.197) (0.198) (0.814)
Observations 10160 10160 10031
Adjusted R2 .2531876 .2538554 .2627839
State dummies yes yes yes
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Notes: Estimation based on Equation 5.1. Cross section derived from balanced panel of 10,160 mu-
nicipalities for the period 1998 to 2013. Dependent variable: Number of tax rate changes (municipal
level). All independent variables (except for funding need growth) are averaged over time. Inde-
pendent variable of interest: Index of credit access (state level). All specifications control for state
dummies. Specification VIII additionally controls for funding need growth (in %). Specification IX
add municipal association status, population, employees (p.c.) (municipal level) and private income,
GDP (both in euro p.c.) and left majority at state elections (county level). Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by county. Significance levels: ∗ 0.10, ∗∗ 0.05, ∗∗∗ 0.01.
However, there are a number of caveats. First, as evidenced by a low AdjustedR2
between .20 and .26, the regressions leave the bulk of tax rate volatility unexplained. This
is despite a high number of observations.32 Secondly, the applied method of ordinary least
squares estimation in a cross section is particularly vulnerable to omitted variables that
might bias estimated coefficients. Thirdly, credit access only varies at state level, making
reliable identification of its effect more challenging. We are therefore left with interesting
correlations that do not necessarily imply a causal effect. Nonetheless, the econometric
analysis confirms the results of the descriptive analysis: Credit access does not seem to
make a contribution towards smoother tax rates at the local level in Germany.
5.4 Discussion and concluding remarks
The theory of tax smoothing suggests that giving governments access to debt financing
could be welfare enhancing, as allowing governments to smooth their taxes over time can
reduce distortionary costs from taxation. While it is clear from a theoretical viewpoint
that tax smoothing is beneficial, it is unknown whether governments with credit access do
in fact engage in tax smoothing. Political decision-makers might not realize the potential
benefits from tax smoothing and instead take advantage of debt to finance unsustainable
levels of current expenditures. The possible relationship between credit access and tax
smoothing is particularly important where lower level governments enjoy tax autonomy.
The standard fiscal federalism literature objects to granting credit access to lower federal
levels. At the same time, credit rationing might inhibit tax smoothing.
32Given the administrative differences between municipalities in Germany, excluding associated mu-
nicipalities from the sample is a straightforward robustness check. The remaining municipalities are all
non-associated (with or without county status), making the sample more homogeneous, but also smaller.
We ran all regressions presented here using this subsample. The results confirm the existence of a positive
link between credit access and tax rate volatility.
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This paper uses the unique institutional setting of German fiscal federalism to study
the behavior of municipalities in Germany and to test whether credit access is associated
with lower tax rate volatility. Germany is a promising case to study given that munici-
palities enjoy autonomy over property and business tax rates and differ in the degree of
credit access allowed by the respective federal state. To operationalize local credit access,
the institutional environment and empirical level of local indebtedness in each of the 13
territorial states are examined in detail to derive an index of local credit access. We pro-
pose the number of tax rate changes within a 16 year-time frame as a measure of tax rate
volatility. The descriptive and econometric modeling is based on a sample of more than
10,000 municipalities across Germany.
Employing a line of argument based on four steps of data analysis we provide evi-
dence against a contribution of credit access to tax smoothing at the local level. We start
by showing that the development of liquidity credit stocks has not been cyclical (Step 1).
In fact, easier credit access coincides with dramatic increases in local per capita short-term
liquidity credits in some federal states. In Step 2 we pinpoint that tax rate changes are
rather rare in all federal states regardless of credit access. We find no cyclical behavior
involving tax reductions and jumps. Instead, we find a rise in tax rate volatility towards
the end of our time horizon, despite easing credit access. Next, we show graphically that
there is a possible positive relationship between tax rate volatility and credit access. This
contradicts the notion that credit access might induce less volatile tax rates (Step 3). We
suggest spending pressure as a potential explanation. Last, we employ an econometric ap-
proach in which we account for spending pressure (Step 4). However, the empirical results
also suggest a positive link, which would point to an improper use of local debt. Hence,
we cannot reject the positive relationship between credit access and tax rate volatility.
It therefore appears that whether federal states allow their municipalities access to
debt or not has no impact on the stability of their tax rate choices. Local tax rates are
not less volatile in federal states which grant their municipalities ample access to debt.
While local tax rates in Germany are generally rather stable over time, this still gives
cause for concern. Further research will be required to validate this conclusion. If it is
confirmed, important implications follow. If the major theoretical justification for public
debt for consumption expenditures crumbles in practice, there is a case for more credit
rationing, at least at the local level. Otherwise calls for bail-outs become more and more
likely. In Germany, federal states with loose attitudes towards local debt should then
follow the example of states that never expanded local credit access in the first place.
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Making such a change would necessarily require revisiting local spending responsibilities
and the adequacy of state transfers to the local level.
Beyond Germany, the findings of this paper suggest that higher-level governments
should think twice before allowing subnational governments, and local governments in
particular, access to credit to fund current expenditures. Chances are local debt will not
be used in a welfare enhancing way.
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5.5 Appendix
Table 5.9: Wording of current liquidity credit paragraph
Federal states Current wording
Baden-
Württemberg
§ 89 GemO (1) The municipality has to ensure timely settlements of
expenses. (2) To ensure timely settlement of expenses, the municipality
may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget
by-law, provided no other funds are available. The authorization
continues to hold until the budget by-law for the following year is
passed. (3) The liquidity credit ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it exceeds one fifth of
the profit and loss budget’s ordinary expenses.
Bavaria Art. 73 GO (1) To ensure timely settlement of expenses, the
municipality may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the
budget by-law, provided no other funds are available. (2) The ceiling
set in the budget by-law shall not exceed one fifth of the cash-flow
budget’s revenues for current administrative activities and one sixth of
the administrative budget’s revenues, respectively, for the core budget,
and one sixth of the profit plan’s revenues for owner-operated
municipal enterprises.
Brandenburg § 76 BbgKVerf (1) The municipality has to ensure solvency through
appropriate liquidity planning at all times. (2) For the timely
settlement of expenses, the municipality may take out liquidity credits
up to the ceiling set by the municipal council. The decision on the
liquidity credit ceiling is to be reported to the regulatory authority
immediately.
Hesse § 105 HGO (1) For the timely settlement of expenses, the municipality
may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget
by-law, provided no other funds are available. This authorization holds
beyond the current budget year until the announcement of the new
budget by-law. (2) The ceiling set in the budget by-law requires
approval by the regulatory authority.
Lower Saxony § 122 NKomVG (1) For the timely settlement of expenses, the
municipalities may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the
budget by-law, provided no other funds are available. This
authorization holds beyond the current budget year until the entry into
force of the new budget by-law. Sentence 2 also holds for a new ceiling
set in the new budget by-law before its entry into force, provided it
does not exceed the amount specified in paragraph 2. (2) The ceiling
set in the budget by-law requires approval by the regulatory authority
if it exceeds one sixth of the cash-flow budget’s revenues for current
administrative activities.
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Federal states Current wording
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
§ 53 KV M-V (1) The municipality has to ensure solvency at all times.
(2) For the timely settlement of expenses, the municipality may take
out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget by-law and
approved according to paragraph 3, provided no other funds are
available. This authorization holds beyond the current budget year
until the public announcement of the new budget by-law. (3) The
liquidity credit ceiling set in the budget by-law requires approval by the
regulatory authority if it exceeds ten percent of the cash-flow budget’s
current revenues for administrative activites.
North
Rhine-Westphalia
§ 89 GO NRW (1) The municipality has to ensure solvency through
appropriate liquidity planning at all times. (2) For the timely
settlement of expenses, the municipality may take out liquidity credits
up to the ceiling set in the budget by-law, provided no other funds are
available. This authorization holds beyond the current budget year
until the promulgation of the new budget by-law.
Rhineland-
Palatinate
§ 105 GemO (1) The municipality has to ensure solvency at all times.
(2) For the timely settlement of expenses, the municipality may take
out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget by-law, provided
no other funds are available. This authorization holds beyond the
current budget year until the public announcement of the new budget
by-law. (3) § 49 does not apply to the take-up of liquidity credits.
Saarland § 94 KSVG (1) For the timely settlement of expenses, the municipality
may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget
by-law, provided no other funds are available. This authorization holds
beyond the current budget year until the announcement of the new
budget by-law. (2) If, given the budget reorganization plan, it is
apparent that a balanced budget is not possible in the foreseeable
future, the municipality may take out liquidity credits with maturities
beyond the budget year, provided this is economically necessary.
Saxony § 84 SächsGemO (1) The municipality has to ensure timely settlements
of expenses. (2) For the timely settlement of expenses, the municipality
may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget
by-law, provided no other funds are available. The authorization
continues to hold until the budget by-law for the following year is
passed. (3) The liquidity credit ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it exceeds one fifth of
the profit and loss budget’s ordinary expenses.
Saxony-Anhalt § 110 KVG LSA (1) For the timely settlement of expenses, the
municipality may take out credits up to the ceiling set in the budget
by-law, provided no other funds are available. The authorization
continues to hold until the budget by-law for the following year is
passed. (2) The liquidity credit ceiling set in the budget by-law
requires approval by the regulatory authority if it exceeds one fifth of
the cash budget’s revenues for current administrative activities.
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Federal states Current wording
Schleswig-Holstein § 87 GO For the timely settlement of expenses, the municipality may
take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the budget by-law,
provided no other funds are available. This authorization holds beyond
the current budget year until the announcement of the new budget
by-law.
Thuringia § 65 ThürKO (1) For the timely settlement of expenses, the
municipality may take out liquidity credits up to the ceiling set in the
budget by-law, provided no other funds are available. This
authorization holds beyond the current budget year until the
promulgation of the new budget by-law. (2) The ceiling set in the
budget by-law requires approval if 1. the ceiling for the core budget
exceeds one sixth of the administrative budget’s expenses, 2. the
ceiling for owner-operated municipal enterprises or municipal
institutions exceeds one sixth of the profit plan’s revenues.
Notes: Local government laws. Translation by authors.




Brandenburg 24.07.2013 If the budget by-law is passed in violation of the general balanced
budget principle, this constitutes an unlawful act that is to be
objected by the regulatory authority. The obligation for objection is
not applicable if the budget by-law is accompanied by a budget
consolidation plan.
Budget consolidation plans require approval by the regulatory
authority. A consolidation period beyond the financial planning
horizon [five years] is usually not approvable. Exceptions are
possible if the consolidation plan demonstrates exceptional
willingness to consolidate.
Municipalities requiring a budget consolidation plan should set
property and business tax rates at least equal to the weighted
average of tax rates in municipalities of their size range. A
reduction of tax rates is not permissible until a structurally
balanced budget is reached.
22.06.2004 Liquidity credits beyond the credit ceiling will be condoned, though
not formally approved, for municipalities under provisional budget
management if the exceedance is due to irrefutable payment
obligations.
Budget consolidation plans should aim for the fastest possible
restoration of budgetary equilibrium. In justified cases where the
municipality demonstrates an exceptional willingness to consolidate,
consolidation periods beyond the financial planning horizon may be
acceptable.




23.02.2000 If the budget by-law violates the principle of budgetary equilibrium,
the budget is unlawful. In order to avoid objection to this unlawful
act, a budget consolidation plan must be passed at the latest in the
same session as the budget by-law.
The budget consolidation plan must specify the time at which
budget equilibrium of the administrative budget will be restored. In
case more than one year is required, a maximum deficit must be
specified for each year. In the exceptional case that the
consolidation period will be longer than the financial planning
horizon, financial planning must be carried forward until the point
of budget equilibrium.
A budget consolidation period beyond the financial planning
horizon is usually not approvable. Criteria for an exceptional
approval are, amongst others: Property tax rates are set at least
equal to the average tax rates of municipalities in their size range.
Hesse 03.03.2014 There are special reporting requirements by regulatory authorities
on muncipalities that will only achieve budget equilibrium in 2016,
as well as those with liquidity credits beyond 200 euro p.c.
The budget of a municipality with permanent deficits cannot be
approved if the property tax rate is not at least 10% higher than
the average in the respective size range.
When raising business tax rates, possible consequences regarding
jobs etc. are to be considered. The regulatory authority can
therefore refrain from insisting on an adjustment to average tax
rates. In case of permanent deficits, business tax rates below the
standard tax rate of 310% are not acceptable.
In case of rejection of budgets, regulatory authorities must inform
municipalities that they are now operating under provisional budget
management. They must monitor compliance effectively.
06.05.2010 Municipalities with permanent deficits must have tax rates,
particulary for property taxes, that are markedly above average
rates in the respective size range.
03.08.2005 In case of permanent deficits, tax rates for the property and




21.07.2014 In case of permanent and irrefutable deficits, mid-term financing of
the stock of liquidity credits may be justified. Maturities of up to
four years may be agreed for this stock of liquidity credits.
Municipalities without a deficit in the current budget year may also
make use of this arrangement in case they have accumulated past
deficits and a corresponding stock of liquidity credits. Municipalities
making use of this exceptional arrangement must develop a concept
for the medium-term reduction of liquidity credits.




29.01.2008 In case of permanent deficits and approved liquidity credits, it is
justifiable that municipalities take out the irrefutable stock of
liquidity credits with a credit period of up to four years if this is
more economical. This also applies to municipalities without a
deficit in the current budget year if they have an irrefutable stock of
liquidity credits due to past deficits.
24.01.2003 Failure to achieve a balanced budget must be justified towards the
regulatory authority, including by a budget consolidation plan.
Such budgets are to be regarded as lawful even if they are in deficit.
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
10.01.2007 Liquidity credit ceilings beyond the approval threshold should only
be approved within tight limits and only after submission of a
substantive liquidity preview. For municipalities in financial
difficulties, further liquidity credits should only be approved within
strict limits. Regular reports by the applicant on the prospective




16.12.2014 The local government law does not specify maturities for liquidity
credits. Municipalities have to agree on maturities of liquidity
credits with creditors on their own authority. Municipalities may
pass interest agreements for a part of its total stock of liquidity
credits according to the following rules: For half of its total stock
interest agreements may have maturities of up to ten years. For a
further quarter of its total stock interest agreements may have
maturities of up to five years. Interest agreements of more than five
years require consultation with the competent regulatory authority.
06.05.2011 The local government law does not specify maturities for liquidity
credits. Municipalities have to agree on maturities of liquidity
credits with creditors on their own authority. Municipalities may
pass interest agreements for a part of its total stock of liquidity
credits according to the following rules: For half of its total stock
interest agreements may have maturities of up to ten years. For a
further quarter of its total stock interest agreements may have
maturities of up to five years. Interest agreements of more than five
years require consultation with the competent regulatory authority.
9.10.2006 The local government law does not specify maturities for liquidity
credits. Municipalities have to agree on maturities of liquidity
credits with creditors on their own authority. Interest agreement
may not exceed five years. Interest agreements of more than three
and up to five years require consultation with the competent
regulatory authority.
05.01.2006 The current rules for the approval of budget consolidation plans,
according to which business and property tax rates should be
markedly above average rates in the respective size range, were not
intended to trigger an upward spiral of tax rates. In the future, tax
rates equal to the average are sufficient. Tax rates may only be
lowered when budget equilibrium has been achieved.




30.08.2004 It is justifiable for municipalities to have a permanent stock of
liquidity credits of up to 50% of average yearly liquidity credits.
04.06.2003 Municipalities without an approved budget consolidation plan have
to report the amount of liquidity credits to the regulatory authority
quarterly. If the liquidity credits exceed a third of gross revenues in
the administrative budget, they have to submit a liquidity plan to




26.09.2008 It has been considered acceptable for municipalities with permanent
deficits to have a stock of liquidity credits, and to have liquidity
credits with maturities of three to four years for the minimum
stock. Now it is considered acceptable for regulatory authorities to
allow maturities of five years if liquidity credits are needed to ensure
solvency in the face of permanent deficits.
Saxony 14.12.2007 If the budget cannot be balanced in the foreseeable future, the rules
of provisional budget management apply. Additionally, a budget
consolidation plan must be passed specifying the feasible
consolidation potentioal.
The approval of credit ceilings beyond the approval threshold may
be subject to conditions.
Municipalities under provisional budget management may take out
liquidity credits to fund permissible expenses. The municipality has
to announce the take-out to the municipal council and the
regulatory authority two weeks in advance for assessment.
Liquidity credits must not exceed the ceiling set in the budget
by-law at any time.
Schleswig-
Holstein
31.03.2006 In case of permanent stocks of liquidity credits, it may be more
economical to fund this stock with medium-term as opposed to
short-term credits. It is therefore acceptable for municipalities with
medium-term permanent deficits to take out liquidity credits with
maturities up to the end of the financial programming period if this
appears more economical.
Thuringia 09.07.2012 Municipalities operating under a budget consolidation plan must
keep daily records of liquidity credits. Such municipalities must levy
property and business taxes at at least the weighted average of tax
rates in their size range.
Notes: Circular decrees and offical government statements. Selective summary and translation by
authors.
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Table 5.11: Number of municipalities with property tax rate changes, 1998-
2013



























































Baden-Württemberg 109 366 540 41 222 571 258 5
Bavaria 842 768 433 7 993 689 363 5
Brandenburg 12 26 18 2 31 18 9 0
Hesse 28 93 268 32 68 148 200 5
Lower Saxony 39 234 662 50 61 269 606 49
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 128 236 206 4 196 218 147 13
North Rhine-Westphalia 0 18 296 82 4 55 312 25
Rhineland-Palatinate 53 230 1907 82 314 980 968 10
Saarland 5 22 21 3 1 3 41 6
Saxony 14 55 185 36 56 87 136 11
Saxony-Anhalt 17 20 83 41 26 21 69 45
Schleswig-Holstein 126 265 572 107 151 383 507 29
Thuringia 69 445 256 6 55 447 268 6
Total 1442 2778 5447 493 2178 3889 3884 209
Notes: Number of municipalities with property tax rate changes of business tax rate calculated for
the balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for the period 1998 to 2013. See Table 5.12 for details









Table 5.12: Panel structure by state
Federal states 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 N in all years
Baden-Württemberg 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.6 1.0 96.0 17600
Bavaria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 32896
Brandenburg 2.1 0.2 13.2 9.7 23.2 1.3 0.7 0.6 2.7 5.6 7.6 2.9 1.1 3.5 16.5 9.1 10425
Hesse 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 99.1 6797
Lower Saxony 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 1.1 96.8 16304
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.8 5.0 1.7 0.2 1.7 1.2 4.1 2.7 5.3 3.9 4.5 67.6 13795
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 6336
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 99.8 36887
Saarland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 98.2 831
Saxony 2.9 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.9 1.7 0.8 1.3 3.7 5.0 24.0 56.8 8173
Saxony-Anhalt 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.0 1.7 3.5 3.3 0.8 1.4 1.2 13.8 53.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 17.9 14537
Schleswig-Holstein 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 97.9 17966
Thuringia 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.5 1.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 2.8 3.9 3.3 84.3 15566
Total 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.7 1.5 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.8 4.4 1.1 1.0 2.7 83.0 198113
Notes: Panel structure of unbalanced panel by federal state.
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Notes: Number of observation by state for the balanced panel.
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1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . . 0 0
3.2 . . . . . . . 1 . . . . 1 1 . .
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bavaria
1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 0 . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . .
3.2 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brandenburg
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . .
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hesse
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0
1.2 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .







































3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . .
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1
Lower Saxony
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Rhine-Westphalia
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 . . . . . . .5 .5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . . . .
3.3 . . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1
Rhineland-Palatinate
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .







































1.3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . .
3.3 . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Saarland
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . .
1.3 . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 1 1 1 . . . . . . . 1 . . . . .
3.3 . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 . 2 2 2 2 2
4 . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Saxony
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 . . 0 0 . . . . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.2 1 1 . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . .
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Saxony-Anhalt
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .








































1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . . . . .
1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.1 0 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thuringia
1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Notes: Component 1.1 equals 0 if the local government law contains an unconditional approval clause
or an upper limit for liquidity credit ceilings and missing (.) otherwise. Component 1.2 equals 1
point if the local government law contains a conditional approval clause for liquidity credit ceilings
and missing (.) otherwise. Component 1.3 equals 2 if the local government law contains no approval
clause for liquidity credit ceilings and missing (.) otherwise. Component 2 amounts to up to 1 point
if circular decrees are in force which expand credit access beyond what is suggested by the letter
of the law and missing (.) otherwise. Component 3.1 equals 0 if the aggregate stock of municipal
liquidity credits per person is below the 15th percentile (14,8 euros per person) of all territorial
states and missing (.) otherwise. Component 3.2 equals 1 if the aggregate stock of municipal
liquidity credits per person is above the 15th percentile and below 85th percentile (544 euros per
person) of all territorial states and missing (.) otherwise. Component 3.3 equals 2 if the aggregate
stock of municipal liquidity credits per person is above the 85th percentile of all territorial states
and missing (.) otherwise. Component 4 equals 1 point if more than one third of municipalities have
a liquidity credit stock of more than 544 euros per person and missing (.) otherwise.
Chapter 5 Empirical Essays on Fiscal Federalism 199
Table 5.15: Summary statistics by state
Federal state Statistics Number of changes Mean of Funding need
PT BT BT and PT access index growth
Baden-Württemberg Mean 1.87 1.11 2.98 1.19 37.76
Std. Dev 1.28 0.85 1.86 0.00 65.17
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.19 -154.83
Max. 7.00 7.00 14.00 1.19 975.61
N 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056
Bavaria Mean 0.89 0.75 1.64 0.88 -2.82
Std. Dev 0.96 0.90 1.64 0.00 58.45
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 -342.33
Max. 6.00 7.00 9.00 0.88 725.78
N 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050.
Brandenburg Mean 1.47 0.72 2.19 2.88 30.52
Std. Dev. 1.27 1.01 1.91 0.00 61.63
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.88 -203.07
Max. 5.00 4.00 8.00 2.88 238.79
N 58 58 58 58 58
Hesse Mean 2.38 1.59 3.96 3.00 46.86
Std. Dev. 1.39 1.14 2.09 0.00 58.42
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 -172.70
Max. 7.00 7.00 12.00 3.00 374.00
N 421 421 421 421 421
Lower Mean 2.32 2.12 4.45 2.38 48.50
Saxony Std. Dev. 1.30 1.26 2.31 0.00 87.57
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.38 -376.93
Max. 8.00 7.00 15.00 2.38 972.60
N 985 985 985 985 985
Mecklenburg- Mean 1.32 1.15 2.47 1.88 53.34
Vorpommern Std. Dev. 1.08 1.20 2.01 0.00 131.11
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.88 -642.64
Max. 7.00 7.00 13.00 1.88 989.75
N 574 574 574 574 574
North Rhine- Mean 3.39 2.62 6.01 4.38 48.56
Westphalia Std. Dev. 1.43 1.20 2.36 0.00 40.97
Min. 1.00 0.00 1.00 4.38 -22.56
Max. 9.00 8.00 17.00 4.38 365.52
N 396 396 396 396 396
Rhineland- Mean 2.54 1.44 3.98 3.81 58.89
Palatinate Std. Dev. 1.07 0.94 1.69 0.00 126.53
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Federal state Statistics Number of changes Mean of Funding need
PT BT BT and PT access index growth
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.81 -891.83
Max. 8.00 6.00 13.00 3.81 910.74
N 2272 2272 2272 2272 2272
Saarland Mean 1.78 3.04 4.82 3.94 92.00
Std. Dev. 1.40 1.25 2.15 0.00 103.72
Min. 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.94 -44.75
Max. 7.00 6.00 10.00 3.94 431.03
N 51 51 51 51 51
Saxony Mean 2.67 1.77 4.44 1.50 42.71
Std. Dev. 1.58 1.48 2.66 0.00 97.39
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.50 -85.44
Max. 11.00 8.00 18.00 1.50 940.92
N 290 290 290 290 290
Saxony- Mean 3.33 3.20 6.53 2.56 81.02
Anhalt Std. Dev. 2.28 2.58 4.50 0.00 126.54
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.56 -441.45
Max. 10.00 11.00 21.00 2.56 833.36
N 161 161 161 161 161
Schleswig- Mean 2.23 1.73 3.96 2.19 84.59
Holstein Std. Dev. 1.59 1.25 2.64 0.00 166.22
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.19 -984.52
Max. 7.00 6.00 12.00 2.19 999.78
N 1070 1070 1070 1070 1070
Thuringia Mean 1.37 1.43 2.80 1.88 31.94
Std. Dev. 0.86 0.90 1.61 0.00 201.72
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.88 -837.95
Max. 6.00 6.00 12.00 1.88 974.03
N 776 776 776 776 776
Total Mean 1.96 1.44 3.40 2.28 42.56
Std. Dev. 1.41 1.21 2.37 1.14 118.14
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 -984.52
Max. 11.00 11.00 21.00 4.38 999.78
N 10160 10160 10160 10160 10160
Notes: Cross section derived from balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for the period 1998 to
2013. Index of credit access corresponds to the mean over the 16-year horizon. Funding need growth
(in %) is defined as the growth in funding need between 1998 and 2006. Number of changes and
funding need growth are municipal level variables while the index of credit access is a state level
variable.
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Table 5.16: Summary statistics by state






Baden- Mean 1.00 9941.35 0.24 19056.92 27137.46 0.01
Württemberg Std. Dev. 0.00 26404.72 0.14 986.72 4070.35 0.07
Min. 1.00 170.00 0.01 16761.07 20654.13 0.00
Max. 1.00 594457.69 1.09 26845.67 56478.33 0.62
N 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056
Bavaria Mean 1.00 6056.91 0.21 18251.39 24723.27 0.01
Std. Dev. 0.00 32065.60 0.16 1817.73 8300.74 0.06
Min. 1.00 232.19 0.01 15518.73 16508.47 0.00
Max. 1.00 1.29e+06 1.84 28235.13 79894.07 0.31
N 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050 2050
Brandenburg Mean 0.66 11501.12 0.24 15216.02 18248.92 1.00
Std. Dev. 0.48 12811.81 0.15 810.17 2770.97 0.00
Min. 0.00 537.81 0.01 13775.47 14436.60 1.00
Max. 1.00 65117.38 0.63 16822.00 28046.27 1.00
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
Hesse Mean 1.00 14326.22 0.22 18176.74 25212.67 0.23
Std. Dev. 0.00 37715.47 0.14 1730.46 5724.32 0.29
Min. 1.00 679.06 0.05 16015.93 19299.13 0.00
Max. 1.00 660622.06 1.40 25293.80 74934.33 1.00
N 421 421 421 421 421 421
Lower Mean 0.28 7359.12 0.17 17011.27 20883.16 0.31
Saxony Std. Dev. 0.45 15905.72 0.13 1203.93 4417.90 0.18
Min. 0.00 314.19 0.01 14966.60 14517.80 0.00
Max. 1.00 246477.81 0.91 20986.87 76327.27 1.00
N 985 985 985 985 985 985
Mecklenburg- Mean 0.06 2577.40 0.19 14014.18 15932.03 0.59
Vorpommern Std. Dev. 0.24 10718.81 0.15 525.94 1596.47 0.36
Min. 0.00 124.25 0.00 13055.43 14123.58 0.19
Max. 1.00 201322.19 1.00 14893.60 28901.20 1.00
N 574 574 568 574 574 574
North Rhine- Mean 1.00 45292.18 0.26 18702.23 24064.24 0.34
Westphalia Std. Dev. 0.00 87117.45 0.09 1593.17 4446.20 0.36
Min. 1.00 4220.19 0.06 15109.40 16622.87 0.00
Max. 1.00 987816.88 0.61 23023.87 64717.87 1.00
N 396 396 396 396 396 396
Rhineland- Mean 0.02 1767.11 0.13 17485.10 20209.04 0.74
Palatinate Std. Dev. 0.14 7597.48 0.16 921.43 3447.34 0.33
Min. 0.00 8.00 0.00 15634.53 12548.73 0.00






Max. 1.00 192906.06 1.94 20931.13 57722.07 1.00
N 2272 2272 2180 2272 2272 2272
Saarland Mean 1.00 16901.06 0.24 17579.70 24651.89 0.12
Std. Dev. 0.00 9953.28 0.15 2324.96 5017.17 0.19
Min. 1.00 6407.94 0.04 15263.53 19034.07 0.00
Max. 1.00 49003.63 0.67 22502.47 32668.40 0.47
N 51 51 51 51 51 51
Saxony Mean 0.50 10106.45 0.25 14796.39 6944.61 0.00
Std. Dev. 0.50 43911.73 0.12 441.15 1219.15 0.00
Min. 0.00 412.00 0.05 14070.50 6119.70 0.00
Max. 1.00 504054.63 0.82 15741.33 22167.83 0.00
N 290 290 290 290 290 290
Saxony- Mean 0.44 7338.16 0.25 16130.09 20045.84 0.25
Anhalt Std. Dev. 0.50 9589.40 0.15 518.85 2565.91 0.00
Min. 0.00 569.19 0.03 15363.67 16259.33 0.25
Max. 1.00 47484.38 0.91 17041.50 25971.17 0.25
N 161 161 161 161 161 161
Schleswig- Mean 0.07 2555.09 0.14 17514.71 21918.22 0.37
Holstein Std. Dev. 0.26 11275.65 0.27 1213.23 3420.02 0.06
Min. 0.00 6.25 0.00 15145.67 15213.33 0.36
Max. 1.00 236321.94 7.70 21071.07 35782.73 1.00
N 1070 1070 1060 1070 1070 1070
Thuringia Mean 0.11 2658.63 0.20 14595.69 17020.85 0.03
Std. Dev. 0.32 10355.50 0.21 481.05 1465.65 0.10
Min. 0.00 42.38 0.00 13462.27 15074.00 0.00
Max. 1.00 202767.94 2.18 16703.47 28488.20 0.67
N 776 776 755 776 776 776
Total Mean 0.47 6895.98 0.19 17308.89 21587.73 0.31
Std. Dev. 0.50 28791.31 0.18 1890.88 6345.32 0.36
Min. 0.00 6.25 0.00 13055.43 6119.70 0.00
Max. 1.00 1.29e+06 7.70 28235.13 79894.07 1.00
N 10160 10160 10031 10160 10160 10160
Notes: Cross section derived from balanced panel of 10,160 municipalities for the period 1998 to
2013. All variables correspond to the mean over the 16-year horizon. Municipal association status,
population, employees (in p.c.) are municipal level variables, GDP, private income (both in euro
p.c.) and left majority at state elections are county level variables.
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